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iI_ - SEC?ION 1 -
I, INTRODUCTION
" £ I
Jr _ !
B,
_J 1.0 INTRODUCTION:
_'_ .- A management syst_ns study for future spacesuit
_[ _ programs was conducted by ILC Dover, a division of ILC
_! Industries, Inc., during the calendar period of December 17, 1973,
i through April 30, 1974, in response to SA 606S (Schedule IV)
r_ contract NAS 9-6100, issued by NASA Johnson Spacecrafti
I_- Center (JSC). This study included the investigation of
S
_. past suit program requirements and management systems in
_[_ addition to new and modified systems in order to identify
[_ -the most cost effective methods for use during future
: spacesuit programs. This report highlights the effort and
-its findings. °_
Past space suit programs have required the contractor
to comply with the overall NASA program requirements of
_ NPC 200-2, NPC 250-1, and NPC 500-I_ These requirements
encompassed development and production of all hardware
%.
r_ ranging from crew protective gear to total launch vehicles,
i_ yet each class of hardware was unique in design, development,
testing manufacturing and inspection criteria. The complexity
of these requirements necessitated significant contractor _
staffs for program compliance. Inevitably, extraneous and
i_ redundant_ areas of documentation, data and program management
control were generated. The identification of a set of
r -
requirements specifically tailored to the space suit is
considered essential to achieve significant cost reductions.
!: It is recognized, however, that the establishment of
a complete set of specialized program requirements and
associated systems for future spacesuit programs would be
expensive. As a result, this study has investigated al£ernate
approaches in order to determine the least costly method
of control, both from an implementation and operational %
standpoint. !
Past spacesuit programs have been extremely dynamic
• with the emphasis concentrated on mission assurance. Systems
were increasingly more complex and expensive to develop
" and maintain with the advent of each new program. Future '_
programs will require fewer controls and redundant checks
_. and balances. To fully realize the inherent reduction of
-2- _ ;
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I " overall program costs, without compromising end item integrity, :(2_ b_
the management systems for these future programs must be
_ structured accordingly. This report investigated several i
major management systems used during the past Apollo, Skylab,
_ and ASTP spacesuit programs. Topics to be discussed _ithin :
' this report include: "-
(-, a. Significant Conclusions - Section II: This) I
I_ section summarizes the important conclusions
[. . and recommendations resultii_g from the study. A
I_ detailed explanation of these conclusions is i _i
_ _ _- contained in the applicable portion of Sections
[" III through VI.
b. Program Management Engineerina. and Quality - _
I_ Sections III through V: This section discusses
the various difficulties experienced with the
_i I" systems and procedures that controlled the
_ (: inter-relation of these groups. Recommendations
or guidelines for future spacesuit programs are
' also included
c. Organization and Cost Summary - Section VI: This
[_ section discusses the recommendations for a
future space suit program organization and ;
_ forecasts the Cost savings.
i2 :'
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I ii. 3 STUDY GROUNDRULES :
(i_ The following items include the basic ground rules
used to establish the guidel_aes or recommendations discussed
I h in Sections II and III through VI:
a. The ILC Management Systems in effect during the
ATLB Program were used as study baseline, i
b. Cost Savings are identified in terms of reduced
man months (by skills) to perform similar efforts
_, on future programs_ !
c. Recommendations are presente_ as guidelines for "future programs.
,_ d. Proposed guidelines are based on state-of-the-art s
advancements in suit designs expected to be
used on future programs.
I_ e. delivery to one (i) spaceThe rate is assumed be
suit every 20 working day@.
i
[_ f.- On future programs, only one (I) cycle Qual is
assumed to be performed using the worst case
_ [[ projected mission(s) through the life of the CEI.
_ | g. The requirements of NHB 5300.4 will be applicable
, to future program quality systems.
h. Minimal change activity and minimal depot flight
f
support will be required for future suit programS.
i " t
_ I""_ '
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I. 4 STUDY APPROACH :
,- At the conclusion of the Apollo, Skylab a',d ASTP
J
_ (" Suit Contract, NAS 9-6100, key personnel from each of th_
_-_ major functional groups were formed as a study team. The
I [. team consisted of representatives from Program Management,
Engineering, CMO, Quality and the Business Management
i i i_ groups. Each of the participants was thoroughly familiar :
I with the history and scope of systems utilized by his
i [" respective groups. A list of specific study tasks centered
, " around known problem areas were identified as the starting
{ _ base. Items within this list were assigned priorities in _
I_ accordance with theil potential dollar savinus. Second level •
_ priorities were established to insure that at least two
i areas within each descipline were selected for the final i
list. The list was reduced to 13 specific tasks divided
'_ " among the five function. 1 areas as follows:
! _ Program Management !includes CMO, Business Management
_i I" and Program Control).
Manufacturing Documentation and Control Systems :
I_( Improved Configuration Management/Control Methods
[_ Government/Contractor Management Reports
{ Program Phasing Philosophy
_ I_ Astronaut Field Option Item Control
Business Management System
[! Engineering
Interface Control Documentation
Contract End Item Specifications
Field Operational Documentation
II: QualityTraceability
Iii Inspection and In-Process Verification
• Organization
The initial effort of each task consisted of defining
the baseline system (Apollo/Skylab A7LB Mc4ei Suit) and
identifying any cost related problems associated with the _
_ baseline system. Flowcharts, standard operating procedures, _4
(" organization charts, and other pertinent documentation were li
1975005463-010
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used to support this phase. Each individual problem was
r
_, then analyzed to identify alternate means of optimization.
_"" Advantages and disadvantages of each were identified, surveys
were made to measure effectiveness of each alternate, and
team meetings were used to resolve final selections.
E Guidelines for futur_ programs were presented for each
identified problem area. When implementation of
proposed guidelines were in violation of known NASA program _
requirements, these were identified, and proposed requirements }_
, . deviations were presented. In several cases, the study
I_ revealed that some ILC baseline systems did not completely _S
- comply with NASA program requirer nts. These were also
:2
identified and where their retention was proposed, supporting
evidence of their advantages were given. _
I_ Cost effectiveness was measured in each functional
group by comparing a baseline organization (A7LB) to a
,i
proposed future organization having.implemented the suggested
guidelines. The individual proposed functional organizations
_. were then combined into a total program organization.
E
?&
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- SECTION II -
SIGNIFICANT CONCLUSIONS
*
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2.0 SIGNIFICANT CONCLUSIONS:
!
,4 NiDe (9) major conclusions or guidelines resulted at
the completion of this study. Additional auidelines are
[ also discussed within each of the subsequent sections of this
: report. These guidelines, if used on future spacesuit
_ programs will result in a major program cost savings.
The major guidelines resulting from this study include:
a. Place emphasis on the qualification of subassemblies
rather than the entire spacesuit assembly.
. b. FACI the first production item rather ttlan t_e
__, qualification item. ;
, c. Qualify to the CEI worst case mission requirements
i ii the first time.d. Reduce the drawing requirements by using
manufacturing instructions for configuration
control. _
e. Increase component and subassembly acceptance
testing to reduce 100% in-process inspection,
} [_ f. Allocatesufficient time early in program tor
i L develop efficient systems and procedures.
i g. Perform astronaut fit checks at user's s_te.
[ -- h, Streamline the data reporting requirements and
centralize the data collection system.
i. Consolidate control functions.program management
• Potential cost savings in each study area were reflected
• _ in terms of reduced manpower required to operate th_ respective
areas with the new guidelines implemented. These individual _
<
|' groups were then combined into a total program organization. :_
L A measure of total potential savings was obtained by comparing
, this new organization with the one in effect at ILC during
i the ATLB program. This total potential saving amounted to
1565 man months.['j In retrospect, this study stresses the importance
" of allotting sufficient time e_rly in a program to develop
[i and verify efficient and compatibiemanagement systems.
_ _ Many cost saving in_ovations to ILC systems were developed _
[_ and implemented during the Apollo/Skylab programs. _he
[
k
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_ i [" fact that the contract ended in an inderrun" condition !
: [ _" bears tribute to NASA and II.C cost saving efforts. However,
I, i- during the program, both NASA an_ ILC became aware of areas
![:[_ that had a potential for being made more cost effective.
_ Several of the conditions discussed in this report are in
!i E this category. In the early phases of the program, the
_ limited nmnber of perso**.lel that were technica].ly qualified
: to analyze and modify the systems were deeply involved in
technical and production activities. In the later phases
k: _. _f: the program, when qualified m_npower was available, a li_
_i_ _ - co_it_ent to _odify _ -exis_.ng manageme:_'-syst _ woult_ have il
_ _ [_ _ resulted in a more costly program impact _an to continue with
i'_:l the proven operational systems. On future programs, new i[_
il :I _ management systems must be analyzed for cost effectf>eness
_" early in the program and existing, proven systems must be ]
"; i J "
• 1
. 2.c '
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3.1 _LANUFACTURING/PROGR2hM DOCUMENTATION CONTROL[,'- OBJECTIVE:"
k_,
To evaluate the possibi]$ty of reducing program costs
L by elimination of unnecessary drawings and redundant
documentation related to the fabrication and control of
Contract End Item_ (CEI).
L
Identify all drawings and documentation utilized infabricating the A7LB Spacesuit Assembly. Eval'Jate the
r " redundancies within the existing documentation and investigate
L the requirement for possible consolidation of the remaining I_
s data. Develop a .sample system which could be implemented on Ii
. future space suit programs and estimate the cost savings
which could be realized. [<
E I
Ix
PROBLEM : . |
Contract NAS 9-6100 required generation of drawings
P per specification MIL-D-1000, Type E, Form B, which in many!
_ cases was superfluous to the table-of operations (TO's).
[ BACKGROUND: .....
_: [ " Federal Sepcification MIL-D-1000, Type E, Form B,
states, "Engineering drawings in this category shall provide
i. the necessary design, engineering, manufacturing and quality
support information directly or by reference to enable the '_
li procurement, without additional design activity of an item
_* that duplicates the physical and performance characteristics _!
: [" Of the original design." As a result of this requirement,
drawings of all assemblies, sub-assemblies and comPonent
_ [' parts of the CEI were prepared. This stipulation caused the
L generation and st_bsequent updating of 5,2_0 drawings. 185 }
i drawings were actually required to fabricate an A7LB space. suit a sembly. The remaining drawings were utilized only _
as a *configuration control vehicle (See Appendix "A") and
li _ U"_ were prepared to meet the requirements of MIL-D-IO00.
; i It was determined very early in the program that
' [_ manufacturing personnel could not reliabiy use softgoods •
_ _ q drawings to manufacture softgoods items. Drawings which _
_ F contained all the detail needed for engineering definition were
_ i i? -12-
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so complex and unwieldly that operational personnel could
. . not understand or use them. To resolve this problem, a
Table of Operations (TO's) was prepared for each major sub-
I assembly and assembly. The TO contained all the instructions
necessary for the fabrication, inspection and traceability
requirements of the CEI. The TO consisted of manufacturing 7
?
instructions and Fabrication Inspection Route Sheets (FIRS). ?
_he Manufacturing instructionsoremained in the Production
L_ area and did not reference any information such as part
•
. numbers, sizing information, inspection requirements, etc. !
The FIRS package, which consisted of approximately 800 pages,
; " was the portion of the TO which contained this information.
• . /
-, Early in the program _,e TO's and drawings were _
released for the first CEI (FACI baseline). A dynamic i _
program was encountered as far as configuration changes were
concerned, and a dual change control procedure was required - _
one for the TO's and one for the drawings (see Figure 3.1.i). _
Any Class I and II changes to one system caused a change in
the other. Since different documentation procedures were
[i_-_ . used by each system, two sets of paper had to be prepared
_ for new designs or changes to existing designs. The TO system
was developed through several iterations. These improvements
to the system gradually caused the drawings to become
I_ increasingly'redundant to the TO system. However, the to£al
!
-_ system drawings and TO's were in existence and being utilized :%
f_ not only at field sites but by other contractors. This
L situation was allowed to continue as a result of a cost
_i trade-off study which indicated it would be less costly to
maintain the inefficiencies rather than implementing a new
system.
_ Upon receipt of a Contract Change Authority (CCA), a
design resolution between NASA and the contractor was
: achieved and a Change Action Request Notice (CARN) was
. >
_ • released to authorize revision of the TO's. TO's were !_
_ classified as Type III documentation and as such did not
_ require the customer's approval. This system permi%ted the( -Suit Contractor to make ohan_es to the TO's without awaiting _
97500543-0 7
NASA formal _:pp_-oval of the associated ECO/drawing. This
i_ ,_'| process allowed the contractor to p]:oce_'d with incol-poration
[ .... of the design change on items in production as soon as was
-i practical to preclude progra_n delays and additional rework
_. o retrofit costs. Co1_cur ent with t_is effort, a formal
:" Engineering Change Ord r (ECO) was being generated to revise
the drawings. The formal ECO generally followed the eARN '
by approximate.ly three weeks because of the document-ation I
' r-: i
[ and approval requirements of MIL-D-1000 and NPC 500-1. I
_ _ RECOMMENDED GUIDELINES __'ORFUTURE PROGRAMS:
"_ F It is recorr_nended that the requirements of MIL-D-1000,
._t_ Type E, Form 3 be revised in future Space Suit Contracts to
'_'" reference the Table of Operations (TO's) on the major suit
.-_ "assembly drawings and delete the requirement for soft goods
sub-assembly draftings. This will eliminate the need to
_ prepare drawings which cannot be used to manufacture and
:? assemble the suit soft goods equipment (patterns and TO's
:[: used) and are only needed to satisfy the requirements of
! . MIL-D-1000. This approach will require that the Suit Con'tractor's
Table of Operations (TO's) be used as Type I documentation
-' requiring government approval of revisions and changes.
_ I_ Additional recommendations are discussed in Section 3.2 oft
_ this report.
f_ The drawing list for the A7LB Space Suit (Appendix "A")
indicates which drawings by size c0uld be deleted. TheU
savings for the preparation of these drawings would be
: _, as follows :
•_ _- Hours ,
I. -- Drafting 21,274
Mission Support 7,090
:_ TOTAL 28,364 blan flours
_: This total savings does not reflect the man l_ours
_I". spent in the updating of the unnecessary drawings.
._.:_ L_ During the period of September 1969 to-September 1970,
_ {'_ 210 EC0|s were processed to revise 525 draftings . Assuming
K
_ _ 50% of these changes affected drawings wl_ich could De
t
• deleted, a savings of 4,192 man hours cou._d result.
/
; "-I4-L
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PROBLEM:
i" [ Various documentation was generated to verify the •'-.._' configuration of the Contract End Item and to control
_ [" " subsequent engineering changes. Tilis was performed byL
several different individuals and was not reviewed for possible .
consolidation of duplicated data. i[ -BACKGROUND: ; ;
During the early stages of the Apollo Program, formats[ ,for various documentation were generated with the emphasis
. placed on controlling the configuration and traceability for '
the manufacture of the FACI baseline space suit assembly.
As the program became operational, additional requirements
E were encountered; such as: retrofit status reports, )
dash number progression charts, retrofit kit deliveries, etc. '_ _
New documents were generated and perpetuated by various _
E departments without considering utiiizing or modifying existing _ :
! i
-. reports which were being generated by other departments.
_. Once this situation developed, it continued through the ! :
Apollo Program. At the end of the Apollo/Skylah Program, _[i:,. Zover 50 different CMO associated documents were being • _
• . . . , . .
, prepared. _
' In addition, this system also required initiation _ :
• of shop orders and compiling of traceability and inspection
; [i records on various form_ts. For each CEI, this meant th e i
4 processing , duplication and accumulation of thousands of :
additional sheets of paper.. Even with this mass of
_ [i documentation, the system did not, other than at original _
release, verify that the operator was using the latest! •
IL revision of the TO's. As _ result, equipment _ould have ,
been manufactured and assembled from obsolete manufacturing
instructions and the error gone undetected until the •_
°
completion of equipment inspection per the FIRS. <
[i RECOMMENDED GUIDELINE FOR FUTUR_ ,ROGRAMS:,,, ,,, , , _
• Determine as early in the program as is practical ,
I [ii which information will be required when the program becomes )- operational. This information should be funneled to a group
_ which has been delegated authority for all the data :
1975005463-0] 9
r_
r': collection and dissemination. A system could then be[ designed taking all control infoz]nation into consideration.
i _ In addition, all requirements, for additional information
i I- should be requested through this group to insure optimization ,"
. of data dissemination. Additional recommendations are
i I" discussed in Section 3.2 of this report.
, J"
" ii[i -16-
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_ _ 3.2 IMPROVED CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT/CONTROL SYSTEMS
_ I["._-._ OBJECTIVE:
, [ - Propose an Authorized Configuration and Traceability ;
_ [" System which would consolidate manufacturing, Product
_ i _ Assurance, Program Control and CMO data. :_
APPROACH:
A review of the data requirements of each of the
departments was performed. A goal was established to
_ _ consolidate the following data on a minimum number of
_ ! i.. . formats: _
[_ As-designed vs. As-built Authorized Configuration
Classification _
Qualification Status
_ I]. Interchangeability . . ).
Bills of Materials .
5 _ Softgoods Sub-Assembly Drawings i _._Modification Kit Status
Traceability
[] Delivery Schedule
INTRODUCTION :
_ . At the outset of the Apollo program, the configuration _
controls established were based on a total Pressure Garment
. Assembly concept, that is an ITLSA, EV Glcves, IV Gloves,
_ _" Suit Instrumentation, Lunar Boots, and Helmet together
_ ;_[i formed a space suit assembly. The decision to make the
} _ transition to separable component configuration control at
i_ the beginning of A7LB 300 series did simplify existing
i ' methods. This change caused the removal of certain components
, from the top assembly (PGA) drawing and components list.
, !_ Separable components were defined as those items
which collectively comprise a PGA: however, they could be
_ functionally tested and shipped as a separate unit. Although
' the separable component control created more paperwork, its i
Ii_ :_effectiveness was proven at time of shipment and it caused
removal of some details from the top assembly drawing making , i
_ [- it easier to use. _ach of the components were individually _
]975005463-02]
%_- controlled by part number and corresponding assen_._ly drawing.
_ ["
L The ITLSA top d._s<.m:._.]yd1-n,...,ingfo_- example did not reflect
%k
serial numbered effectivities; therefore, a components
" [.. list - a parts list of critical parts and asse_lies, _'
depicting authol-ized and as-built conditions was initiated :
_ to compliment the drawing and Table of Operations (TO's) -.
t :
system. Tlle components list defined the dash number which
?
' _" applied to a given serial numbered suit for each of the ITLSA's. -
!
_-- Other separable component configurations (i.e., helmet,
,)
! r_ gloves, etc.) were controlled by an Authorized Cllange List (ACL)
K and/el" _D250 identification of the drawing. The ACL identified
the components authorized part number and "as built" _.__/_ :
|! condition along with a description of each applicable Engineering
Change Order. This required ILC configuration management,
" [' Quality Assurance, and NASA verification inspection at the ;/
• time of initial shipment. In other words, the space suit
[_ contractor had a mixture of several different types of[
authoritative configuration and engineering data cont_.-olling
I" the configurations of various components of which each had
, [ its own unique rules. Also to further define the configuration
. complexity of the A7LB suit program, there were two distinct
. categories of ITLSA's; the A7LB 300 and A7LB 600 series :
:_ applicable to the Apollo and Skylab programs respectively.
' Both series of suit configurations were based on the same
o,
con%men top assembly drawing. Throughout this A7LB suit
period, twenty-three (23) unique configurations ranging from
dash 01 through dash 23 evolved from approximately seventy-six
( (76) Class I engineering changes. In each case, the same -':
top assembly drawing was affected by either creating a _ew ?.
I _ dash number of modifying existing o_]es . The total number 'i
of Integrated Torso L_mb Suit Assen_blies (ITLSA's) controlled _
by this drawing during the Apollo/Skylab programs was _:I! sixty-seven (671. " -:
This problem is further demonstrated by the earlier
[ Apollo A7L PGA phase whe_'e one hundred and fifteen (i15) _.
_. [. different configurations were created on the same drawing. [
_ than the total number of _._' _ "
; P<,,..] (96) actually manufact_,red. _
I: i
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The statistics referenced in this portion of the study
_ reflect the large volume and pyramid effects upon an
_- assembly drawing resultin% _rom multiple engineering changes.
i The many variations of different configuratons on one drawing
L. not only made it difficult for the drawing user to interpret, :
[" but als_ became a time-consuming task when one had to
[_ "_ differentiate one configuration from another. Atypical
!- - top assembly drawing for the ITLSA consisted of four (4)
L. _'J" sized drawings supplemented with a list of materials
describing one hundred and twenty-two (122) items. This same
drawing was revised approximately fifty-£wo times which
L
included at least one complete redraw. Ntunerous status :_
[" listings and matrices also evolved with each engineering
drawing change. (Reference Government-Contractor Management
" [_ Reports Section). These same listings in most cases
,. _" attempted to serve as drawing abstracts. The end results
:, _ _were always the same with each change . . . a mountain of _
L paper and complicated engineering drawings. Throughout
_I [ the program the contractor was constintly trying to create
_J [/ one piece of paper that provided a complete description of
each separable component configuration.
This was proven to be an impossible task after the ;
_! generation of more than 50 different CMO reports, matrices, _
" Manufacturing and Product Assurance originated
: , additional documentation for traceability and accountability
I_ requirements.
£
PROBLEM: • o . 0
' Configuration changes occurring at component or lowe)
_q levels created time consuming paper searches when the
[_ identification of configuration differences was required.
I 0urn ror m,oorm
I.
' block conf_/ration control existed but only to the extent
_ where ohar_s were made to "like" items without affecting
- its top assembly or (part number) identity. An example of /
this included (9) ITLSA's (serial numbers 00! - 009) which i
E 1
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were configured to an A7LB-100000-01. A Class I Engineering
[' Change Order prescribes a change for all nine suits and the
Ii k-
\ change occurs at a lower level (other than top assemb]y). _
' i The top assembly remains an A7LB-100000-01; however, the
changes (or dash 01 modifications) of this sort at any _
lower level of the top assembly drawing. At time of comDcncnt
shipment (ITLSA for example), if there were five modifications
to the dash 01 and only four were incorporated, all
configuration data and traceability records would indicate _
a dash 01 when theoretically it was not. The components _
r- " list was the only document _hich indicated the _xact
[ as-authorized versus as-built condition of the suit. Furthermore,
i_ this list only concerned itself with Class I changes There
_, were cases of significant Class II engineering changes
_:_ which were of a Class I nature and should have been reflected
{ at a major drawing level by a part number change but was not. _r [ -
i This is not considered good configuration management practice
!0 because it created problems of tracking these items, since :
a Class II change was not required to be recorded on any ;
!
configuration and/or Quality Assurance data records and yet
some Class II ECO's were _equired to be shown on various
reports• Using the nine ITLSA's as an example, if a Class
i I change was implemented affecting only a portion of the
1 nine suits, then a new dash number was created (-02)
L for the affected suits• Two unique configurations would
now exist, a dash 01 and dash 02 with the possibility of
[ many inherent lower level changes Multiply this condition _
by 23 with 76 Class I ECO's and several significant Class
I II ECO's ahd it becomes a difficult task to properly
identify configuration differences between any combination
I of dash numbers.
PROBLEM: _
%
No defined policy existed for using acceptable al-
• ternate (interchangeable) parts without causing a configuration _;
change.
J_
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; BACKGROUND APOLLO/SKYLAg SUIT PROGRAM: _J
The definition of interchangeabili_y for the Apollo
_ C and Skylab program as stated in the A7LB Pressure Garment
- _ [ Assembly CEI specification prescribed changeout only for _
: _ ' those components with the same part number. Each component
_ _ had to be designed to be replaceable with all other :_
- components having the same part nun_er. Each potentially
[- interchangeable part which was a subassembly to a complete
•_ _ component, required a configuration change (or top
. assembly part number re-identification) prior to implementation. ;F
I_ This would involve an ECO to changc the affected drawings
and configuration data. One of the major difficulties
_- that occurred was the fact that flight qualified hardware
. , remained in a spares category and was not used due to the
[- costly configuration changes that would occur if that hardware
_ was to be used in a suit. As an austerity program was
_ I_ implemented an d funding for new hardware (with latest design _
, |_ improvements) was not available, deviations to prescribed
practices were accepted. This philosophy was used on the
: I Apollo/Soyuz Test Project where the A7L arm bearing was
classified as an acceptable alternate part for the optimum
: _ A7LB arm bearing without any configuration impact.
: GUIDELINES FOR FUTURE PROGRAMS:
[" Consolidate the information contained on various
documentation thus reducing the manpower required and _L
, )
' i [ associated costs and still provide sufficient controls and
_ visibility. ;¢ %
( As early as possible, a drawing family tree should
t
_be generated. The contractor would review and d&termine 7
I _ which subassembly drawings would be redundant to information ,_
[_ in the Table of Operations. The results of this review R
should be similar to that shown on Appendix "A" of this }
Ii 'report. The remaining items which required drawings would _
be identified by the appropriate model prefix, i.e., A6L,
A7LB, etc. Those items not requiring drawings would be
" - identified by the contractor's numbering system
k _
(
! i -21-
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i A follower tag would be generated. The purpose of this
Ii document is two-fold:
i _" i. Replace drawings, shop orders, traceability and
r_ inspection records and bills of materials.
L. 2. Provide one vehicle to indicate the time required
to fabricate the subassembly, which revision of
TO for the operation to use, the components
required for fabrication and an organized
I manufacturing flow. !
A sample of a format is illustrated in Figure 3 2.1 _
" An explanation of the form is as follows: <
A. The part number and serial number of this item to
be fabricated. <
B. The authority; nomenclature, charge number,
i "spares order, production order go-ahead, etc. _F C. Description - each detail required to complete
• the assembly would be noted, i.e., join arms
_i to torso, cure, install boots, install wrist
di3connect, inspect, etc. :
" D. Operation Number: an operation number would be
assigned to each detail, for example 005 - join _,
I arms to to, so, 010 cure, etc. and would identify
I
the appropriate manufacturing or inspection
%
I' instruction to use for the particular operation.
I L, S. Accept/Reject/Rework Authority: if the operation
I. is a manufacturing function - the individual
i I completing the detail would initial. In the case
i of inspection, the inspector would stamp the i
i i accept dispositioning authority, !
column or note the
1 DR, MRB, etc. ,_
F. Government Acceptance_ where applicable the
! government quality representative would verify
! f-_ inspection.
!
- , G. Hours: scheduled lapse time in hours to compl_te -
the task would be noted.
• " :_- H. Bill of Materials: all assemblies, _,ubassemblies,
piece pa_ts and raw materials required to complete[i the item being fabricated would be listed, i_%
(¢
I
1g7500543-02
i,. °.r_
I. The part number and nomenclature.
i _< J. Quantity per unit, quantity pen lot - the number
, and amount of each line item required.
C K Lot and Serial Numb e_: he material traceability
i L either by serial number or lot number would be
verified and noted.
L, Operation numbers - the operation number or nmbers
, where the line item is utilized would be listed.
I °The "Follower Tag: could be a Type III document _o
maiDtain a fast release system should the program dynamics
.
[" dictate it. However, this should be the exception. All
documentation should be changed by the Procedures of the
Engineering Change Order and the class established accordingly.
; L
L_ A control and verification document would also be %
required. A sample could be an "Au£]_orized C,_,figurationand Delivery Schedule" (ACDS). The purpose of this form
_ would be two-fold:
1 The replacement of the following documentation:
•
Components List
[k Authorized Change List
Supplemental Change List
[_ .C?mponent Li_t Progression Chart
" configuration Identification index
_ Configurati0n Status Listing
_-. Open Engineering and Retrofit Report _
2. Provide a configuration mechanism and qualification
status for NASA as well as an active document
for all contractor departments.
_ The ACDS would be initiated at the deliverable CEI
level, or could be initiated at an intermediate level as a _
E •. result of a NASA review of the drawing family tree. All ?
ACDS' would be identified by the model prefixed and would
I_ require follower tags and drawings. However, the details
, on drawings should be kept to a minimum to avoid duplication ¢
L
of information with the T0's. Ideally, they could be
) , outline drawings since the configuration of the components ;
_ _ comprising tile assembly wou_d be controlled by the ACDS.
a
. r:}____. , " 23 :;
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r., A samole of this format is illustrated in Figure 3.2 2
[._ An explanation of the form is as follows: !
_ A. D£awing n_mber and name. I
[.. B. Custom - identification of the astronaut if the i
I article is custom sized. ,
! i [', C. Class - indication of classification I, II or III. I'
I [" D. Size - in the case of sized parts, i.e., boots, { i
" ! [" arms, the app/opriate size would be noted.. I
-.,_ ...._.......--4_. List of Materials the assemblies,I:_ _ . -. subasse/_blie_ !
_, LI _i xZ,_:_._.___eI,T.%;-_< and piece parts required to assembly the article ! _- "w..n',_.sC-' would be iden ified by part number&" i
_ _ . F. As-authorized/as-built incorporated - this would !
show the latest authorized and the present configuration._
[-:": - situations any given change could be relative to i_
A_F__%_ _ aCEI. " :
]i*_ _-_'_w_ H. Delivery Schedule - the scheduled ship date for :_
__ each C_I or modification kit would be indicated.
_-.'-" ACDS would be released upon receipt of a production
- order go-ahead for only those CEI's authorized. The "
[. information requireu would be compiled from the follower _
_ tags and theplanning and scheduling section. To indicate
_ how the system would operate, a change cycle will be
i (" simulated. (See Figure 3.2.3.) : °
_ A CCA is received for an arm assembly. Nine units
have been delivered and a Class I change _o the lower arm
% is received to add a pressur e relief valve. This change
i" revises the part number of the'lower arm assembly from a
_ -01 to -02 with an effectivity of S/N 001, O05, 009 by
i
_ ! C " retrofit and S/N 010 and subsequent "in-line" incorporation. _.
I _ Qualification status is not effected and production order _
_- go-ahead has been received for 21 arm assemblies. The
i Ul , contractor chaP4es the lower arm assembly part humber
(see Figure 3 2.4) The notation AR01 is placed under SN001,
I_ 005 and 009 and the delivery date for the modification is
, _ listed. This informs the reader that these CEI's are authorized
|_ as a -02 configuration, that the present configuration is
e" t_
_01 and the proper delivery date for the modification kit. |; ... -24-
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[ When the modification kit is incorporated (see figure 3.2 5) _
_ L_/'" the Symbol A replaces AD0!" and the as-built configuration is _
k. : changed to -02 NA01 is noted under S/N'S 002, 003, 004 and
006 through 008 indicating the present configuration and i •
¢ if future program requirements dictate that this change is _ -
_ necessary for any of the CEI's the change may be incorporated _
without qualification testing• The Symbol A remains
under S/I_'s 010 through 021.
L Concurrent with the above, the manufacturing and/or
- _ inspection instructiOnSg would be modified as necessary and" the "follower ta " for the production CEI's would be revised
(see Figure 3.2._) and an explanation is as follows- _
and 015.• This would be shown by changing the numbers from _.
- _ 010A and 015A to 010B and 015B. The revision block would
. _ •
be change d to show the new part number of the piece affected,
in this case I04002-01 changes to 104002-02Land the pressure _"_relief valve would be added. The only drawing which would _"
" be changed is the arm assembly and this revision-may only
_ _ change the part number and revision block and illustrate _
the addition of the pressure'relief valve.
2
"j"
f
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[- 3.3 GOVERNMENT - CONTRACTOR _NAGEMENT REPORTSs
_ , OBJECTIVE: .
_ L TO consolidate as many Government - Contractor
Reports as possible under one control in order to eliminate
• ! repetitious activities and data files•
APPROACH : %
L i / ./
!" Methods of controlling the quantity of Government - _i
_ Contractor management documentation used to support the
r- " Apollo, Skylab and ASTP programs were examined in addi-
• tion to new concepts of control These concepts were
2
i ! evaluated for necessity and cost effectiveness•
_. . Cost savings data was developed by comparing Apollo, I_
-_ Skylab and ASTP programs to the recommended new data i '_
!: centralization techniques. _
,_ GROUNDRULES USED FOR STUDY:
_ i. The space suit program for the period of 1970 through
1973 was used as the study baseline.
INTRODUCTION:
Large quantities of configuration management documen- :_
_ tation were prepared during the Apollo, Skylab and ASTP ?
;: programs As a result, the duplication of files within
'i_ the suit program office organizational structure and the :_
preparation of similar reports and documentation by
;: different functional groups occurred. These problems
_. , have been examined in this report with recommendations I
i for future suit programs which will result in a cost !_.
14
;. , reduction. I_, PROBLEM:
, Duplication of files within the Program Office structure. I_
! iiI!During the Apollo and Skylab suit programs, several
. _roups wiehin the program office organizational structure _'
prepared, approved and functioned in a_cordance with
_ Similar, and in some cases, the same documentation.
%
-32-
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_ i "_ As a result, each group created and maintained their ,
: _ _.I(....., own set of files to perform their duties. _
-: This group organizational structul:e produced similar !
r" " "
;° i_ and sepa_'ate files in each of the blocks identified. This ;
section of the systems study, however, only deals with
! {_ configuration management customer/col_tractor reports.
"_ It is estimated that there were at least eleven (ii) _
[_ files at the suit contractor's facility containing _
similarly related data. For each of the separate working
i "data files, additional clerical functions evolved, thereby
requiring a large work force to maintain all the data. i!
• iI_ Some of the typical management reports, matricies,
_ [} status listings, etc., investigated included those items _°
)_ listed in Figures 3.3.2.
_ Many factors contributed towards the generation of
_ separate files at the suit contractor's facility. The
, reorganization and relocation of various interdepartmental :,
!
groups throughout the program is considered the prime cause !,_
._ i I { of the generation of separate files. When some of the i
' ' larger departments within the Apollo/Skylab program structue '_
- .,%
_:' [i were divided into smaller groups, the supervision of these
- new areas adopted their own file keeping. Often the :.
; I' reorganizaticn involved the physical re-location of a ,d partment or portion of that department to a other rea of :
_ the plant. When this occurred, the existing files remained , ,:-
If with the department head and the relocated activity would _i .i
..... generate their own reference file.
[ _..t_," / One example of file duplication was the records kept
1 _ _2-J' i for the two governmental agencies located at the contractor's
i _" ___._._._ . , facility; the DCASR and the NASA resident engineer's file.
; '' _ _J'" ; At one time, both agencies shared the same data file;
[ _however, when the DCASR personnel were relocated to anotherpart of the contractor's facility, a new file was established.
_ i_i Another factor which contributed to the duplication_ .. of files was the random distribution techniques used for
,"_ [, -- all report dissemination. This method resulted in the
_ (.i originator of various data to establish his own distribution
, "} i
L_: -3:3-
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!requirements. Typical random distribution techniques were
i used with Engineering Memorandums (EM's) and Project[I
t Directives (PD's). EM's were the documentation by which
I- technical and contractural da£a was conveyed to the customer.
[- Since EM's were generated by different management and
r- engineering personnel, each originator established his own
t
_. internal distribution. PD's served as program mangement
directives tovarious departments. They contained pertinent
[, suit program instructions not governed by normal change
• control board directives (CCBD's). The average distribution
i for a PD during the peak of the Apollo and Skylab programs
• was approximately thirty (30) in-house copies. In some
i !i instances, severa! people from the same department received
copies. This was partially due to the constant change-over
° [i of personnel resulting in new oncoming pe_sonnel needs.This desire for copies of separate files is prevalent in any _
industry_
During the latter part of the A7LB suit program, a _,
!
review of all data'and their respective distributionsl
! ! was conducted in an effort to reduce reproduction costs.
As a result, a router system was employed. Data distribution
I listings were reduced by sending copies of data reports
to only the head of each department. This effort did ease
I reproduction costs somewhat; however, it did not stop
_. additional copying of the routed copies.
I GUIDELINES FOR FUTURE SUIT PROGRAMS: ,
i Proliferation of files and data distribution list
occurred during the Apollo and Skylab programs. As a
i result it is reconmlended that data centralization and
• electronic data processing (EDP) be used to enhance data ;
I control and will result in a considerable cost-savings.
A detailed discussion of the reco_nended electronic data _ _
I processing (EDP) will be presented in this guideline. _ ;
1 , PROBLEM:
{ Similar reports were prepared by the government and the _
_ [ suit contractor and even by different inter-departmental ,
_ groups, i
i[ 1
' -34-
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°. BACKGROUND:
' _ i A problem inherent to the aeros_ace industry is the
; _ \. duplicagion of efforts of data management report generation
and dissemination by the customer and contractor. Two
' key factors were the cause of this problem;i
I" I. Uncontrolled paper
_ 2. No central data source
Uncontrolled paper is data which has no formal
Ill review and/or concurrence prior to being disseminated.
, Therefore, the data itself is questionable as to its validity.
I These uncontrolled data usually fostered explanatory or
'- corrective documents after distribution.
! The lack of a central data source caused many duplicated _
_ reports. Examples include the customer's QA & R personnel
i favoring the contractor reports and customer CMO personnel|%..,
: favoring their countezparts data. This was a normal
, occurrence since customer and contractor counterparts
_ understood each other's operations and had difficulty
• . understanding the existence of other operations.
_ Some examples of similar report generation which
existed (shown in combination due to commonality) include:
; I' 1. Component Historical Report, Components List,
and QA & R Component Serialization Log.
I' 2. Program Action Check List and contents, ARD-001,
i_ _-- Mission Profile Matrix, Configuration Status
." Listing, Waiver Status, Open Engineering and ,
t Incorporation Schedule, Flight Readiness Review
_ ° Package, and Retrofit Status Report. ::
_.I" 3. The ARD-004, Engineering Change Log, Drawing
" Index Card File, and Drawing Status Listing. }
These few examples illustrate cases of multiple !
related reports that evolved over a period of several years.
_ A central data control pro_eriy administered could combine
the similar data and meet the same data management
! requirements of the contract by providing fewer consolidated
_ :' ( reports.
v
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, ;-- GUJDELINES FOR FUTURE SUIT PROGRAMS:
_ '._(, It is recommended that a data centralization system
, be used to reduce and as a goal eliminate the preparation
of similar data and reports by different contractor and customer
groups.
f-
[. The objectives of a central data source would be as
follows :
I" A. To monitor and control all data distribution
!.
,_ relative to contract needs. This means that once
i_ I_ the data requirements and distributions are
L. established, the data control group would control
? _ /
_ [- the number of copies reproduced and distributed.
[: Also any requests for additional copies would
first have to be approved by the central data
_ [" office.
B. To organize the central data source in order to
._ encompass CMO, engineering liaison and administrative
j service functions. Since the CMO department was
- i '_ essentially the centra? source of data for the A7LB
• program, the transition efforts toward complete
i I data control by CMO would be minimal.
L_ C. To monitor and effect material cost savings in
i [ the area of data reproduction. Elimination of
_ [ "open door" reproduction policies !and instituting
' daily surveillance of Xerox copy counts should
_ __ discourage in many cases, separate file keeping
• D. TO designate one area as the central point for
all current data. Since the central data source
either administers and/or generates all data,
_: I'' the status of any data requested from this source
_ _ will be current.
_- |*_ SUPPLEMENTAL RECOMMENDATIONS - ELECTRONIC DATA PROCESSING'
il -- Manual documentation control was used to receive
material, manufacture, ship and trace each Contract End Item
_ t._l during the Apollo, Skylab and ASTP programs. Due to the
!_ (iii' quantity of documentation previously discussed, la_'ge data
files and continuous updating and referral back to these
_ files became a major activity. As a result, the methods .of .¢
bT
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t Electronic Data Processing (EDP) was investigated during
|_, this study. An EDP Sy.;teln is recommended f_om tile tJ.m_ of
< : I "
; _ raw material receipt throuqh the fabricat.ion phases, f_nal
¢' shipment, and subsequent QA and R and CHO monitoz-ing.
; i The common data base approach for EDP is recommended.
t" A colmnon data base approach is a computer _,rien_-ed central
I
information system which integrates structured data files
for use by all operating areas of the contractor. It makes
: _ available a set of non-duplicated files which are useable
in a time3y and accurate manner for both oper,_tional and
[" planning purposes.
A chaining technique, which is a data processing
[i. technique of £yping together files of inter-related data,
is used tc retrieve information by direct access methods, :.
," rather than by traditional sequential methods as was used
.' o_ the programs generated for the components list, CCA
{. matrix, ARD-001, ARD-004 and COMPHIST data management reports.
I • The use of this structured information system satisfies
the need for information to be current, easily maintainable
,, yet flexible enough to meet the needs of mu] c"ple users.
Information needed to update the system requires capturing ._
_. } only once, at its source and does not req_]...._'ere-entry for
various uses by other operating areas.
_ I One example of a conunon data base is the ,'se of the
r ECO system. Figure 3 3 3 illustrates how it was used to• • ,,
_., !. support various data generated during the Apollo and Skylab :
. programs. As illustrated in this table, the ECO contained ' _;?
data which was used as the basis for numerous other documentation. ! "
Through utilization of the reconunended EDP methods, the :
pertinent information on the ECO would be provided the ;
': i I computerized system.
_, i
The proper data inputs of part number, serial number,
t
;' ' I effectivity, authorizing CCA, and other pertinent data,
• each cross-referenced to the other will enable easy
: { referral back through the data and provide quick information.
:. I. . If doubt exisgs with the EDP information, it could-then be
'_ (- easily checked with the master record files since the ru_-off!.r, )
;: ......... v-- ....
/ .
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• could reference all documentation used to provide the final _ _
_ i .... output.
L
\_ Additional information considered to be desirable
{" for future suit programs and O_tainable from this EDP
_- program are: _ -
r- I. An Authorized Component Listing generated by i
{_ a structured component list expanded for each
!, CEI separable component in the assembly sequence, i _
"i.;_ 2. The Fabrication List (trace data) is a structured_ 1
_ _, list of components (as built) which compares the _
[ authorized configuration to that which was built.
_ , ° _
As configuration differences are recognized,
i reference to existing CCA records will be noted.
,_ : 3. Additional traceability is possible in the follo_ing i_
r_ manner:
_ [- a. The ACL Report kcan be provided by inquiring tE
,-_ as to the status of each CCA with respect to
_ [_ its generated ECO's and ECP's I _'
_- [-( b. The common data base facilitates the use of i
.... -_ inquiring devices to display the reduction of !
any assembly to its components or the expansion I '
! of any component listing to show the end item ! _
_ structure used o_ effectivity, i _
i_ c. Vendor traceability and rating techniques iI
_" could also be implemented when pertinent vendor I
*, f- master files are included into the common data i _
, I
h. base. I
The use of a co_iputer base information system will
i_ provide a comprehensive vehicle for timely and accurate data
L management reporting to serve the customer as well as the
1 .. contracuor's_needs. -.
_- The concept of EDP control for future suit application?
' I- is to first reduce the number of reports and matrices and
_" secondly to centralize the data source. The production of
I" accurate reports in a timely fashion, especially during
_ critical times (i.e. flight readiness reviews, actual
" flight applications, and formal design reviews) will resultf
!. An a major cost savings. The goal will be to service material
!i
_ . . -38- :,
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J
I: i
i inventory control, configuration control and status listings, - _
-" production and delivery scheduling, traceability, cost _
i |.C, managem,_nt, and retrofit requirements all £rom one data .
_- source.
t_ In conclusion, this recommendation for EDP control and ;
F: processing is the result of an investigation to determine
I_ the system feasibility for future space suit programs. An
a_ditional detailed study involving a systems teasn, consisting
F:
L .of .an analyst and a programmer. (approximately nine months)
"is recommended to completely create and implement the control
of all necessary data. ._ 9
•
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°[_ DOCUMENT TITLE STA_DAP_ DT_TRI_UTIONComponent lli_torical Report 12"
CCA Matrix -16
{ {'_" Components List (CL} 15 .
ARD-001 .17
!" _RD-004 3" :
i ['" Program Action Checklist 23
_' Documentation Section 23
ti. Open Engineering "23
A_-licable Mission Open Engineering -
! Close In Flight 23%
. Formal Review Status 23
[_ Formal Reiv_w Chit or RID Status 23
Engineering Change Log 23
r_ Co_ponents List Progression Chart 15
: (,
Co_figuration Change Account Status 6 ..
" " Mission Profile Matrix 13F
_. Au_,orized Mission ConfigurationMatrlx (AMCI) 21
._. Minutes & Agenda Change Control Board
Directives (CCBD) 20 '_:
:_ CEI/Separable Component Flight Classification
-_ in List (Class I, II &III Gear} -6
_/ Conflguration Identification Index (CII} 9
[_ Configuration Status List (CSL) 9 -.
_ "'" Dash Number Progression Chart Ii _:
Waiver Status 10 :
:_ ' I'( waiverstatusLog 10
Waiver Status Notice 10
• Authorized Change List (ACL} 8
_ Supplementary Authorized Change List (SACL) 8
Configuration Change Record (CCR) 10 :__
J
!'" Engineerin_ Change Proposals (ECP) 11
" _ Rough Order of Magnitude 11 '_
Prel_inary ECP's (PECP} ii ,.
( " Engineering Memorandums (EM's} 12 Min.
i " "V
)
t', PGA TLSA Sizing Adjustment Record As Required
- Pro_ect Directives 30 Min. <
Open Engineering and Incorporation Schedule 14 --
t._, , Equipment Allocation Matrix 12 't
Flight Readiness Review Package 6 _°
_" Waiver Deviations lO ':
•.' Field Operations Bulletins (FOB} 12 _'
li _. Stetus n "
Systems Safety Hotice "12
I. Field Optional Item List (FOIL} I0
i Supplementary FOIL lO
! 1;. .i,torioal tatu i :
_ I ( ' .Drawing Index Card File (CMO) AS Required }o_
._ _. -, Drawing Status Lis_ & ERRC 6
" L Retrofit Status Report 8 I:
J ECO Review 5
i. i ,_] EC0 Di_rlbu_ion 21 -40-.
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CO._.ION DATA SOURCE
%
_ \'" - ENGINEERING CHANGE ORDER (ECO) -
_ t.
The ECO provided data for:
'_ Component Historical Report
!° CCA Matrix
: Components List
_ {- ARD-001
• ARD-004
Program Action Check List
. Engineering Changa Log
i" CL Progression Chart
AMCI _,
_ !" CII
r- Dash Number Progression
, t._ ACL/SACL
;: CCRi'(
t = ECP
: ("
_: [ Drawing Index
Drawing Status List |_
_- l Retrofit Status Report
; i t j
I-) , .
I- Figure 3.3.3 ?-
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" 3.4 TITLE :
f- Proglam Phasing Philosophy
_ (- OBJECTIVE:
\L
: I" TO reduce overall program costs by minimizing the
_ program impact of engineering changes occurring during%_.
Design Verification Testing and Qualification Testing.
i BACKGROUND:
_ Durin_ the Apollo and Sk_ab phases of the Space
_ Suit program, schedules were very tight. The program wouldt
it.
not allo_ enough time for the completion of Qualification
!
i [- " Testing prior to the start of manufacturing space suits.
i" Changing mission profiles were constantly demanding
} " additional requirements of the suit, which in conjunction
_'j with the redesigns to meet the enlarged requirements, caused
7
_ ._. the qualification testing phase to extend from four months
_ ' to 15 months on the A7LB space suit.
PROBLEM:
• I_ Design Verification Testing (DVT) was concurrent with
the fabrication of the qualification space suit and
!"( Qualification Testing was parallel to the fabrication of
L. production space suits.
[ The DVT and Qualification Programs were based on the
[_ mission requirements of an entire space suit assembly rather
_4
, than by comFonents.
!._ BACKGROUND:
This situation caused significant program delays
[L especially in the initial phases of the DVT and Qua]ificatic_
. - Testing. If a failure occurred, the entire space suit was
( . "impounded" not only until a design resolution could be :
formulated, but until design concurrence with the government&
I was reached. Compounding the problem, the delay had a
[ significant cost impact on items being produced that would
now require retrofit.
i ! , RECO_4ENDED GUIDELINES FOR FUTURE PROGRAMS:
i The DVT and Qua!_fication programs should be based
[ on a component level as depicted in Figure 3.4.1. This would
_ enable the contractor, in the event of a failure, to proceed
> I
,_i,-'
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?; to Qualification Testing of another component rather than
subject the program to undue del_ys. It would also allow
_ _ significant _lexibility in the event of unanticipated design
problems. Qualification testing could commence with a
slave component until the item is ready for design release.
[_ The required cycle life of each component, arms, legs,
i etc. should be established early in the program to insure
!. DVT and Qualification procedures are written to insure that
_ this flexibility is reflected and approved• _
[" PROBLEM :
!__ The design engineers could not adequately train the
. proiect, manufacturing and quality engineers:_rior to
i fabrication of the DVT space suit. _
"Fine tuning" changes were incorporated in the DVT
| and qualification units without "cost trade-off" studies.
{
Future programs should be designed to permit design
[- engineering to allocate sufficient training time for
_ project, manufacturing and quality engineers. The results
•_ • of this situation cause the design engineer to spend an
_ excess am.ount of time supporting manufacturing problems _
rather than solving known design tasks. The design engineer
t
exerts a considerable amount of influence during the fabrication
of the DVT and qualification units. Since his goal is to
! "fineI provide the best design within the allotted time,
! '" tuning" changes are incorporated. These changes could very
! often be incorporated in any one unit, but to process the
_" formal change paperwork and to coordinate the redesign to !
meet production schedules often caused schedule delays.
_ Verifying the configuration at Pre-delivery Acceptance was
! very time consuming, this factor contributed significantly
• i to that problem. •
: RECO_IENDED GUIDELINES FOR FUTURE PROGRAMS: -
! The appropriate engineering disciplies and program
management should control the fabricati0n of all contract
'_ end items. This can only occur if these groups are available
and sufficient time allocated prior to any fabrication.
/
, -43-
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PROBI,EM:
!" Significant delays are encountered during Qualification
t (" testing awaiting contract changes authorizing incorporation
: [_ of design changes. -
i BACK_ ROIIND : "_
FACI was performed on the first qualification space
_ ' suit. This signified that the CEI met the design requirements
of the drawings. However, one of the main problems was the
( - j
i.. time delay from submittal of ROM. to receipt of CCA. The
< ECP baseline for changes is established at FACI. Thus, this
_ f'" "delay occurred during the qualification of the PGA's. This ;.f
_" caused significant program delays and associated increases
(a in program costs. _=7_ _
/ I_ GUIDELINES FOR FUTURE PROGRAbIS: _< ._
_: /_ Depending on the circumstances and negotiations, the :
: [- /
i.; _ , contractor could commit to a FACI after completion of <
_!. _ _ Qualification and a summary FACI upon availability of the
i i,i i final component. This agreement would place additional <
[ emphasis on the contractor during the design phase to
"i !/" \ ) assure successful completion of Qualification. However, :
i 1
"" _ such areas as NASA approval of changes, duration of the ,_
._ _ k_'development phase, etc. would require re-evaluation
2 _
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[:r 3.5 TITI.E: :"
[' 0( Astronaut Field ptional Item Control
• o JEc  vE. .
i _ TO estab).ish sound guidelines for field optional item
:. control which will result in cost saving for future suit
., [ [_ program.
)
_ _ PROBLEM :
(_ _![_ Field optional modifications which impact configuration
change, multiple drawing revisions, additional tracking
' mechanisms, and generation of massive historica] files.
I[ BACKGROt]ND APOLLO/SKYLAB SU_T PROGP_:!S:
i :" Many field optional items (FO!'s) evolved during the
'" 200 plus fit checks of contract NAS 9-6100. The FOI's asually .
!. resulted when a cre_cman at initial fit check would request
•_ [.- modifications to his suit or separable component for some
[ of the following reasons; physical abnormalities, personal
[.. discomfort caused by hard points on the suit, cosmetic
_ value, simplification of donning and doffing, etc. The
I approximate nun_,er of defined FOI's that were initiated at
: fit checks, and controlled and monitored by the CMO
• { department during the suit program was thirty (30). This
:_ count includes separate listings of FOI's for each of the
: [ separable components of a PGA; ITLSA, I_/EV GloVes, .•helmet,
: ['" suit instrumentation, and CEI Liquid Cooling Garment. •
_ i_ During the earlier part of the program, there were
. ,.. no real controls governing the creation and implementation
_ of FOI's. The "/efinition of FOI's (originally referred to
_: [ as crew perference items) were an_J.guous in that the notation
for various FOI's or comfo_'t pads usually indicated "install
i. as required". A system of FOI controls was then
established
• ° . 0 o ,
tO properly identify and control (in detail) all new and/or i
_ 1 revised items. Each time a crewman expressed a..desire, for
• ' a unique modification to his suit, this request was first
_' exposed to the customer prior to incorporation.
_ It was the contractor's r_sponsibility to relay this
_t request to NASA via notation on the affected components
± shipping papers, the Form DD250. After the reque:._t for the
1975005463-052
i or new FOr was apl,roved by NASA, and contractural authorization
t
i I ( granted, the following chain of events occurred:
i i. CMO initiation of configuration change control
I board directive, specification change notice, and/
r, subsequent Engineering Change Order.
" i 2. Revision to applicable drawing affected by adding
or revising a Field Optional Item to an end item ,
i and/or separable component. One typical example i
i .
< causing a configur&tion change could be the addition _
[ of a new unique comfort pad on the torso limb
suit liner assen_ly for Skylab only. This would
i_ involve a change to the liner assembly drawing, _
_ *_ creation of a comfort pad drawing and part number
change at the top ITLSA assembly.
3. CMO updates master Field Optional Item List (FOIL)
and initiates a supplementary FOIL for all suits _.[
! affected that have been DD250'd. The new FOI
requirement would be scheduled for retrofit after
I consulting the crewman to see if he desires the :
I
new change.
i 4. The insertion and verificatioi_ of the new FOI
requirement in applicable component accepLance
i _ data package.
I Although a formal list of FOI's were described in the
;f i PGA Contract End Item Specification and were similar in
_ _ nature, each separate category of suit configurations required
" unique configuration requirements. Incorporation and
configuration of FOI!s for Skylab differed from the Apollo
! suit program. One example would be the orientation of gas ;
: connectors where the crewman had the option of positioning
the "lock-locks" in the orientation most comfortable to
him when attaching 02 and exhaust lines. This item was
_ noted in the CEI specification as "orientation of gas
,, /
I connector locks for all Apollo, Skylab and ASTP suits. This
! particular FOI required different clocking configurations
( for the Command Module Pilot as compared to clocking for th_ :I
-_ |
'2
v
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I EV crewman's suits since the gas connector locations on the _
_ (. . PGA's were different.
I_ The specific tasks involved in the preparation for
a forthcoming fit check and subsequent fit check action
/
['- was as follows: /
t Crewman Initial (First Suit) Fit Check.
i_ i. Preparation of a total FOI package sho_ing all
I_ the various options fo_ the separable components
and CEI's _o be fitchecked. This package is ,_
Ii submitted to the Fit Check Engineer the day before.
fit check. _
1 2. The Fit Check Engineer discusses the various
, field optional items with the crewman at fit check :_
[°_ " using the FOIL as a guidelines. ,_[ 3. The crewman's FOI selections are noted on the ° _
• FOIL package and returned to the CMO. _
4. CMO generates a Fit Check Project Directive which
S
directs the details for fabrication and incorporation j_
i "( of the various crewman selected options. This
action is conducted prior to the shipment of the '_
I CEI/separable components affected. _
5. After the FOI's are incorporated, Quality Assurance _
submits a verified FOIL to the CMO for close out.
L. If a requested FOI does not get incorporated at i_
I- the depo£, then CMO annotates this configuration
difference on the separable components/CEI's parts
, list or ACL which ever is applicable.
t
!. 6. If a request for a FOI is made that was not defined
. in the CEI specification, CMO would then initiate
to advise the customer ofpaperwork
a new request.
Approval of this new request for a FOI would
revert back to the chain of events described in
i
the previously mentioned Items 1 - 4.
Crewman S_bsequent Fit Check (Second and _ub Suits) _ .
i. About 4-5 _eeks prior to the next forthcoming i
( fit check, CMO would initiate a FOIL package _;
(with Fit Check Engineering, Program Control, CM0, _
QA & R, and Manufacturing review) to manufacturing _
| /
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" ;'_ for incorporation of all FO]'_., previously
requested by the same crewman. This was done to
i have the crewman's' l_ext production suit to be
. identical to that previousb,..., shipped.
2. After incorporation of prescribed FOI's, Quality
[-, Assurance would advise CMO as to the results of
, manuf_.cturing's efforts. If a FOI did not gct
,_ [ incorporated by manufacturing due to schedule
: problems, then the'CMO _.ould advise Fit Check
I- Engineering of any discrepancies. :
i. 3. The Fit ChecJ-." Eng;neer would advise the crewman ;'
I; of the options incorporated not incorporated
i_ _ duril_g the suit's fabrication phase. At this
I' point, the crewman had some suit experience on
" I.' his first suit and usually as was the case, he
_: would not want some of the options reque_;ted ,.
-i. { during the initial Fit Check. The next step would
L
L
be to remove these FOI's not desired and reflect
I , _Ii new desires on any subsequent Fit Checks
¢ [ Therefore, the FOI baseline for each crewm_;;
! varied with each of his suits.
_ _ 4. Results of the second suit fit would be received '
. 1 by the CMO and appropriate action taken to repeat _J
{ the previously mentioned steps one through six. !
A new problem surfaced when suits were undcrgoin-
,_ " numerous rework operations at the depot and field sites.
_- The rework in some instances caused the alteration or removal , :
" of cer£ain POl's, citing the arm and leg adjustment changes
_. as a typical example.
'_ This problem wouldn't show until the next time the *:
i crewman wore the _it. This condition not only produced "
crewman discomfort, but caused a loss of confidence over
_{ the field optional item configuration and quality controls.
• To counteract this type of problem, the CMO was tasked to
review each CEI/separable component ADP upon receipt at the
depot prior to rework. CMO compared the original baseline
/ | *
1
i
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! _ FOIL to the verified FOIL in the ADP. All d±fferences andT
_ '_ unique changes derived from the ADP were noted on a FOI
r_ Test Preparation Sheet. It wa{ CMO's responsibility to
i • identify the exact dimensions, comfort pad requiren_ents, '
_ f" gas connector clocking, etc., on the TPb. UpoD completion
> [, i.. of retrofit requirements, CMO wiLh the aid of the Quality
{ ....
; _ Assurance Department, re-verified the fact that the suit
/ _ rt
, L; was restored tu its original FOI status prior to re-shipment.
_ i _ - The efforts involved by the CMO during this period amounted[. to a ull-time task during periods of con ecutive fit checks.
_ Also all field incorporated FOI's before they were :
_ i _" incorporated Lad to be reported to the CMO, who in turn '_
"-_ , r&views same with deput project engineering. The change ,
i receives depot concurrence and is authorized for incorporation ;
{ _ by the applicable field site. Verification.of this incorporated _
! .= chenge is then logged in and monitored by the CMO.i -i There were many FOI's that, regardless of whether or
_- [ not the cre%_an desired same, were shipped with each suit.
. _ i The FOI shipments with each CEI/separable component produced -
_ addJtiona! configuratiop and Quality Assurance controls. For )
i _ each CEI/separable component, there were standard FOI' s,
_ i.e., chin pad, suit liner comfort pads, wristlets, glove
. }i - comfort pads, valsalva device, etc.
L, The rules for FOI's were changing due to progrm_ dynamics.
: o ° .
I This induced ano£her problem of whether or not to re-identify
_- the component for new proposed FOI's or add the change
across the board for all suits.
}iii The latter preference was usually the rule, and "
.. "mountains" of pape_orkwere generated by new ACL's, ECO's, i
_ Drawing Changes, Specification Changes FO£L revision, etc.
; One of the rules applicable to FOI r.e-identification of
I! the "as-built" part number on a components list to agree :
" - with the "authorized" part number was when a crewman '_
_ |_ exercised his option to install/not install the FOI. This !
(i meant that if he did not want a certain FOI that affected !_ ,
I a dash number change and was noted on the FOIL, the "as- .. ,i
_ [.. built" dash hu,_er was progressed indicating incorporation. ! .)_
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fBy looking at the components li._;tyou could not determ.ine
.- whether or not the change actually was instal led, but only
that the crewman exercised a positive or negative option.
• ! : It was obvious that due £o this colaplex system of
o Field Optional Item identification, control, and continuous
* i _ accountability that a more practical and economical system
_ _ } could be devised. Belovz are some recolamendations for
_:, ": enhancing prev'ious FO! metilods add controls.
_; _ _. PROPOSED FUTURE SUIT PROGP_t4 METHOD: :,L
Recommendations for future, program FOI control should
o , follow these guidelines:
_-_ i _I. Conduct all fit checks in the field; this permits ,-
I" the re-verification of field optional items with
" _ the crev.,man upon completion of FOI installation.
"_ i 2. Install. all FOI's in the field. This action would !:_.
[ elimin'ate FOI reporting to tile depot, as well as '_
; allow the cre_nuan to better evaluate the effects _
_ , of the FOI. In most cases, the temporary instal-
%
f lation of eomfo_-t pads and suosequcnt acceptance
_ _ , ; .... by the crewman would save many manufacturing, CMO
":-_ and Quality Assurance hours.
i 3. Do not change configurations as a result of new
or revised FOi's. If a crewman's desire for change
4
affects the qualification status of a CEI or
separable component, then it should be classified _
_ as a Class I engim.ering change which requires :.
" contractural authorization.
' 4. Create a "cookbook" of acceptable FOI's as defined
at the CEI/Separable component FACI. This2 ,
%
* " p:-oposed "cookbook" would be classified as a
_ _ Type II document• It would be subjected to
i internal _CO controls; however, at the Class II
;_ ; level of ch_n%,e. This same book wculd define in :
; detail each c_:ange, all necessary manufacturing} r i
_' l and fabrication instructions for installation, .:
1'* methods of tracking, and the procedures involved *
_ I_" with each fit check operation This book would
• ;:
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• I
i eliminate the need for the CEI specification FOI
I
listing, and numerous activities conducted by the
. °
I CMO. Verification of FOI installation should
remain a part of the end item ADP.
5. Provide FOI's only when specifically requested by
1 the crewinan
I It is estimated that a minimum of 40 hours was
_i [ expended by CMO for each fit check. The cost savingsexperienced under the new method relative to the CMO effort
F"
I would be approximately 36 hours/fit check.
_c
:|c
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!i [ 3.6 TITLE:
' _ Business Menagement System
PROBI,_I:
• _ _ During the performance of NAS 9-6100 the two most
significant problems encountered in the operation of the
business management system %;ere:
_ I. The 533 reporting format was not directly
I ! relatable to ILC internal cost control methods.
t
_ This rendered the 533 significantly non-utilitarian
q_ e
_ . as an internal management tool. This-resulted
_ in the construction and administration of a
: .," redundant cost control system, non-reflective
_ of the 533 report, to provide ILC management
• with cost and manpower monitoring data.
! 2. The Work Breakdown Structure [WBS) which served
: as the basic skeleton for reporting (533 report)
i and for developing cost collection data went
' through significant changes at various stages4
of the contract. At each change, implementation
and re-education produced inefficiencies and
inaccuracies as well as a loss in continuous 1
- track of data. Equally as important, the various
WBS's employed did not provide significant
segregation of data to establish meaningful
relationship for management-information relative
' to future planning efforts.
- BACKGROUND:
WORK BREAXDOWN STRUCTURE:
At the outset of NAS 9-6100, Schedules I and II, a
t
'WBS was employed which closely approx_ma.ed the classic type
_ WBS found in textbook applications. A facsimile of the WBS
is shown in Figure 3.6 1 This WBS provided information adeauate
_ to meet program reporting requirements during the period
_ it was applied. The reports, however, never served as an
" internal management tool. The data available from this..'!
i WBS has blended in quite satisfactorily with the general
i _• -55-
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terms established in the previous section's historical cost
_ I analysis. The failings in this _S are th,it a Contractor
must be sufficiently computerized and oriente_ towards
t# -
} government cost systems as well as being propcr!y organized
t
to attain the full h_,_f4_ of thic _" -'_
........... app_lc_t ..... The
: cross-matrJxing of organizational and resource informationJ 2
becomes quite cumbersome to handle and useful timely data
is difficulg to derive without correct o_ientation and :
adequate computer system_. This WBS concept was abandoned
|. at the inception of Schedule IV.
- [ Schedule IVA was performed unde2 the WBS shown in
Figure 3.6.2. This I_S was constructed to provide separation ofm
i__ _ all engineering and manufacturing costs by Contract End _"
J
Item (CEI) and Level 1 Task_; i.e., Design, Component
5: i Development, Production, Soares, etc. Program Management
and Field Support were exceptions. Costs were further segmented
[ by functions. The manageluenh philosophy at this time was ;
! that all costs should be identified to a CEI within a
; Level 1 Task. In re£rospect, the data in this form was
never used or compiled to produce meaningful management
_ information. The functions which were determined to beL i
essential data at the time of formation of the WBS have had
limited value in historical cost studies and were not useful
_ in any way to ILC in the day-to-day operation of the program.
: The use of this data by NASA is not known.
At a milestone occurring on July I, 1971 and
following negotiations of SA 433 a revised WBS was instituted.
This was the start date for Schedule IVB. This WBS attempted
to retain the Level I Tasks for continuity. The primary
_ : aim, however, was to relate the framework as close as
possible to the organizational alignment of ILC. This was
significant in that negotiated manpower _nd internal budgets
had been arranged organizationally. _t was felt then, and
_ now, that a basic framework should be established early -
!_ and retained from proposal phase _hrough negotiation and
into operation and repo_ting of the program This WBS _j I •
C
concept was retained essentially through the completion of
e •
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the program, one notable change that did occur was the
establishzhenh of ' "","Ai_..ion Support as a Level 1 Tash at
Janua_;y i, ]973. This wes a_,othc:r step closer to adhering
i , to negotiatcd and budgeted infor;_ntion. Previously
Mission Support had bccn jnc]udc.d in vari_,us Level l Tasks.
_- Reviewing all the _gBS's en,ployed during the performance
i of Schedule IV, very fe,,:items are found which _'ere
continued and retained in the same form and under the same •_
: r
i
. ground rules throughout the program. In addition to the ;
WBS levels varying it is also noted that the other axis .
{ to the D_BS, the resources applied, varied in its format
/
and content through the program. In Schedule I and II
! labor categories %.;ere the detail level of the _BS. In
:_ _, Schedule IV, functions were the detail level. Neither of
- _ these, in the application at ILC, provided workable management
, data for day-to-day program monitoring nor did they readily <
, produce data useful fol" the historical cost analysis in the _
!
, previous section.
The h_S's themselves were not sufficiently detailed
_' to provide ease in interpreting and applying. WBS element
[ descriptions and ground rules seemed continually to need
{ reclarification. "his undoubtedly was caused by the instabilit_ _
t
in the WBS's but equally resulted from "gray area" in each
; WBS. Future WBS's should be clearly defined and be aligned
such that "gray areas" cannot exist.
_ 533 REPORT : :
, Reporting of data via the 533 Report was strictly an
! exercise in report preparation. Very few facets of the 533 _
data were relevant to internal management of the program.
2
Rather than the report data being a natural fallout from the
daily business information it was a once-a-month reconstruction. _
It was necessary to take input data from the departments
involved and reorient the data for inclusion in the report _• Z
This reorientin_ of data coupled with the volume of inputs _
and the lack of computer facilities placed significant
• burdens on manpower Both parties, the government and the i_
• contractor, would be better served I_ the organizational
_ { •-57- 9k
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alignment and the cost systems in place at the contr_.ctor's
!
! ; facility were governing factors in the e:;tabJishment of 533
, !
reporting formats. This problem, however, is relatable te
i_ the formation of the correct _;ifS. The solution of the
_" correct WDS should also produce the solution to the 533
i reporting problems.
i :
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GUTD]/;LINE:-_- FUTURE PROGRA;.I RECO'.:!dENDATION._;:
r -
At the close of the Apollo Program, NAS 9-6100, thei .
cost studies presented in the previous sections %.:el'e
, performed. Prior to the study, the significant criter:" to
a suit program were determined. The majol: functions of
I Development, Production, blission Support, Program Management,
Spares, Retrofit and Repair, and Field _h_.pport were
establishcrl as being the meaningful criteria which wou!_: l,e
existent in 1-ypicai suit program:. These functions sl_ould
therefore be the basis for manage_,:.ent of future suit
• °
programs. The "" -_-Brea]:down Structure (_qES), being the
i
skeleton fer the business management syste_n, should be
constructed to produce information on the major functions
' described above. Exhibit i is a recommended _'_3Swhich would
, be applicable to typical space suit prcgrams and which also
would provide the segregation of c0st into the major functions.
A brief description of each major function and the recommended
contents of each are as follows:
Program :._anage_ent - Level 1 task Program Management
would include costs associated with activities performed by
all segments of the program office organization.
Development- Level 1 tasks Design, Component Development
and Engineering Tasks would combine to encempass the total
', Development function. ..-
i Design - would include all engineering and other
support effort such as quality assurance and reliability and
the fabrication of engineering models for verification of
design concepts. Indi%idual cost accounts could be established
at Level 2 to segregate costs of each design activity.
, Component Development - would include fabrication of
formal Design Verification Test prototypes and Qualification :
t
Test units. Formal Design Verification Testing and
Qualification Testing would also be Level 2 activities
within this task.
E_n_inee_ing Tasks - would accumulate costs on all
Engineering Design tasks authorized by Work Request Forms (WRF's).
1- -59- _
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Individual cost accounts would be assigned to e;_ch _'IRF.
PRODUCTION - All l_roduction costs would be included
under the Level 1 task Production. Production would be
l-
I defined as including only that .manufacturinc 7 and inspection
labor_- directly associated with fabrication of the Contract
End Items. [.:anufacturin 9 Engineeri,,g would also be considered
as a production cost. Level 2 task CEI's would be further
segregated at ].evel 3 into the various CEI's determined to
be separately identifiable on the future space suit.
_. MISSION SUPPORT - All costs associated with effort
i performed by personnel designated as mission support
_ personnel shall be included. Mission support personnel
would perform engineering, quality assurance and reliability _
. activities.
i
RETROFIT AND REPAIR - This Level 1 task will segregate
at Level 2 into the following: _
: Depot Retrofit - all retrofit work performed on
i articles already delivered to the customer but retained or
o , returned to the contractor's depot would be considered as
_, depot retrofit. Individual tasks could be assigned for each
retrofit task.
_ _ Modification }'it Fabrication - all costs associated
with M & R effort authorized by WRF's would be accumulated
under this Level 2 task.
! SPARES - all spares costs woul_be included within
_ the single Level 1 task entitled Spares. All manufacturing ::
, and inspection labor and materials utilized in the completion
; of spares orders would be included. Each Spares Order would _'
_ _ have an individual cost collection code. :
>
i i FIELD SUPPORT - the Level 1 task Field Support would _:
_ be totally synomomous with the function Field Support. All
9
costs associated with the support of the space suits in the _
• field would be included. Level 2 segregatior could be by
site with Level 3 if desired further segregaling the types }
_ of field support activity, i_
1975005463-064
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In fur_he_ "_:ek,ie_¢ of the meaningful criteria to a {
.;, program as well as rc:vJ.-.i:tg,the n,,(.l_,,,:,-of _:,contractor for
internal management of cos.',:s,it was decidec] that the typical
_. _,.: :._i._ into the following: { space _;u''- co_;Lracto_: would " - o-.,. . ]
t
primary labo_: divisiohs: Program 1.]anacAcment , Engineering,
! Manufacturing, Quality Assurance and Reliability, and
Field Support. This bei._g the case, detail level ].abet
_' should be summarized accordingly. O1-ganization coding to
L_ provide this data could be established. Exhibit 1 portrays
_ [-- "a typical organizatien sun,mary which would be used in
,. adjunct to the WBS and su_'ve as the detail level of the
_ _. WBS. Brief definitions follow: _
[ Program Management - Each organization under the i_'
L ,- Program (_fice would have an individual coding. The sum of
i i the data accumulated through these codes would represent
the total activity of the Program Management organization.
•_ I Engineering - Engineering could be further segmented
into such alignments as Systems Engineering, Design Engineeri_g,
i Test EngJ.neering or as seen fit by the organization at the
time of performance.
Manufacturing - The Manufactul-ing organization
; would segregate and identify at. a minimum all activity performed
by the fabrication group; the inspectien group and manufacturing
engineering.
Quality Assurance and Reliability- The QA & R ;_
organization would include such groupings as Qua]ity i
Engineering, Reliability Engineering, Technician Support
- and Documentation Support. Other organizational alignments
deemed more satisfactory at the time of contract performance
"" could be inserted here as well as in all other primary labor ,.
divisions.
Field Operations - Each Field Site would be the basis
for segregation of organizational information for field
ope._:ations. The above reco_endations are directed towards :
%
/ specific a_'eas needing attention at the outset of the next
i,- suit program. In addition to the above, however, there are ,!
i!"some general recon_endations which should definitely be/
-6_ -
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[inc.luded in the planning for the next prog_-am. They are:
, i. Establish a WBS, prefcrrably along the lines
described above, early in the p£ogram; be
r
[ sure it will meet all needs of the business
management system; and that it will be in _o..cu__._n__
! or readily adaptable to the contractor's internal
_ accounting system; tAen retain the same WBS
: through the entire program.
• 2. Make the reporting system a useful tool to both
r - the contractor and NASA. Do not _:equire establishment
I. of information tracks that are not readily drawn
from contractor data or have no use to the :{ ,- contractor's management system. 3
3. k_,en the WBS is finally solidified, establish f
! clear guidelines to the application . . . allow
no gray areas. Do not change ground rules in _
I mid-program.
The above recommendations are in some cases genera].
! in nature and in others, more specific. In either case,
however, we feel that they will be of benefit in the
establishment, operation and analysis of future space suit
programs.
i
Q
L
' Apollo
! NAS 9-6].00 Schedules I & II
: lqork Brc.,hdo,..-._Structure
l
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- I
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GLOSSARY
: COST ELI_;HENT - the type of cost, e.g., Labor, Materia],
'- Burden, etc.
I
MAJOR FUNCTION - a separation of costs into meaningfu]
_ generic tasks typical of suit pr, jram-_. The
, functions are: Production, Dcve].opl.ient, Mission
Support, Prog_.-am Management, Field Support,
; Maintenance and Repair, and Spare..s.
/
" _ !" PIIA___I£E- - refers to the various suit applications and time
-_ divisions of the total contract relative to Apu]lo 7
_ !" through 14, Apollo 15 th1"ough 17, Skyiab an_ AS_i'P.
_ ,- PRIMARY LABOR DIVISION - a separation of labor into organizational
' components, i e., Manufacturing, Engineering, Program
Managen_ent, Quality Assurance, and Reliability and
' Field Support.[
i
!-
J
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!3.7 TITLe: :
f-
_- Frogram 14anagement Organization and Manpower Su_.,_ary
OBJ I._'CT!VE :
Evaluate the program "manage_ent organization whi._hl
existed d_ring the Apollo, Skylab and ASTP suit programs.
(- Deter,_ine the total manpower savings resulting from the
' implementation of the guidelines for future progrmus as
f- presented in paragraphs 3.1 through 3,6 of this section.
: !
L_ APPROACII:
f.... The ILC program management o_ganization which supported ;
! the Apollo, Sk_,lab and ASTP suit programs was used as a ::
, comparative hsseline. Guidelines identified as program _
_ maPgement manpower savings in paragrephs 3 ] through 3 6 of
:_ _ _ this section were used to formulate hbe ree_u_nended manpower $
' _ } required to support a future suit program. The resulting
_ summary of manpower savings was then determin,:d by a comparison
of these program management organiza'Lions.
, L GROUNDRULES USED FOR THE STUDY:
! I. The program management organization for the period
i_ _' ! of 1970 through 1973 was used as the study
[ baseline. Emphasis was placed on reducing the
._ I {_ level of required manpower.
2. Th_ proposed program management organization was
_ : manloaded to support the program schedule
[ _ presented in section 3.4 . }
_' { DISCUSSION :
; _ . Implementation of the guidelines for future p_'ograms
_ ! ; as discussed in the preceeding paragraphs of this section
_ resulted in the recommended program management structure as
%
i " illustrated in figure 3.7.2 The manpower level of this
L
. _ organization was then compared to the level of the program
•management organization that existed at ILC d_ ring the period
_Y [.i 1970 to 1973 (See Figure 3.7.3). The manloading of the
: 197_ to 1973 organiz; :ion _.,asbased on an average 1/5
1:: .- production rate. In order to properly compare these
_ k . organizations, the production rate was factored to reflect
_ I the estimated levels of manpower required for a 1/20
-66-
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g/
_ [- _- production rate• Comparison of these two programs revealed
_ [_ _ . a total manpower savings of 480 man montJls.
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4.0 ENGINEERING
[_ 4.1 TITL_ "
I Interface control docu.n-.._icn,_"_" (ICD) for _up-
• port of a future space suit program.
_ OBJECTIVE:
Establish the most efficient and least costly method
%
, of controlling the interfaces of future space suits with
government and contractor furnished equipment.
! APPROACH :(
The methods of space suit interface control used on
_ the ApOllo, Skylab and ASTP programs were examined in ad-
dition to new concepts of control.
_ _ These concepts were evaluated for efficiency and
_ i associated cost effectiveness.
- Cost savings data was developed by comparing Apollo,
[ Skylab and ASTP Programs to the recommended new interface
technique.
i GROUND_ RULES USED FOR STUDY:
i. The space suit ICD program for the period of
} 1966 through 1973 was used as the study baseline.
2. It was assumed _lat a new space suit configura-
i I tion will be used for future suit progra:z_ and
_ that the majority of existing interface documen-
f_ tation will not be useable.
{ INTRODUCTION :
, During the Apollo, Skylab and ASTP programs, various
L techniques of interface control were used by both NASA and
" the associate contractors for the identification and docu-
I mentation of interfaces. On the Apollo program, the associate
contractors performed practically all the interface nego-
I_ tiations among themselves. If a stalemate occurred, NASA
would intervene to resolve the contractor differences and
i
1_ additional effort was then continued among contractors.
I
r
t" '
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/_ med!,.to._ among _ _,During this program, NASA acted as a r "= ,- L,i_
\ contractors and scheduled frequent meetS ngs in order to ',
_- maintain a punctual resolution of interface problems. :
:
This type of clu_e associate contractor interfacing be-
came less effective during the Skylab program as Level _J
_ "A" ICD's were introduced. During this program, NASA _
still acted as mediator, but also actively negotiated ,
[ interfaces with other NASA centers and Jn many cases
without the knov.'icdge or assistance of the contractor !
who designed and manufactured the equipment. The ASTP ,_{
program involved the least amount of contractor coordJna- /
tion during the suit program. This occurred since all the _:
_ suit interfaces already existed on prior programs, therefore,
!- existing ICD's were used.
In this report, the problems of suit interfac'e control '
: : experienced during the Apollo, Shylab and ASTP pro_'_,,.,_
were examined. Each problem of group of problems is prr
sented '_'-
_Lh recommendations for future suit programs which
will result in a cost reduction. _-
The study encompassed investigation of the following
areas :
k .
a. Tl,e impact of flight effectivities, part numbers "_
and end item weight changes on the ICD' s. _
b. The use of Level "A" ICD's on advanced suit pro- _.
grams.
c. The duplication and unnecessary information re-
quired on many Apollo, Skylab and ASTP ICD's.
" d. The difficulties in the handling of some ICD's
due to s_ze.
e. Cost considerations if new methods of interface _'-
control are utilized.
_
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PROBLEM :
!- Flight effectivities, part numbers, and end item
;,"
_ weight changes _esulted in numerous Interface Control
! Document (ICD) end Interface Revision Notice (IRN) chan-
[ ges. In most cases, this information had been previously
_ provided to _ contractor in another document.
i BACKGROUND:
Flight effectivity notes were required by NASA as a
method of configuration control on all Apollo, Skylab andI
%
ASTP ICD's. This was done to identify which suit and ve-
[ hi_le or life support system configuration and what missionI
: was being illustrated on the ICD.
!_ Flight vehicle and mission reassignments resulted
r_ in numerous Apollo and Skylab suit ICD changes, and nearly
r all ASTP suit ICD chan_es. A total of 31 "effectlvity"
, changes were processed during the ASTP program alone. Fi-
C
gures 4-1-1, 4-1-2 and 4-1-3 illustrate examples of typical
_ ILC, Grumman, and Rockwell International ICD effectivity
changes
In all cases, these effectivity changes did not actually(
effect any real suit interface. In an effort to reduce
the costs of processing these changes, Interface Revision :
:- Notices (IRN's) were transmitted for signature in groups of :
more than one. However, much time was shill expended in
transmitting memorandums and attending meetings to complete
the approval of "effectivity" changes.
_. Similar to flight effectivity changes, part nu_er, and
- dash number changes appeared on many ICD's and IRN's. In
i most cases, part number callouts were not required. Identi-
fication by part number was neces_a£y for the interface of
( some hardware since the dimensions were proprietary informa-
i tion.
( Since the part numbers were noted, each time the dash
i •
t ' number of the vehicle or suit changed, the ICD had to change.
: ( In most cases, these changes resulted from component and
_ I sub-system changes which did not effect the interface. :
?
_ _ -74-
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I_ Unlihe flight effectivity notes, configuratiol- dash
. ! numbers provide absolutely no useful inforlaation on the ICD.
Since the interface dimensiol_s and other necessary info]-mation
!,
i% 2rovided, the dash r_ur_er does nothing but confuse an1
associc'_te contractor" unfamiliar with the suit sub-systei,_
- _ and components.
| The itemizing of weights on tDe ICD served to advi_,e
,; the interfacing contractor of the !a_est suit and suit
I
_ equipment (LEVA, SEVA, gloves, helmet, etc.) weights for use
f- -in the structural design of the vehicle or the o.'eration of a
t
maneuvering unit.
The frequent changing of hardware weights may be an _
_. abnormal occurrence for most flight hardware. However, this
I has not been the cc._e with the pres_ure suits. Frequent changes
! have occurred due to:
a. Changes dn mission requirements resulting in
: i I substantial design changes necessitated numerous
! i weight changes. An example J.ncluded the Apollo
_ ' , suit design change from a four hour Lunar EVA to ani
• ! eight hour mission.
, _ b. Nume_.-ous crew optional items used on the suit were
i continually being revised or added to the basic suit
: configul'ation. Examples of some crew optional
items included special comfort pads, comfort gloves,
valsalva device, wristlets, quantity of pockets
and many others•
. On the Skylab program, the suit and suit equipment
weights were documented on the Skylab Stowage List• This
stowage list was updated as each suit ccjntractor CEI specification
' _ weight c1_ange was authorized on a contract change authorization.
_ i In addition, the suit contractor was required to periodic_%lly
perform a formal review ot the stowage list•
, _ The flow chart illustrates what happened to an approved
," suit weight change on the Skylab program after the CCA was
il released.
_ -78-
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' The stowage list also served as design requirements to
•: _- the OWS design contractor. As a result, there was no n_,ed to
document the suit weight changes on the ICD. {
! " Thi_ system was not used during the Apollo prog_.-an_ or
; with the Con_r_dnd Module contractor on the Skylab and _e_
_ " programs A.'-a result, each time the suit contractor received '
<. a contract change authorization which changed the sui weight,
" : the ICD required a change.
, _ GUIDELINES FOR FUTURE :?]_OC.R2_,iS:
i. Although the effectivity notation'_-; on the ICb's ,
caused numerous change ,_ctivity, they did serv_ to ;
advise the reader of t_e flight mission(s) on
" which the equipm-cnt was intended for useI
Therefore, for futare programs it is recommended
. that a separate listing of the individual ICD's
and their respectiw, effectivities be prepared and
maintained by each contractor. Tl-is list._ng .
could be part of a monthly status report or other
similar documentation which could be used as
,; information to p'_rsunnel no._ directly as:_ociated
with the suit proc-ram.
: 2. Configuration part numbers and dash number's of the
various system, sub-system and component suit
_ hardware, should be omitted from the ICD's when net I7 "
• required. _ "Y
_' -79- _
197500546:3-083
' 3. A progr_:m stowage list or other similar document,
used effectively, is the " '.....qu].c, co_ anu ea'_:icst
method of provic_ing a suit weight change to a
t
vehicle contractor. As long as tile stowage list is
: a contractu.'-al requirement for the vehicle contractor,
I it will eliminate the need to process and transmit
tlr,.= a suit weJ.ght change isan ICD change each " ,_
approved. The suit v,,ights should not bu .'oted on
the ICD if the stowage list is used.[
{ PROBLEM : :"
: Interfaces identifie_ on Level "A" ICD's were activel l" :_
negotiated between NASA centers -.n_ in many cases witl'3ut the i
kno:.ledgc or assista._,,:e of :he suit cont,:actor. _
BACi:GROUND : _>
£
: [ Le,,-" "A _ or Intercenter ICD's were utilized on the
l**_e_ f_ce._ with, Apollo anc_ Skylab programs to define the suit " ".....
, equipment supFlied to a NASA c_nter other than the Johnson
_.pzceci'aft Center (JSC). These suit inter_aces inclu_;ed:
a. Suit to Lunar Rover Veh._cle (MSFC) - Apo.!lo
b. Su-.t and c m_t?ment to _,,"
•-.. _.S (MSFC) - Skylab
c. Juit to T020 F3ot Controlled M_neuvering Unit -
/_angley Reseaxci_ Center - 3ky]:-tb
_. Suit to PGA Foot Restraint (MSFC) - Skvlab
The ICD's were approved only by NASA JSC and the
interfacing NASA center.
:' Whe, each of these Level "A" ICD's were initiate_, suit
information %'as trahsmitted from JASA JSC to the interfacing
NASA center. It was then transmitted from the interfacing
t
NASA center to the contractor _re Ia',-ing the ICD. In one of
i the._e interfaces (b), the interface coordination was performed
directly betweer, the suit contractor and the 9WS vehicle
manufacture._- -_t the commencement of the program. This ICD was
well coordinate,_ dnd defined. However, later changes or PIRN's
(Preliminary Interface Revision Notices) were initiated by =
NASA which were not coordinated with the suit contractor until
k
fter N,_SA approval had been made.
I
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In addition, two other Love] "A" ICD's (ite_,s a and d)
were never revie_:,ed by the suit coi_tractc-r until after receipt
. of the NASA approved docum_nt. It, addition, the approval ti::_e
requi,-e_ fo-; a ].evel "A" ICD in some cases rcqui',-ed several
! months.
- : All of th_s re_:1_'ited in the suit contractor ICD
• p-._rson_el bei::g less concerned ebout the accuracy of suit
details en the ICD. This resulted .because:
a. The suit contractor into,of ace personnel did not sigr,
• Q
; the ICD.
b. Even when the stair contractor attempted to itemize
• _ engineering discrepan -its on Level "A" ICD's
by memoranduu, they were -n most cases signed by
NASA without the reco_endcd corrections.
{
e. Many PIR_'s were approved without the s11it ccntractor's
review since NASA cc.nsidered them to have no ip_pact
_ : on the suit.?
; In sunlmary, NASA assumed the responsibility for insuring
{
. _ proper inte._:fac_s were provided on the Love]. "A" ICD's as
well as the changes (PIP_N's). Since th_ S_ylab program used
: an Apollo configured suit, the interfaces were easily defined
and the vehicle and other Shylab hardware was generally
i designed to fit the suit.
GUIDE!,INES FOP. FUTURE DD_r'_'c.
• i Based on past experience, it is believed that the
Level "A" ICD's used on the Skylab program for suit interfaces
: is an un_e_iroble method of control for future programs
i-
espec%ally if a newly designed suit is used.
If Level "A" ICD's are to be used in future programs,
it is recon_ended that the interface coordination for the[
initial or basic ICD and _ubse_uent PIRN's be coordinated
,I directly between the affected contractors, with each indicating(
agreement by signing an approval sheet. NASA centers can then
! use this approval sheet to help expedite later NASA approval
I of these ICD's.
I
I •
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PI_OBLE_-i:
"- During the Apollo, S):y]._:band ASTP programs, individual
interfaces were documen-_ed separite]y in lieu of groul._.
This rcnultcd in dupl_cation of inL_ _'z_c_'s,unnecessary :
: information and difficult handling due to the quantity of the "_! [
i
i _ ICD 's.
•. BACKGROU:'D :
The suit ICD's for the A:_ollo, Skylab and ASTP programs
used the philosophy that each individual interface be documented
J separo rely.."
In addition, ,._echanical interfaces were traditionally _:
.. documented on a drawing which ranged from a "C" to roll size
while functional ICD's were documented in specification fo1_nat. .
i This resulted in a total of 98 Apollo, 57 Sky!ab and 31 ASTP
; _ • suit ";elated ICD's. Besides requiring massive amounts of
paper%::ork (engineering memoraP, iums, ICD status reports,
_ , internal memos for ICD release), these large quantities of
ICD's led to the duplication of interfaces and the need to
.. add unnecessary information in order tc fill the drawing _
paper.
! Duplication of suit interfaces occu,-red between ICD's _"
prepamed by different associate contractors and the su_t
: contractor.
" ' This occurred when one contractor prepared an ICD
• illustrating the interface of a specialized piece of his
: hardware with the suit while a second contractor preen, red an
identical view of the suit interface _:'ith his specialized .piece
, of hardware.
" Prior to ICD preparation by an associate contractor, '_
i
[ the suit contractor was required _o prepare and transmit an
illustration uf the various suit configurations and changes
: ; which occurred during the phases of each program. As a :
i
result, the duplication of effort between different contractors
; I was further compounded by the preparation of the initial :
_ •_ illustrations which were then copied or traced by the associate: !
_ '_ contractor responsible for preparation of the ICD. ,
t" !
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: One cau3e of th_s situatJ_en was the use of the
"py. amid" or pcc_.ing system used with the Apollo ICD's.
.'4 r _"
;-- $'.._enan ICD _.... required betwqgn two or more contractor_, this :
NASA system placed the responsibility of ICD preparation on the
. associat_ contractor li:_tcd highest on the pyramid. In most
{ cases, this required "'t....contractor below the higher listed
contractor to prepare a drawing or shetch which was then copied
or traced onto an official ICD by the higher contractor on the
[ f
pyramid. As a result, the s_ae :_,o,-kwas perforned twice with
". "each contractor charging NASA for his effort.
i Another source of interface duplication was the -_
: i "Intercentcx'" or Level "I" NASA interface system used primarily _
on the Skylab proaram. Duplication occurred on suit interfaces
such as connectors, hard point mounting area_, functional
requirements etc., _ince the interfaces previously doc_unented :"
between the suit and NASA JSC vehicle contractors were again
documented on t_e Level "A" ICD between the NASA MSFC vehicle i"
contractor and suit contractor (NASA JSC). As a result,
sketches and vicws from already existing ICD's were copied onto
a Level "A" ICD.
"t
ICD's IDA02-1004-11, IDA04-1031-11, HDA02-715618-11,
t
HDA02-729670-11, MH01-21021-136, MII01-2i048-136, and 13M13524
illustrate an example of ICD duplication. These examples
illustrate how duplication of the suit connector inte_face
occurred on the Apollo p_ogram and was carried over to the
Skylab and ASTP programs-.
During past suit p;:ograms, numerous ICD's were prepared
which contained views, dimensions and other information which
was not ne"-essary in defining the interface.
Two examples of ICD's which contained numerous detailed
views, dimensions and notes of equipment which was not required _
to describe the interface included:
1
a. IDA02-1022-Ii '!A7LB PGA Pocket Accessories Interface"
b. HDA02-729629-!I "Mechanical and Functional ICD -
Buddy SLSS to A7LB PGA and A6L LCG" •
Many other ICD's existed& but these two were readily •
available at the writing of this report. Inspection of each
document reveals the following:
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a. IDA02-I022-II (two roll szzed ..h_,;_J - each 3 1/2
feet long).
: This ICD co.'.[:ail,s illu._:tratior's of each pocket v.'o_._n
on the ATLB-hV and A7L!_ CMP PCA's. The only
.. dimensions illustrated for any of the poc._ets
are the envelope dir]-unsions called out ui:der each
detail, in the case of the sc;_sor:_ chec].l ...._,
daha list, an._ utility pocket conf_c_u:-ations, each
pocket could have been listed by n:me, part n[:m]_;:v
and inside envelope dimensions without requiring a
detailed illustration of the individual pocket.
;. Separate views of the pen, penlight, sunglasses
pouch and [erso;_.al dosimet._r could have been f
; illustrated to show the detailed interface
i dimensions of these items without illustrating the
suit pockets. As a result, it wos!d be the
; _espcnsibility of the suit con_nactor to insure e_:ch
of the dimensioned items fit _.:ithin each particular"
pocket. Likewise, with the pocket internal
envelope dimc:'sions listed on the 3.CD, it woa]d be
• the NASA responsibil_ty Lhat the items placed in
th_.t pocket would properly fit. :
Additie.,ally, the items i]].ustl_ated on Sheet
2 of this iCD could have all been deleted an.;.discusse( _
in words by adding notes to the drawing. It
'" should be notc_d that all the add3 tional information
contained in this ICD and others like it was not
" added by the suit contractor ho obtain additional
profits since all ICD efforts by the suit contracto;"
were accomplished under a "level of effort prog_-am". _
All of the details a_ded to Sheet 2 and all changes
itemized in Revision "A" were directed by four _
separate contract change authorizations.
f
?
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b. III)A02-7296::9-]I - (one ro!] sized sheet, sex-cn ,.'_
feet long)
4
This ICD illustrateu the i.utc:rface b(:iween the
Buddy seconOary life sui_port syste'.n (BSLSS)
. and the Apol]o PCA. In thi[: ICD, detailed
illustrations of the suited crewmen, ]ocation of the
BSLSS stowage bag on 9::c I;LSS and detailed dimensions
; of the NASA GFE BSLSS hocks was unnecessary. In
addition, t]-e views "of the suit or PG_ multiple water
connector and alignment marks was already illustrated
• on another Apollo ICD, HDA02-71390_-I3 which was
: in effect at that time.
: These two ICD's represent typical suit related ICD's
which contain unnecessary information. Expe:'ience has shown
flat unnqocessary information was added to ICD's for several
• reasons, two of which include:
, a. The use of the ICD by the contractor as a technical
document to freeze the dimensions, mounting
location and other information in order to expedite
the design of the flight hard,;are before a formal
PDR or CDR. The object was to obnain early NASA
and contractor approval by rushing through an ICD
change. After approval, the ICD was used as
" leverage for a program cost increase if dimensional
or location hardware changes were later required.
b. It was accepted p_'ocedure to always document both
sides of an interface on the ICD. This occurred
even when no dimensions were contained in the
illustration. An exception to this ocu_¢red on
several North American Rockwell ICD's which contained
only the associate contractor's interface dimensions.
In this system, only necessary interface information
• such as the envelope dimensions or functional
requirements were noted. The interfacing stowage
bag was not illustrated. In these cases, the
responsibility for the method of softgoods stowage
(foam and duffle bags) was accepted by North American.
::.... 85- " :
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Another difficulty experienced _:ith the interface
' documentation used on past prcgram_ was the handling of large
i roll nized d_'awings as well as all interface dz-awings i.
general. Some of these problems included:
i" a. ICD copying delays due to the size of the drawing.
i
" b. Reproducible copies of all suit related ICD's
;- were kept en file. This required special storage
facilities to prevent drawing damage.
[ . c. Reproducible co oies "of suit cont,'actor prepared
. : ICD's were transmitted tc associate contractors
_ for their files. This required the prenaration ofr-
_. special mylar reproducible drawings. _i
d. The mailing of drawing originals to associate
' contractors fol" signature required the use of >
I. special cardboard dra':ing tubes to protect the
dra_,:ing during mailing. Mailing by registered
J mail and special d_livery was frequently done _o
. preclude loss.
i GUIDELINES FOR _:UTURE PROGI_H_: _.
I. It is reconam,ended th_i all suit interfaces on future
, i
_ [ programs be documented in a single ICD which is
. prepared on standard 8 1/2 X ii inch specification
' I . paper. This ICD document would be similar to a
J
suit systems level interfac _ specification and
I _ . include all suit and other suit related equipment
;. ' (SEVA, Maintenance Kit, LCG, FCS, etc.) . This
" " document would include all the suit contractor
I
i interfaces to all associa contractors and NASA,
' and would only illustrate and describe the suit side
of the interface. An approval sheet which would
be part of the ICD would be signed by all affected
!- _ associate contractors and NASA add used as the
_ontractural document de_.ining the suit. Changes
I _ to the ICD could be initiated by NASA or a contractor '
_ with an IRN similar to the current procedures
\
: A similar systems level ICD was prepured by Boeing _
_ Aircraft for the Lunar Roving Vehicle (LRV) during
{ !
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Apo]!o prog_:am. The LRV was a co_,plex piecc of
hardware with n_merous Jnte_-fau¢.s. A similar
: document for the su_.t il_terfaces is possible c_nd
should _-ork for futu_-e program_..
r 2. As noted _n .item I, the ICD should be prepared
L on 8 1/2 X ii inch pa]_er to reduce expel,ses in
mailinc, reproduction and storage and permit the
convenience of carrying the e_._..:en.lr_',_ _'_ within a
standard briefcase..
t
' COST CO'/SIDERATIONS :<
• By implementing the recommended guidelines, it is
• [ estimated that the manpower required to support future suit
ICD programs can be reduced to a one (I) man "level of effort
; support" for the duration of the program. This represents
' a savings of approximately two men that were utilized during
the early phases of the Apollo p_-ogram and one man that
was later used at the start of the Skylab program. Additional
support would be available from the systems specification
or systc:ms test engineers during ]?eriods of excessive
activity or when interface tl-ave! is required to more than
i one associate contractor or NASA at the s_me time. The
' cost savings resulting from the decrease in drafting effort,
i mailing, reproductioiA an_ storage changes could not be
{ estil,_ated but would definitely provide a savings in cost
and schedule time.
f
&
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i 4.2 TITL_ '"
, Contract E'_.d Itc_m (CEI) Specifications optimization.
rb "rr,_1 T_ 7%_
[ Dcterm.ine improver_ents _;'hJ.chcan be made to Contract
End Item specifications and as._5ociz:ted maintenance systems for#
future space _ "_Ul_. proaram'_: which _,{13 provide the most efficient
and least costly method of control.
i App}_,OACH :
i
The CEi Specifications used on the Apollo, Sky!nb and
[" ASTP suit p_o,j.._u._-_'.,'nave becn stuCind_ These snecif[cations
' have been examined to determine which requirements or information
[ can be deleted. Those specification items which experienced
_; frequent change activity resulting in excessive maintenance :'!
7
i time and expense %_ere identified as prime candidates for possible
, deletio.1 or change. ,
An estimate of the manpower saved by implementing the •
proposed deletions or revisions in future suit specificatSons
L !
is provided.
i ' GROUND RULES USED FOR STUDY:i
i. The CEI spec'tfications _sed fo_- the period 1970
i through 1973 was used as the study baseline. In
some cases, earlier periods of activity were used
to support this study.
( 2. Any new space suit programs will require new contract
, end item specifications.
: INTRODUCT 7_ON:
Duri:_g past space suit programs, the Contract En_
Item (CEI) specifications w._ , preFared in accordance with the
NASA "Apollo Configuration Management Manua].," NPC 500--1. All
I requirements for the format, contents and change procedurest
i
were imposed on the suit contractor by this manual and little
f flexibility was permitted.
I This study considered several problems experienced
I during the Apollo, Skylab and ASTP suit programs in the preparation
I and maintenance of these rigidly controlled specifications,
(,i reconm_endations for improvement during future space suitt
I programs is provided
-88.
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- PROBLEM :
' Frc_q_._._:utchan_;e_ to suit spec:_ _' -_ :-, ;.lc,,. .....c,n weigl,ts -- "a ] ,,cl
t
Interface Control Docunien[-o (ICD) resulted in nume2:ous CEI
!
: specification changes.[.
BACKGROUND :
!
i Frequent changes to the p_-ez_urc .qa_cellt asseJ_,bly and
separablc comj_onent specification _,,_igh_s have occur_-ed
: '. " because :
i ; a. Changes in mission and symptom der;ign requirements
.. _ . resulting in substantial design changes nece_s':;.tated
i numerous ',..'eightchanges. An example included the
_: :_ Apollo suit design change f'?om a four hour lunar EVA
mission to an eight hour EVA mission.
b. Numerous crew optional items u_:cd on the suit
_ were continually being reviewed or added to the basic
suit configuration. Examples of crew optional
_ } items incl_.dc'd special comfc'i't pads, coT:]fo_t gloves{ . g
. _ val,_alva device, wristlets, qua_-tity of pockets
and many others.
Each weight change resul_ing from t._e addition of a
crew optional item or design requirement re._u_t_d in a
corr,:spending CEI specification weight change. In some cases,
' the weight changed by as little .as a tenth of a pound.
i It should be noted that the cent:col of weighc_; during
the Apollo, Skylab and ASTP suit progr6uns did not include a
i profit inceutative plan for the suit contractor. As a result,
. the suit contractcr in most cases did not add safety factors
to actual component weights when establishi_.._ the suit system
' specification weight. As a result, the maximum actual weight
I of the largest suit and the maximum specification :,ieJght were
I generally within one half a pound. This provided appJ:oxim_tely
a I% safety factor on the specification weight.
A new method of weight control was instituted through
' ILC by NASA in 1972 in an effort to reduce this specification
I change activity. This system was initiated by incl-easing the|
specification maximum weight requirement to one half ;_ pound (1%)
: ! greater than the agreed upon maximum specification value.
, Contract changes were ,r.ade resulting in minor weight inc._'eases
i
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L'" to the system (0.i or less pounds) were rucorded and kept o_:
, , file until the excess one half pound in the specification, ";as
r exceeded. At this time, authorization w_s requested altd
[ approved to increase the specification -_ an. V_ .ue additional
one half pound. This system reduced the number of weight
change SCN's to the specifications significa,_tly.
" In accordance with NPC 500-1, "ApollolConfiguratior,
Management Manual", dated February 19 67, Exhibit If, "Interface
: Requzrement3 states P_ragraph.3.2.1 of the CEI specification
c. shall: ". . . specify, either d_rectly or by reference,
- requirements imposed on the design of the CEI because of
_ its functional, physical and procedural relationships to ?
other equipment/facilities". As a result of this requirement,
:
: all Interface Control Documents (ICD's) pertaining to the end
item were tabulated or "referenced" within each CEI specification.
:. Since these were tabulated by noting the approval date and the
l&test ICD revision letter, each time an ICD document changed
(by IRN or revision letter) correspchding change to the CEI
Specification (SCN) was necessary. This required either the
initiation of an Engineering Change Proposal and the eventual
receipt of a Contract Change t{uthorization since the CEI
specification was a Type I Document requiring formal NASA
approval or these changes were colrd_ined with other formal i
ECP's during th( Skylab Program. This confining of changes
reduced the paperwork somewhat during the Program.[
' GUIDELINES FOR FUTURE PROGRAMS:
I. Two percent increase above the agreed upon maximum
specification weight value should be permitted in
. the system specification. This will decrease
drastically th_ excessive specification change
activity caused by individual weight changes. <
2. The requirement to conform to Paragraph 3.2.1
"Interface Reguirement" in Exhibit II to NPC 500-1
should be deleted since the ICD's are signed by ,
1 the contractor during approval. Zf this is not
('. possible, it is reconunended that as a minimum, :_
the revision letter and approval dates not be
itemized. ,'
f
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_, .. PROB] oEM:
,- During the Apollo, Skylal._ and ASTP suit programs,
i specig_-_c'-,_ _.'._,_ prc,p._.r_d re)- each end item (prime
[_ equi_ment).. . This resulted in the constant ._ep,'_ating of
i "boiler plate" type information.
._ BAC]_G;<CUIgD-:
"Boi].ec plate" information was contained in each]
' CEI e_'''c_t' . . E_._].blt Iisp -±tl _. ion in accorda**ce with the par_:, r.apbs of "'"" "
[ [ "of NASA Document NPC 500-1. Sections such a_ natural
' environments (ground environments) induced environments _fl_ _,- ..gnt)
?
materials, parts and processes selection, standard and commercial
i parts, safety provisions and many other paragraphs cons;:ituted
"boiler plate" information, i
I "Boiler plate" information represents approximately
[
60% of a typical CEI specification where the specifications
ranged from 19 to 70 pages in length (excluding tables and
figures) depending on the complexity of the end item.
Separate CEI specifications were prepared for each
individual end item and each was pl-cpared in accordance with
, NPC 500-1. Due to this requirement, items such as the LCG
water connector adapter assembly r_quire6 ._.separate CEI
• specification. As a result, a total of 12 CEI Specifications
were p_epared for the Apollo program, seven for Skylab and two
for ASTP.
I Due to numerous specifications and the use of the same
- boiler plate ir_formaticu _.n each, changes effecting one
document in some cases required hanges to others. An example
of this repeatability of one change throughout all the CEI
Specifications were the changes to the tabulation of applicability
and compliance to MSCM 8080 design standard requrements which
required changes in all the specifications se:,,,_,_:altimes during
the program.
To compound this problem further, each individual
contract end item required a se,._arate En'jineering Change
( Proposal (ECP) even if the saw_e change effected several
different CEI's. As a result, the MSC:4 8080 boiler plate
-91-
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: specification changcs required a s" )arate ECP be transmitted
to NASA for approval for each CEI changed.
Therefore, these so cal,lcd "no c st" changes achu_lly
resulted in extensive "level of effort" man]_cn_rs to complete
some extremely __- , _ _ .s.._.plu changes, Be_idcs re=_uJt'ing addJ_Jonal
, manpower to type an(_ process the original, o-- "_._p_:c]._icai.Jons,
manpower was also required to review each separate c,_,-,-",ge,
:_ ' submit engineering chan_e propos_Is (ECP_s) to NASA, process
• sCN's and _=upport the Contractor's Configuration Control
' Board (CCB)
The flow diagrams ia ",?igures 4-2-1 and 4-2-2 illustrat,
i" the various activities within ILC that were involved in the
< approval, route for uhe CEI Specifications. It can be seen that
{ even _ small reduction in the number of specification chanc e.,_
f
_- or in the nuni_er of specifications produce_ d_iring the program
can have a sioni[icant effect on the maldlo'u_s of s_pport
manpower required duri_g a program,
GUIDELINES I,'OR FUTURE PkOGP_AMS:
In order to reduce _ manpower "_ ,_ ",.... r(.qu zed to support the
initial preparation and maintenance of CEI specifJ.catio_:s, it
• . "I is reconm_.ended that one CEI specification be prepared to
l
.'" describe all the space suit end J.tem ].equiremcnts. This would
reduce the manpower required i:o support both the Jnitia]
preparation and the later maintensnce o_ the documentation.
! It should be noted that this re¢:onm_endation is in violation
t,,
!.
of NASA Document NPC 500-1. if the implementation of this
_ change on f_ture space suit programs J.s desired, the applicab]._
. ',_' requirements of NASA Document NPC 500-1 should not be imposed
on future suit contractors.
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PROBLEM:
[
Tile confiquration management program required a CEI
L. / "
_= \ specification approval system which created delays in
; incorporating equipment design changes.
_: BACKGROUND:
"_ During the Apollo program and part of the Skylab
i program, specification change notices (SCN) were prepared
r- to document a CEI specification change in accordance with{
I NPC 500-1. Per NPC 500-1, all SCN's require submittal to
i_ .the procuring agency prior to their distribution at thecontractor's depot. (Ref. Pare. 6.1, Exhibit VII of NPC 500-1.)
This approval s_stem resulted in many changes (SCN) requiring
an approval time of up to six months. This was due to thei,
extended time for tile preparation and submittal of the
i ! necessary engineering change proposal (ECP) by ILC and the
" complexity of the NASA approval system. •
i: An additional problem also resulted from'the requirements ;
i of the SCN approval system. This occurred when several
different SC_;'s were submitted to NASA and each affected
{ the same paragraph of the same specification. Examples of
this occurred in chancj;:s made to the interface control ! _
!document listing, weights, field optional item list,
standards of manufacturing (process specs table) and others.
1 Each SCN was documented on a separate engineering change
< proposal (ECP) since different design changes were issued
' on separate contract change authorizations (CCA's)I
_ _ In accordance with Paragraph 6.1.1.5 of Exhibit VII
to NPC 500-1, each SCN was required to state the original
. specification paragraph being changed ("changed from") and
the recommended new replacement paragraph ("changed to").
: _ As a result, when several SCN's were prepared against the
same specification paragraph due to different CCA's, each
SCN referred to the same latest approved specification
paragraph. Therefore, once one ECP and SCN was approved by
NASA_ the remaining ECP's and SCN's would be rejected since
_ . these SCN's no longer stated the latest "changed from"
paragraph Of the specification. This occurred because
;, -95-
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approval of the first SCN revised the wording of the _
affected paragraph.
_ - In an effort to resolve this paperwork problem, ILC
[ revised the Skylab/Apol]o configuration management plan,
881270043D. Exhibit ].202, Paragraph V-A and F of the
,_ plan, contains the following SCN approval system agreed _
t
, upon by ILC Dover and NASA/JSC: _,
"For expediency in implementation, the NASA Resident
i Engineer, based on t ±econ concurrence with the NASA/JSC
" Technical Monitor (or his designee), will approve the SCN,
by signature, prior to ECP submittal/approval• In these
instances, the SCN will be officially released and implemented.
f Subsequent changes, related to ECP approval will be implemented
I'_ by an additional SCN which will be made part of the original
" I,
_. "SCN's which do not reflect signatory approval at _
i ti_e of ECP submittal will not be implemented until the
i ECP is approved• When this occurs, CMO will be responsible
for obtaining NASA Resident Engineer approval prior to
i release and implementation of the SCN."
When the SCN was approved in accordance with this
system, it permitted any subsequent SCN's changing the same
paragraph to reflecL the new "changed from" paragraph. This
I occurred since the normal approval time was approximately
J one to five days Once this approval was received, the
, approved SCN was then submitted to the ECP eliminating the
I
'" problems experienced in the past. It should be noted that
" this sytem did contain one drawback, the risk of ECP
I disapproval by NASA/JSC Recognizing this remote possibility,( " ,-
• a procedure was incorporated in ILC Document 881270043D,
f
I Exhibit 1202F stating the following:
"In the event an SCN is subsequently disapproved/
_ ! modified, after NASA Resident Engineer approval and offical
i release, the applicable CCBD will be revised to identy _
. action required."
_ _ , "SCN's will never be revised. Subsequent changes
L [ incorporating modifications or retracting a previous SCN
-96-
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f (in total) will require a new SCN. In cases of total
_- retracting, the previously superseded pages will be re-activated
with the latest SCN nuri_er added and the Release datu changed.
i
The change log will be updated to reflect the latest S_
and other required data."
In actuality, less than 1% of the SCN approval and
preparation time was used to prepara new SCN's due to
t customer disapproval of the ECP.
T
GUIDELINES FOR FUTURE PROGR;9._S:
C_ _' It is recommended that a specification change notice _
%
I_ "' (SCN) system similar to that discussed in ILC Document
. : / 881270043D be utilized on future space suit programs. >
I F !"
f.' ' This procedure should be used in lieu of the recommended
NASA procedure discussed in NPC 500-1. Utilization of
{ this new procedure will result in a signification cost savings
in manpower for the preparation, review and copying time •
I involved in rewriting SCN's. In addition, a definite
L .
schedule savings will also result since the submithal and
_ approval time for engineering change proposals could extend
I to six months.
, CEI SPECIFICATION COST CONSIDERATIONS:
!
1 By implementing the guidelines discussed and assuming
a similar rate of change activity as in past programs, :.
! : it is estimated that the manpower required to support future :
suit specification maintenance activities can be performed
•I. by one (i) man for the duration of a program. This represents
L
- a savings of one man over the level required to perform :
this function during most of the Apollo and Skylab programs.
}
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B4.3 TITLE:
_ Field Operating Procedures
_ OBJECTIVE: _:
Ii To review the systems and philosophy used during
Contract NAS 9-6100 for preparation and maintenance of Field
[" Operating Procedures. To identify guidelines that might
L_ be employed on future space suit programs that would
effectively reduce costs for preparing and maintaining Field
_._ Operating Procedures.
' f
APPROACH:l- ?
_, Fiel_ Operating Procedures were analyzed in terms of i
contract requirements, format, methods of change, ease of
I" use and effectiveness. Level of detail of these documents
?
was compared to the depot Table of Operations (TO's) to
_ I_ determine if cross-utilization cou]_ be:implemented. Emphasis
: was placed on identifying areas within the Operational
, Procedures that could be modified to effect cost savings.
Future program guidelines are recommended in areas of potential
_ cost savings. Potential savings are presented by comparison _
iL of level of effort required on NAS 9-6100 and projected
level of effort for future programs employing _le recommended
!
o I• guidelines.
i INTRODUCTION: :_
I. Field operational documents as referred to in this
study consisted of the following documents:
i | Maintenance Manual (No. 8819700712)
. Illustrated Parts Breakdown (No. 8819700713)
i At the initiation of this study, the Chamber
i Pre-installation Acceptance Test_rQcedure and th_ Fl_,ght
"4
I Pre-installation Test Procedure were to be included in the
[ analysis of field operational procedures. However, a _
preliminary survey identified very few cost related problems :_
i: I with them. These documents were revised prior to the Skylab
_ , program to incorporate a test sequence that had evolved _!
I through several years of successful use. Personnel using
[
! ( these documents expressed overall satisfaction with the
I' _ format and adequacy. On the basis of the results of this i _
I; preliminary survey, these two documents were deleted
,. -98- s
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i from the study.
k The Maintenance Manual (_4) Js a two volume (1,0].3
: ! pages) technical publication containing descriptions of ,|
space suit equipment and systems with instructions for
°
i I" effectiv_ use inc_'_dJng operational instructions, maintenance
'i I t
j and overhaul instructlons, assel_ly parts lists with supporting
I illustrations and mod!:_ication instructions.
The illustrated Parts Breakdown (IPB) is a single
_" _ol_me, 309 pages, parts list which supplements the
L Maintenance Manual and is used primarily for spare parts
definition.
iI _ The MM and IPB resulting from Contract NAS 9-6100
evolved from four years of continued support activity which
•_!}"I_ included many. _eviews and modifications to the format andi I
the required level of detail. Having a complete, current
[ and understandable document is necessary for performance ofi
quality CEI maintenance in the field. A survey of users
_ indicated general satisfaction with the document in meeting
! its intended objective. These technical publications were
of a);high standard and as such were expensive to prepare andI
: I maintain in relation to other space suit operational
documents. These documents required an average of two _
!
I engineers, a technician and part time use of an illustrator
to maintain throughout most of the program. Labor costs
" associated with this activity were on a level-of-effortcharged
• basis, that is, the required personnel were maintained
I_ throughout the program to support any tasks associated with i
maintenance of technical publications and their time was
• : _
i not charged to contract changes.PROBLEM: i '_
! The Maintenance Manual and IPB were expensive to
i prepare and maintain throughout the space suit program.
' BACKGROUND: _.
i I The Maintenance Manual was required to be an all
L
_, encompassing document and contain a very high level of ,!
I "'( technical detail The text is concise, comprehensive, and
i
[:
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SO worded as to be understandable to a high school or service
[ school graduate with knowledge of the applicable general
theory _nd technical terms used in the space suit field and :
i" with some practical experience, Illustration_ consisting of
art work such as graphs, photographs, charts, diagrams, and
[. drawings are used to support the text. The illustrationsused in the manual required more d tail than normally found
on drawings. While drawings are usu_lly of a full front
[" view, many of the illustrations required a three quarter
profile which are not readily trans[errable from drawings.
[" At the completion of the contract, the _M and IPB contained
a total of 185 illu_trations. An average illustration :i
->
required 30 hours of time to prepare.
i_ Technical descriptions and illustrated details
! concerning all current Class I and Class II configurations
[ had to be maintained. All space suit models that were in :
current use had to be included. At one time during the
P
program, this included the A7LB Apollo, A7LB Skylab,
. Command Module Pilot (CMP) and the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project %
(ASTP). space suits. Since the Maintenance Manual is the i
only technical publication in use by field personnel, it
T
! serves as a "catch all" for all non-testing technical _
: directions. Field Operations Bulletins, System Safety
I I Notices and Standard Repair Procedures had to b_ incorporated
I into the document as part of routine maintenance. _
i [ References to other existing operational procedures
were not permitted. Notes and warnings had to be repeated
e
! throughout the document instead of including them in the r
i i" general section and referring to them when applicable • _
I • If design changes affected one section of an illustration _• and did not obsolete th current configuration, i required ;
i the complete redrawing of the illustration, rather than
! showing both approved configurations on the same illustration.
i: Cleaning instructions were contained throughout the manual. _
_ I Although complete and current procedures existed in other
I. Class I documentation, reference to these procedures were _
_ .( not permitted.
2 [ :_
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,.. Separate and different operating instructions were
used by the depot and field even though they performed many
k similar activities. Depot TO's are detailed step-by-step i
r[- manufacturing instructions describing fabrication of an end
item. They contain all the sequences, specifications,
inspection points and material identifications that are •
I.
required to fabricate a suit. The instructions are tailored/
_ I" to the use of all new materials and all assembly work
. starts from zero flow. Disassembly instructions are not
contained in TO's. Production operators normally do not haveU
_ to contend with the difficulty associated with working on a
!_ total space suit assembly. TO's were not prepared in
I_ Maintenance Manual format because the sequence of work was
i not compatible with maintenance activities. When CEI "
[-_ modifications were performed at the depot, rework i_structions,
: '' prepared in the TO format, were used in lieu of the Maintenance
' Manual Additionally, the pressures of the manufacturing
k' [ • _,
schedules never permitted sufficient time to insur_ that
.?
! i ' TO's were written in a format useable for both depot and
! I field activities. Less time was required to address the
rework instructions to the conditions that prevailed for theI
_ { particular job in-flow. Although the Maintenance Manual _
_ was useable at the depot in some instances, complete utilization
I_i was never considered because of the following reasons:
i A. Depot rework nearly always involved work on i
_ I structural members of the space suit. The
_: Maintenance Manual did not address itself to the
J i
' i" rework of structural seams since it was not an :
t authorized field maintenance aztivity. _,
I B. Since most of the instructions needed to perform i_
t rework were already contained in existing TO's !.w
it was more expeditious and economical to change
i/ a TO to fit the particular rework problem than
attempt to update existing Maintenance Manual
. instructions.
,( CEI design changes were excessive during certain
I periods of the space suit program This caused a high
turnover on Maintenace Manual changes. During 1971 and
L
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{ 1972, a total of 80 changes were processed to the Maintenanc(
Manual and IPB. These changes required modification of
r
} 2,378 text pages and 173 illustrations. Bascd on established
t,
standards, processing of these changes required over 12,000
, man hours.
The level-of-effort method of maintaining the
7 Maintenance Ha_ual and IPB created a situation whereby
_ change direction to the Maintenance Manual was directed
• with little regard for associated costs. The Customer¢-- •
I. on maintaining the initially stand3rds,
insisted established
even though the experience level of field technicians had i
[ increased. This required long-term extension of required '
l %
support personnel.
I: GUIDELINES FOR FUTURE PROGRAMS:
!" i. Future CEI designs should place more emphasis
_ on field maintainability. Future programs should
i authorize all levels of modification, maintenance
f and repair by field personnel and Incorporate
..i appropriate instructions in the Maintenance Manual. _
_ This guideline will probably increase the initial
_ [ preparation cost of maintenance publications,
/ but will result in considerably less program
[ costs when compared to the cost of returning CEI's!
i to the depot for modification. Major CEI overhaul _
I should continue to be performed at the depot •
; _" in order to keep logistics and tooling costs to
_ a minimum.
I. 2. Table of Operations (TO's) should be utilized as
! - the assembly instructions in the Maintenance
Manual whenever practical. Initial preparation
of TO's should consider subsequent field use as *.
a major objective. A section describing disassembly
_ ' procedures could be provided to supplement TO
_ assembly instructions.
: , I 3. Use of references should be permitted within the ,
i /_ Maintenance Manual when practical. Documentationi
_ L which is developed and maintained specifically to
_ perform other related activities should be
: -i02-
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referenced in lieu of incorporating
the actual verbage in the Maintenance Manual.
1
" k. Notes, cautions, etc. should be contained in a
f
I I general section 'of the document, and only
_" repeated in the body when absolutely necessary.
I-" When simple design differences exist between
i.
assemblies or sub-assemblies, allow the use of
one illustration to depict both authorized
['" configurations. .
4. The requirement to perform a Customer review in
!, 20 working days sh_ _id be enforced and when not
complied with, allow the contractor to
I'_-" release the change without further delay.
L_
Delays of change release create a pyramid effect
r"
i. and causes expensive b_cklogs and delays on
maintaining a current _ecument.
_ [' 5. Maintenance Manual change activity should be
l handled on a CCA instead of a level-of-effort
f basis. This will insure proper forethought
_ ,, before requesting changes that are not absolutel_,
: necessary. This would eliminate a high percentage
_- I of changes caused by personal desires when
_ techniques or manner of presentation is the only
_ I' thing in question.
!
COSTING:
_'_ I_ Preparation and maintenance of Technical Publications
was performed on a level-o'f-effort basis during Contract
NAS 9.6100. As many as seven people were utilized full-timeI
I'_ on this effort during certain phases of the program. Initial
I' preparation costs were high since very little technical
" _ information was available for use as groundwork. A large
L
part of the initial art work was performed by outside
contracts since the Company capabilities in this area were
• limited. As the program matured, additional capability was
developed in-house and the writers bec_ne more familiar with
the suit design and associated manufacturing techniques.
When the ATLB model space suit was introduced, the publications
-103-
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¢_ group had stabilized to a level of two engineers, one
[ "_ technical writer and one illustrator. T_is level was
.. maintained until early 1972 when the illustrator was phased
[ [ out. Cost data compiled from July 1971 through the end of
the contract (September 1973) reveals that a total of 85 man
>
I
I months was expended on technical publication support. This
equates to slightly over 3.1 men per month. During this
I. period, three major changes were processed which incorperated
the CMP, Skylab, and ASTP configured suits. The change for
[" " the ASTP required approximately 165 new ext pages and i
modification to 323 other pages. Thirty-seven new illustrations
! were required. On the basis of established standards,
I preparation of this change required approximately 3,400 _
man hours or over 90% of the total time spent on technical
I" publications during the ASTP period, it is apparent that
the bulk of support was used in incorporating text and
" new On a program relatively
illustrations for models. that is
stable in terms of design changes, most of the support cost
[ would be eliminated. Incorporation of cost savings guidelines
recommended herein would result in further cost reductions.
[ _ It is probable that one full-time person with part-time
support of an illustrator could have maintained the
I_ required technical publications after establishment of the
_ qualification baseline. This would have resulted in a
savings of 17 to 20 man months per year during the operational
i. phases of the program.
4
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[_ 4.4 TITLE:
!" Engineeri_,g Orgmization and Manpower Summary
__ [.. OBJkCT'[VE : ,
' Evaluate the engineering org_,nization that existedL.
: during the A7LB and ASTP space suit programs. RecoI_end
!
[" changes that would result in reduced overall costs while
still providing an efficient and effective engineering -i
I- operation.
I
APPROACH:
i " The ILC functional engineering organization in effect i
during the A7LB and ASTP space suit programs is used as a
[_ comparative baseline. Areas that contributed to excessive
_ engineering costs are identified. These areas are reviewed
toidentify reasons for excessive costs and recon_T,endations
[ are made on means of reducing associated costs. These are
presented in the form of future program g_idelines relative[., to each problem area Cost savings are reflected in a _•
: proposed organization chart that is compared to a factored '
[ -'
• _ A7LB organization chart.
,,. GROUND RULES USED FOR STUDY: :,
i i. The engineering organization for the period 1970
I through 1973 was used as the study baseline.
In some cases, activities of earlier periods _i '.. were used to support trade-cffs. Emphasis was )
placed on reducing the level of required engineers.
The effects on supporting personnel (draftsmen,
- technicians, etc.) was assumed to be proportional
I. (See Figure 4.4.1). :' •
2. The proposed engineering organization was manloaded
' I to support the program schedule presented in :
_ _ section 3.4 of this report (See Figure 4.4.2).
; { INTRODUCTION: ,'
_ [ In an aerospace program, engineering organizational
_ ; structure and responsibilities are principally the responsibility _
_ I_' of the contractor. Very few specific operational requirements
( concerning engineering are imposed on the Contractor Exceptions
{_ [
-I05-
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[- are requi1:e_,ents to provide drawings and de_,ign requi.-ements
i imposed d_rinc] the devc]opment and qualification phase: ofi . . . --
the program. In most cases, the Project Manager has _:
t s_fficient flexibility to allow him to c:r,janiTe Jn the manner
he feels will get the job done best. Direction from the
e --'De d _.
Customer is nearly always in the form of r c_m,n ations
In this report, several problezs chat were considered .
{ to be causes of excess costs hove been identified. The
I
nature an_ causes of the identified problems are varied.
i
[ "Some were a result oi contr<ct direction and some because the
• _ dynamics of the program didn't allow tim:,' to develop more
i" r" efficient systems. In each case, guidelines are give_ as
i a means of eliminating or reducing these costs. In most
_, cases, the savings are identified Jn terms of reduced
; (
! man hours. However, the amount of savings realized on a
i, future program would be primarily a function of how the
[
i ' Project Manager elects to organize his engineering department. _[
If he elects to use engineering prim_.rJ ly as problem solvers ,_
once development is complete, costs will be lower. IIowever,
' if he feels the need for a large engineering force after _,
development is complete, costs will be higher. On ::_y new
program, a manpower trade-off study based on management
objectives must be performed after the development phase to
determine the level of engineering required. In this
: report, an engineering organization is proposed that will be
r
• based on implementation of all or most of t/_e included
" guidelines. The manpower level of this organization is
: then compared to the level of the engineering organization
• that existed at ILC during the period 1970 to 1973. The
man loading of the 1970-1973 organization was based on an
average 1/5 production rate. Manloading differences between
the proposed organization and the 1/20th factored organization _
, are a measure of the savings associated with the recon_nendations
of this report. See Figure 4.4.3.
BACKGROUND OF A7LB ENGINEERING ORGANIZATION: '
u. !
i _- The Apollo, Skylaband ASTP Engineering Organization '
reported directly to the Program Manager. The engineering i
-106- !_
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organization operated as a "line" _unction throughout the
!. total program and was involved in nearly_ every aspect of
•. tho program. It w_,s managed by a chief engineer who reported
; directly to tl_e Program Manag6r. He had total responsibility
for the Apollo engineering group and functional responsibility
I for all other engineering personnel supporting the Apollo
!
group.
The organization consisted of personnel assigned!
!
[. directly to the Apollo group supplemented by engineers or ,
" .support personnel from other company non-Apollo groupc.
{? The organization primarily consisted of four engineering
disciplines; design_ project, systems and documentation i ;
_. Project engineering responsibility was sub-divided
.
into major CEI's or _roups of CEI's that were associated_in _
i some respect. As an example, one project engineer was i
,. assigned responsibility for the Integrated Themnal Meteoroid
Garment, Extravehicular Visor Assembly and EV gloves.
_'_1
1 Each of thesa CEI's are associated through emphasis on its
.- thermal requirements. Additional junior project engineers
i were then assigned to the lead engineers. Since every
"_ Contract End Item (CEI) was assigned as the responsibility
[ of a project engineer, all major decisions effecting CEI's
were made by the project engineer or by a group in which the
" i project engineer was a prime contributor• Sol,_e typical
,z . responsibilities of a project engineer were: CEI coordination,
¢. I flight support, engineering change activity, requirements¢ -
'" definition and failure analysis support.
• Design engineers were assigned to project engineers
;" in accordance with their respective expertiso. Historically,
, " these were people that had gained their space suit knowledge
! through long experience and were involved with the CEI
from the concept stage through production. Typical
. responsibilities of a design engineer were: CE_ design and
\ ' development, production and retrofit problem support,
• manufacturin 9 instructions, tooling design, fitcheck support, !
engineering drawings, engineering change activity, and testing. ;j
-i07-
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•I The system enqineering group was primarily rez_)nsJ.b!e
i for all activities that dealt with the total spacesuit system.
It included all manned testing, final CEI acceptance testing,
|
; fitchecks, qualification testing, interface coordination and
!. system level documentation.
! The documentation group was responsible for the majority
_ of all non-system level documentation generated in the
:_ , engineering group. This included engineering change orders,°
{• process and procurement specifications, drafting, field
" .operational documents and modification instructions.
q
i _ small material engineering group reported directlyl.
t
to the chief engineer because support from this group was
usually required by all sub-gro_pc within the organization.
( Some typical responsibilities of this gzoup included:
materials selection, evaluation and testing, generation of
I material specifications and production trouble-shooting! ' *
The remaining organizations consisted of an engineering
planner who performed scheduling, costing and activity
coordination, and a test engineer whose prime responsibility
I
! was coordinating and directing space suit test activities in
: the test labs.
i PROBLEM:
_ Throughout the ILC space suit program, several
I support functions which were primarily performing production
_ _ tasks were assigned to the engineering organization. Costs
I associated with these non-engineering tasks were charged to
the engineering department.
• BACKGROUND:
i The functions included glove modelmaking, pattern
" making and test technicians.
I The glove model maker's major responsibility relative
.w •
to the suit program was development of molds used for the
I manufacture of custom gloves. This task consisted of
I • making a master mold from the astronaut hand cast and using
! it to make the custom manufacturing mold. Time standards
,_ 1 were developed early in the program and were fairly
(_ consistent regardless of the size of the hand. With the
exception of a few design improvements, the techniques used
i
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r by the glove modelmakers were relatively unchange.] throu_;hout _
! . ' tile program Following deve]op:_ent of the molding technJcue:;, \
\ which occurred very early in the program, tl_is was
!
I primarily a manufacturino supp0_'t function and s.ho_nld h_ve
been assigned organizationally to that department.
i The pattern making function was very similar to the <
glove modclmaking function in terms of enc;.neering versus
; manufactu_-in, 3 support During th,: development phase of a
i program, the pattern maker develops the patterns necessary _:
i I" for the intended design. From that point on, his major
_- responsibility is developing cu._tom and sized patterns to
meet production requirements for assigned astronauts. Again
i this was primarily a manufactt_ring support function and _'
should have been assigned organizationally to that department.
Test technicians perform a large variety of functions :|
in support of a suit program. An attempt to make a realistic
5
I eshimate of technician's work load associated with engineering
{ and that associated with manufacturing _.:ould be impractical,
i since it varied according to the dyna1_ics of the progrsm.
. However, several functions performed by the technician
group could readily be identified as production-associated.
These tasks included daily testing of adhesive samples,
weekly testing of material properties, fitcheck support
I
1 and equipment calibration and repair. These were routines
that were relatively standard in terms of time and varied
t primarily as a function of the production rate. Because&
'. of the structure of the organization, the_e function-s were
' the responsibility of engineering and in many cases couhs _
IJ
_ associated with these functions were charged to engineering.
I This was especially true when idle time occurred or when the
' nature of the particular job was difficult to identify A
prime example occurred during the trouble-shooting of a '
_. manufacturing problem when detailed direction of the technician
,o
was usually provided by an engineer. This time was normally _/
charged to engineering rather than manufacturing. :.,
, With the possible exception of improved communication :%
° ' and coordination, reassignment of functions identified :
-109- I '
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herein would px-obably not result in a new program saving:.
However, from the standpoint of cost management, proper *
assignment would result in a more realistic distribution of
program costs, and in this situation wou]d have resulted
in a smaller share of total cost being identified as "engineer__ng
! costs".
L GUIDELINES FOR FUTURE PROGRam, S:
_ Personnel supporting the manufactuxing process
i
{ should be assigned oxganizationally to the manufacturing i
department or tile manufacturing department should be ;
{- responsible for the financial management of tasks suppo_:ting
their effort.
i PROBLEM:
Changing mission requirements caused continuous ;7
i qualificati,_n activity which in turn dictated a high level
i
' of continuous engineering support.
BACKGROUND :
L In a period extending from February 1968 through
; , Febxuary 1972, active cycle qualification testing was in
[ prog_-ess for 29 months or approximahely 70% of the 49 *
! month period (see Table i). Approxin_tely 72% of the test
! _! time was utilized in testing to meet new or redefined mission
requirements. The remaining time was spent in qualifying
! for a combination of equipment failures and design changes _
such as adding arm bearings and large wrist disconnects.
Fifteen months were expended on the A7LB suit while the
_. remaining time was spent on the A7L suit. The elapsed times
noted on Table 4.4.6 reflects active test time and does not
include _dditonal time spent in preparation of test plans,
procedures and final reports. For all practical purposes,
}
i _ it can be stated that qualification test activity was in _
progress throughout the total period.
{
Since this task deals only with the engineering _
i
organization, no attempt will be made herein to develop a
total cost of the qualification activity performed during the _
: A7L/A7LB suit program. The objective of this section is to
{
-IIO-
1975005463-I14
! •
identify engineering costs associated with quaiif_cation
!
\. testing and recommend methods of red'acing these engineering'
I costn. Through a review of program engineering charges, it
i
' has been estimdt_d that four r: n months per month of engineer__ng
, support was required to support each month of qualification
! testing regardless of what phase the program was in. This ! •
support consisted of a con_ination of softgoods, hardgoods,
! pattern designers and systems test engineers. This support
does nc,t include the design, development and DVT time _
I _xpendc:d on the CEI prior to the start of testing, but does
:_ include ti'ne spent in qual failure redesigns a:_d preparation
_ _ of qualification documentation such as plans, procedures,
_" TRR's and report's. On this basis, it is estimated that a
: ; minimum of 196 man months of engineering time was expended
" D/
_ I in direct support of qualification test activity in a four •
: _ year period. If complete and correct A7L and A7LB mission
! requirements had been available prior to the start oft
?
o_ testing, it can be assumed that only the Mission C and :
M_ssion J test programs would have been necessary. These
¢
:_ two progran_s required seven and nine months of elapsed time
¢_
respectively. On the basis of four man months/month of _
engineering support and allowing a 40% increase to cover
I test preparation, reports and contingencies; total time
I expended for these two programs would have been
I 4 [ (7 + 9) + 0.4 (7 + 9) ] = 89.6 man months of effort.
,_ The attainable savings would have been 196 - 90 or 106 man
• months of engineering. :'
}" The attached man loading chart (Table 4-4-4),
• reflecting engineering requirements for a future program,
' I show performance of a qualification program in a seven
: month period. Th._s p_e_osed program takes advantage of
_ i qualification by subassemblies to minimize total qualification
I flow time. Again, allowing a 40% increase in time for test _
_ preparation, final report and contingencies, total time
would be 4 [7 X 0.4 (7) ] = 39.2 man months of effort.
\
J {
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I( It is obvious that considerable savings can be
:, attained by minimizing qualification test time. In addition
I : to savings of direct qualification test _upport time,
t
similar engineering savings %zill be realized by the reduction
i of personnel needed to perform delta DVT and component
bench tests.
; •
I GUIDELINES FOR FUTURE PROGRAMS:
i. Cycle requirements must be thoroughly defined _
I for all possible missions that might utilize the
_" CEI being qualified. _f this is no_ possible, the
" " CEI should be subjected to cycle endurance
I _ testing to establish its useful life.
" 2. If failures occur during the qual testing, a
(- , i ,',' L '_ trade-off should be performed to determine if _
' _t" £ " I
,.r /
/ the item should be redesigned and retested or
1 - classified as a limited life item to the extent "
t
that cycle testing had been completed.
( 3. Subassembly qualification as reflected in section
3.4 should be utilized to preclude test delays _
?
if a failure should occur. On past programs, a -
failure to any part of the CEI required complete
/ termination of testing until the failure was _
i_. analyzed and corrective action defined and _-
implemented.
I 4. Overtesting should be prevented. Several examples
that occurred during the A7L/A7LB programs were:
!. initial safety factors were set too high, no
i ° allowance was made for "i g" versus i/6g effects
1"
• on the CEI and astronaut mobility techniques
such as "young's Rocks" caused undue stresses
on the CEI and resulted in a test failure and
! I expensive redesign. In the latter case, redesign
• could have been precluded by,definition of! allowable mobility techniques.
._ PROBLEM:
I Astronaut fitchecks were performed at the depot as I_(
L.' part of the pre-delivery acceptance test which required a
significant amount of engineering support.
Ii
' .. -112-
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i BACKGROUND:
Because of the integrated design of the A7L and A7LB
' _ _ space suits, it was necessary that fitchecks be performed
i at the depot. In order to obtain optimum fit of the CEI,
_" it was imperative that cable lengths were correct. In
r addition to affecting suit fit, improper cable lengths
!
i could cause premature failures and restrict mobility. Since
the cables wei:e beneath the Integrated Thermal Meteoroid Ccver
L (ITMG) and were attached with. permanent fittings, it was
¢ . necessary that correct cable lengths be established and
_. permanently installed prior to integration of the ITMG and
final acceptance testing.
Each fitcheck required an average of 52 maDhours of
I support by softgoods, hardgoods, systems, project and
! { manufacturing engineers. This support consisted of pre-fitchecks,
f
! _ preparation of supporting hardware and facilities, coordination
}
_ ;II of supporting personnel and the actual fitcheck. This 52
:I
: ! hours did not include engineering time required in correcting
fitcheck discrepancies. On this basis, the 200 PGA'sI
_ _ procured on NAS 9-6100 required roughly 10,400 manhours of
• engineering fitcheck support. It is estimated that elimination
; i of fitchecks would have resulted in the elimination of one
full-time engineer during the life of the contract. Other
I savings not reflected in this report would have been realized
in the areas of technicians, quality inspectors and program
_[ personnel; cost of facilities and equipment to support
• fitchecks; and savings associated with more efficient utilization
of astronauts' training time.
_ _ GUIDELINES FOR FUTURE PROGKAMS:
Impose a design requirement that initial fitchecks
J _
i.e., do not make fitcheck a requirement of PDA. To
i 1 accomplish this, a modularized suit with simplified sizing
%
' adjustments should be considered. Use of permanent sizing
i I cables, which are one of the prime reasons for depot fitchecks,
I should be reduced or completely eliminated. With modularization,
I . -113-
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slave sub-assemblies could be used for pre-ma_ufacturing size
I_ selection. Ideally, the only sub-assemblies that could not
L
be preselected on the basis of slave units would be the
[ii gloves. The few times that _ suit might require return
•i to the depot for rework as a result of a fitcheck problem
would be far less expensive than having the astronauts[-
[. commute to the depot.
PROBLEM: .:
]" Limited resources of other engineering groups within
L L
the company required the space su_t group to maintain a
[_ " minimum of critical engineering skills.
BACKGROUND:
[ In terms of employees, ILC is considered a small
company. Historically, its product line has been limited
to speciality items. Examples or company products otL_r .i[
[. than space suits were helmets, face shields, inflatable
structures and other miscellaneons personnel protective
• gear. During the space suit program, an average of 80%
of ILC's business was with NASA. The pool o_ _ngineering
i resources _utside the suit program was limited and thei
company product line was such that a large non-suit engineering !
[ staff was not required and could not be supported. Therefore,
_. most of the engineers employed by the Company were hired
[ i_ expressly for working on the space suit program. _[
- A space suit program requires an extensive amount of ?
_J [ unique engineering expertise. The high quality and reliability
requirements dictate the need for design specialists in
areas such as softgoods, materials, hardware, human factor_,
i. _mnned testing and patterning. Many of the required skills
• are not taught as part of a classical engineering curriculum, "
__" [ but are learned through experience.' '_
_ In large companies, necessary design engineering talent i_
_ 1 WOU_ be drawn from the company engineering department when _
| , needed and returned to the engineering department when his :_;
, _ services were no longer required. In the event of problems
i -_ requiring his expertise, he could be recalled for short-term
_ support. Small companies such as ILC, not having the surplus _5 _ "
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!t resources available, must hire personnel to meet the
' requirements of the individual program_. Under these
conditions, the engineer must be suppo_.ted almost entirely
_'-
i by the program for which they were hired. When contractural
committments require that the contractor be prepared to
support resolution of any design problems occurring
throuahout the program, it is imperative that the company
! retain as many of the "experts" as practical. This can be
costly but is the trade-off that must be made in order to
[_ - insure theft the talent is available when required. The
l_-. dynamics of a space suit program, with its cost].y penalities
- f_ for schedule delays, usually leave no other alternahives
I_ for a small contractor.
OPTIONS FOR FUTURE PROGRAMS:[! i. NASA should supply services associated with certain
engineering specialist skills. An example of
_i Iii this would be in stress analysis whereby NASA could I
• supply complete support in the form of analysis,
_ testing and specifications. This system would
[ probably result in increased flow time for
i development and change activity but in a progr_,
_ with limited change activity, it could result in
a net savings.
, _., 2. NASA could perform all failure analysis with
• ,6t_,' contractor approval. Excluding engineering activityI
• I, t._,' caused by mission requirement changes,
. /_ analysis is probably the most expensive design
failure
: I. engineering activity that occurs after qualification.
it Qualified personnel must be retained in the
!• _ | organization to handle all levels of failure. The
_ ! [ facilities and resources that exist at NASA might
iil I allow this _unction to be performed by them at
' _ considerably less expense.
_ Another option avaialable would be for NASA to retaint
I responsibility of product redesign and use the Contractor
_. (_ primarily for retrofits and nod kit fabrication once
/
1 qualification is completed
:' !
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PROBLEM:
[_'.- Manufacturing engineers were not given enough
_ -_- responsibility. This resulted in design engineers spending
_ a significant amount of time supporting production floor
problems.
:- In the early days of tile space suit program, very)
_; _'_ few personnei were familiar with the design and fabrication
t ' of the space suit.
" - These were the design engineers who developed
_ [;_ the suit and were engrossed in design modifications as
well as preparaLion of all documentation required for
_ _, production. Tight program schedules resulted in the design i
engineers making key technical decisions to solve manufacturing
_ •I!_: problems. This occurred because the manufacturing engineers
were delegated the role of production supervisors until
I-i they gained enough experience to make technical decisions.
i.. Eventually, it became necessary to assign a design engineer<
_: _ full-time to the production area.
I. Through the last qua_:ter of the program, a committee
:, consisting of a design, manufacturing and quality engineer
_ was assigned to the production area to support manufacturing
_ activities. This system, although effective, was inefficient
_ I and costly. However, as the program matured, the manufacturing
engineers acquired the experience and were delegated
_ !. additional responsibilities.
• The design engineer was, then required only on an
_i I- "as-needed" basis. This transition was lengthy, inefficient
_ _ and expensive and was caused by not allowing _dequate timel' P
_ _ "_ I ' during the development phase for training ol personnel.} GUIDELINES FOR FUTURE PROGRAMS:
I. Manufacturing engineers should get involved during
If _ _" _he CEI development process to the extent of
• .i, _,-- writing detailed manufacturing instructions and
4, I ! _"'l 4.,." recommending techniques that will expedite flow
_ t" '_ ! _'t or reduce costs when the CEI goes into production.
I , -i16-
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2. Discrepant conditions and the level of criticality J
must be clearly defined te preclude lost time
caused by generating unnecessary discrepancy
_° reports. |
3. Manufacturing tooling requiremeDt should be the |
[_ responsibility of manufacturing engineers. _
Participation of manufacturing engineers during
U
I the development process will reduce the number
(. of "one-time only" tools made for the purpose of
• checking out design concepts. _
I_ 4. Design engineers should serve only as a support
function to manufacturing once the production _
- phase has started. They should only be used on "
an as-needed-basis and only when the problems
I- are one of a design nature. !:
_ - 5. Manufacturing engineers should be given increased _
! responsibility in the disposition of discrepancies. _
_. PROBLEM:
i Activities were performed by the engineering group ?
I that were redundant and could have been performed as
effectively by other program groups•
Engineering Liaison was a small group within the _5
I engineering organization that was responsible for engineering
_ change orders and operational specifications. As their _
I title implies, they performed liaison functions between
i $ engineering, drafting, CMO and the program office. The
' I group was originally formed to process the engineering <
I documentation required for engineering changes. During the
periods of extensive design change activity, it was determined :_
,.
1 that.project and design engineers were devoting an extensive
" amount of their time to processing change documentation.
) The majority of the workload was created by the contractural _
_ requirements of MIL-D-1000 which necessitated total documentation
of assemblies, sub-assemblies and component parts of the i'
_ suit. A change to a simple piece part could affect as many
iI 1 as seven levels of drawings in addition to process, procurement _
" [
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.... and test specifications. As the workload became excessive,
_:_: backlogs occurred and changes to second level documentation i
were being overlooked. Liaison engineers were tasked to
[ identif_ all documents affected by a change and to insure '
that all changes were completely and correctly documented.
I_ The necessity of this group was justified under the circumstances
that existed during the Apollo program_ However, if drawing
F requirements are reduced (see Section 3.1) on future programs,
_ the need for an engineering liaison group would be reduced.I
_. " The resPonsibilities performed by this group could then bedivided between the engineering organization and the
Configuration Management Organization (CMO). Preparation
of technical documents such as process and test specifications
would remain the responsibility of engineering while the
processing coordinating engineering change
$
and of documentation
would be performed by the CMO group. This transfer of
! responsibility is considered feasible since much of theA
check-and-balance and coordinating activity performed by
_ the Liaison Engineering Group was redundant to activities
performed by the CMO group, ii__
A flow process chart is presented (Figure 4.4.5) as[; ,an example of one of the cost savings that could be realized _
by transferring ECO responsibility from the engineering ilrz
[i liaison group to CMO. By merely transferring the functional /
responsibility, the elimination of coordination and transportationl il
time amounts to a savings of 52 minutes per ECO. Although
- 52 minutes seems insignificant, when multiplied by the i
! average 700 ECO's that were processed per year, this amounts
to a savings of over 600 man hours per year. This same
r_ savings would be attainable on other types of change
I;. documentation. Additional savings not reflected on the i
flow chart result by the use of less expensive personnel !
to perform the same function. Other areas of duplication
that occurred between CMO and Engineering Liaison were=
Ill control o_ changes to manufacturing instructions,
control
• !•_ of specification change notices, participation on the change
.i review board, and maintenance and control of component lists.
-I18-
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iF" Total responsibility for these functions can easily be
[ - - transferred to o CMO group without hindering or affecting
k
the effectiveness of the.cnginc.cring group.
The size of the engineering liaison group varied
;: during the A7LB program. The group reached a level of five
[ people during the Apollo and Skylab development phases.
) During these periods, new aocum_--ntatlon was being generated
" ! on the new model suits while concurrent changes were occurring
_. _t on existing operational models. The group was reduced to
_ [, " one man during the later part of the contract. It is
_, _'. estimated that a transfer of responsibilities to other
groups would result in a net reduction of 40% of the manpowerF
; _! level required during the A7LB program. That is, the five
! people required during the Apollo Program could be reduced
to three people, with one remaining in engineering and two
:" reporting to CMO. During the operational phase, the level
"r [,
could be further reduced to one person in the CMO group.
_ GUIDELINES FOR FUTURE PROGRTW._S:
_ i Expand the responsibility of the CMO group to perform
.,_ L change activity functions which are normally performed by
_ the engineering group.
., [
t.
, [
; t
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Ir" FIGURE 4.4.6
°.
%
J REASON FOR ELA2SED
" QUALIFICATION ITEM QUALIFICATION DATES TIN_ (_._O_T.IS)"'_
[" A7L PGA Mission C 1/25/68 7.0
8/29/G8
|'" Fluorel Boot Soles Qual new material 8/1/68 1,5
9/19/68 -) ..
,- A7L'PGA Mission C Prime 10/15/68 0.25
10/22/68.
A7L PGA Mission D 11/12/68 1.0
F 12/12/68L_
A7L Lunar Surface Mission G 2/4/69 4.5
,'-" 6/12/69
I
L_rge Wrist Disconnect New Requirements 3/13/69 0.25
r" (Apollo ll) - 3/17/69
. " .
Arm Bearing .New Requirement 4/24/69 0.24 _
[ (Apollo i!) 4/29/69
Boot Bladder Flight failur_ 1/9/70 0.25
I (Apollo 13) 1/14/70
|- Arm Assembly and Redefinition of 9/22/70 0.75
EV Glove (Apollo 14) Cycle requirements 10/14/70
I
I Redesigned Thigh Qual Failure 12/3/70 1.5
Convolute (Apollo 14) 1/14/71
i- ATLB PGA Mission J 9/21/70 9.0
" (Apollo 15) 6/25/71
i A7LB PGA New Requirements 9/3/71 5.75
. ' (Apollo 16 & Skylab) (Young's Rocks) 2/21/72
• SL Boots and SEVA .
i Total Period- 49 months
I Total Time in Qualification Testing - 32 months
Calendar Time in Qualification Testing - 29 months
I • ""
d ! --
i .
" l '
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5 1 TITLE :
Traceability System
?
_ OBJECTIVE:
' In To determine if a reduction in Quality and Reliability
i, manpower can be realized through an evaluation of the_
,. Apollo/Skylab" traceability system.
• : I APPROACH:
_ -
o ;
An evaluation of the traceability system has been[ -
_ ° performed by the use of flow charts to determine if modifications
J
_ can be implemented to reduce pape_ork and manpower without
i affecting systcra capabilities.
BACKGROUND:
[i The traceability syste_ was a manual Identification <
and Data Retrieval System meeting requirements of NPC-200-2
: and is described in Flow Chart QI"
L The in-house documentation center, which contained
_ the trace data, was also used as the central CEI file.
t 1 It was the historical filing center, maintaining copies F
of all field generated TPS's and DR's, and functioned the !|
1 same as field sites in that delivered end items could be )
processed in-house for rework and retrofit through TPS
i I and discrepancy reporting systems. This system also provided
L-.
trackin 9 of Class II as well as Class I changes. The
I Documentation Center utilized full-time traceability/(
_ documentation clerks, documentation group leader, and a ,_
I documentation engineer• In addition, 23 inspectors, 5 _
[" technicians and several quality engineers spent a significant
amount of time related to the traceability system (approximately
10% for a CEI delivery rate of one every three days).
PROBLEM_
i A $1gnificant amount of manpower was required to
3'
, maintain the traceability system. --
%
,J,
- !
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BACKGROUND:
.- i. Tile system developed from a standard quality *
\ trace system and reliability data center :
r-_ (Ref. NPC-250-i) to one of providing a total _
L
historical/verification capability.
i Ref. Flow Chart VI - As the flow chart indicates, >
the contractor quality documentation center
received all field data and maintained centralE CEI and historical files. This required several _
" . traceability/documentation clerks to receive, j_
file, update and store data. The Q & R department
provided this manpower° These manpower requirements
could be reduced if the task of filing, storing o
and retrieving data could be assigned to a
Central Data Department. Q & R would still be
responsible for verifying data being received !
E by the centr_l department.2. Parts and materials were not categorized. This /_
requiredthe tracking of many non-critical parts
L or materials. "_
All parts and materials used on CEI's were
[ °treated equally with regards to material trace .!
requirements. An evaluation of past d_ta has _
i_ shown that approximately 25% of the items need
not have been traced past receiving inspection.
'_ I" Identification of critical and non-critical items i
i _'- must be completed as early as possible in order _
i. to effectively reduce all non-critical trace
" data during the production phase of the contract.
" However, evaluation has also revealed that even
I with criticality definition, the traceability _
' flow (Ref. Flow Chart Q1 ) structure under a manual[
[_ i .system can not be improved. The remaining trace
of parts/materials would still require a closed
_ i loop system such as described in Flow Chart QI"
i A 25% decrease in trace requirements will be
_ I _ significant in respect to time required to
-130-
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w_
L_
¢" transfer, log, accumulate, cross-post and file|
L " data.
%
_ An early establishment of a Critical _)arts
[ List would also be invaluable to quality engineering
in performing vendor surveys, especially for those
f_
' items that are long lead-times or sole source to
assure they are fully dcceptable to meet long
|-.
I_ term requirements of the contract. This would
• greatly reduce the probability of production
[" downtime and schedule impact due to vendors'
failure to meet full-term contract commitments.
4" 3. Several different methods of tracking traceability
I: data were used. This included shop orders,
proprietary inspection route sheets and fabrication
inspection route sheets.
Different forms, utilized by manufachuring,
i required various methods of tracing data to meet
traceability requirements. Shop orders were
f _ used by model and machine shop personnel to _i
I record _ac_ data where the drawing was the means
of cor_trol for fabrication and acceptance_ :_
Fabrication inspection route sheets were used
by all other production azeas for acceptance and!
i.-': trace, except the dip room, where fabrication _:
and acceptance _as accomplished with the Proprietary
_ Tables of Operation (T/O)
- Regardless of the method used to fabricate '
_ {o and accept components, subassemblies or CEI's, a
t
uniform method should be established as early as
_ possible for meet all. trace requirements. A
[ reduction would be realized in filing because
I three different formats would no longer be4
; [ required. Retrieval would be easier because
. there would be one system index. This system
I would eliminate the overlooking of a revision to
::_ _ , any of the forms as a result of a CCA; i.e.,
! changing the drawing and not the shop order.
(
I
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4. Retrieval of data was time consuming because of /F"
, the vast amount of parts and materials being traced.
\ Development of a matrix for a continuing update
[+ capability for al]_ parts/materials combinations
and permutations proved to be impractical.
[_ %'he situation could be alleviated by reducing
[: the number of items requiring traceability
,-- beyond receiving inspection and a single
_. fabrication acceptance format.
. It is anticipated that sufficient quantities
i_ of critical items will still have to be traced.
Therefore, a cost trade-off study of a manual
I+' versus computerized system should be undertaken.
++ 5. A procedure was never established to identify who _
i--! _ould request data. ,
t
This resulted in a ccnsiderable amount of
[+i overtime over the years in order to retrieve
[ data and to prepare matrices and charts for data ;_
comparisons. Overtime _as often z2quire0 to
L + perform normal daily duties that could not be _
performed as a result of requests for trace
* [ +
[. data. Some requests for data by contractor and%
NASA was either previously requested or of a
[ (
[.+ non-critical nature. Quality and reliability ;
personnel were handicapped in scheduling quality +_
I data center work as any request for trace data
by NASA personnel was normally afforded top
_ , priority. While advantageous to have a :+
I- }
i contractor provide this service, it is also !i
, costly to NASA under a manual system. A procedure ++
I should be generated to control traceability
Z ! access in order to reduce the possible non-critical
i [ or redundant data requests. The requests for _!
' data are often related to a specific problem
i but various departments require different
,_ information. If the requests were funneled
e _hrough one sourcc, the necessary information
, could be retrieved efficiently.
--132--
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C_. P,1i" RECO;,DIEh]D:I.:D I:UTE;R]'_ _,U] z PROGRAI ._, ;',IgTItOD :
GU IDEL INi':S:
,: - Method I - manual system, Str_oamline pro._;ent
i!|- traceability syctc:m by reduc:i:_.9 requirements and transferring
some tasks to a centralized data center.
_i.[_' The advantages would be reduction in manpower
" requirements, a reduction of paperwork and a faster retriew._l 5
:i:[" capability. _i
I_ Using a centralized data center fo_: filing and sto_-Jn 3 !
::-V; trace data, quality assurance will only mon_.tor and verify
_[; trace data incoming to the een_er. This will require a
full-time QC representative in central data system or seve]:&l ;_
_I" representatives having this duty as part of their overall
function. Class II ECO info_.-mation will not be traced.
_':I'_:: This will resu].t in a smaller fabrication inspection route :
sheet system which will reduce the quality representa%ive_._
} [ verification time as well as paper work requiring filing i
and storing, Future prograw, s should have a specific '_
, procedure for how and who may request traceability data
i in o_'der to reduce manpower requirements for attaining
%
non-essential or redundant requests for traceability data. :,
[ The traceability requirements should be established.
This baseline _ould include information required for such
Ii ,
i ' events as to support design studies, malfunction investigations,
, material review board activity, defect analysis and unsatisfactory _
i reports corrective actions. A system could then be
.I
" developed which could be satisfactorily operational with a
_. minimum amount of changes.
RECO_IENDED GROUND RULES FOR _NUAL SYSTEM:Ii
i! [ I. Mus_ function under NPB 5300.4 document.i 2. Non-critical parts are not to be traced past
_ receiving inspection.
':. 3. Central data center will handle all filing,
" storing and retrieval of traceablity data and
_. will verify data. ,.z
-_; 4 All trace data _._ to be recorded by a single ._
!I system.
_le 'i! ' 2-133- _ :
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_" Method II - Computerized system - if the future "_,
_ f contractor has access to computerized system, this could
..... reduce the traceability manpower requirements sub._:tantially.
: The computer cou]_ be proguammed to follow guidelines
_. identified by trace flo¢l cbart QI"
The advantages, other than a reduction in manpower
f-
[ requirements, would be faster retrieval in response to any
requests for data and less control on who may use this
T'
I service. Class £I changes may still be tracked without
• additional •.anpe_:er requirement&. As-built configvratJons
f-: can be compared £o as-authorized configurations anywhere
i. in the production process.
r" GROUND RULES FOR COMPUTERIZED SYSTEM:
I i. Compliance with NHB 5200.4.
2. Quality assurance must have effective cont_'ols
_i:I [" to verify all data necessary to rneet requirements.
3. The contractor must have central data center to
f
i. handle all filing and storing of data.
4. All trace data is to be recorded by a sir : e
f
! system of reporting.
!
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5.2 TASK TITLE: IL!i
i Inspection and In-Process Verification
OBJECT__VE :
[ Reduce amount of d'.._;cre]_an'cypa_er, inspection
• manpower and p__'oduction de::n-timu.{
,- APPROACH :
[. Evaluate present system of production, inspection and
: discrepancy re'pol-ting to identify major problems that resulte6 :
: in defects, production down-time, excessive inspectJ.on time
• and overtime. This evaluation will concentrate on the
•- in-process fabrication and testing acceptance.
i
BACKGROU_D: ',
:- Apollo/Skylab suit inspection system met requirements !.
: _ of NPC-?00-2. It was implemented to assure a product qua].ity ii.
_ cunsistent with the level of confidence necessary for a I"
< L
man/space rated system. I
[ The inspection and testing system was designed to [
_ i assure that end items met a]l ore-delivery acceptance criteria, i_
Quality established a very detailed inspection system•
' Components and sub-assemblies were inspected at every point !.
whe,-e characteristics could not be verified at a later
operation. Some components and most sub-assemblies were not
i
:_ teste_] until after integration of C,_.I. These component/
' ' sub-assemblies had to meet strict inspection standards since
= _ test failures affected shipping schedules, fabrication of new
asse-_blies, overtime mnd malfunction reports.
Quality inspection was required to maintain the "
,%
production flow under this system of 100% quality inspection
verification. Inspection manpower could not be reduced
by delegating portions of inspection to manufacturing,
because defects may not have been detected until CEI testing.
Then investigation at the CEI level for cause and corrective '_
- action at the component/sub-assembly level would have been '_
difficult, or impossible and would have had greater impact !_
i;
on manufacturing scheduling, i
. The normal ratio of inspectors to production operators !
J, was approximately one to eight. This caused an inspector to
:_ -135-
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i have a:_ malzy as seven or e'J.ght d[f_-erent articles to inspezt
: at one given period. This resulLcd in manufocturin 9 down- i
" time awaiting the return o_ tb.e artJ.cl,_ from inspection.
' Even tLot,sn production flo,.:_'as set--up in an assen_;ly line
•
sequence, many times an opereto_ _ had not_,.i_:g to _e unt_ 1
the article _._as returned by inspectien. Approxj_,ately ,
: 90% of all in-pxocess inspection was of an in-line n_-ure.
This meant that the inspection wos acc_;mi,lis:hed while the
! {
: _ : article was being fabricated and only 10% of inspection :I -
occurr<:d at article's completion. This added a considerable :
"t
amount of (additional) flow time to fab._'icate a complete
sub-assen_b!y or component.
. Articles presented to inspection which were of a
non-conformance nature req_ired the initiation of a reject
! tag. It took an average of one hour to write, process
and accept disposil-ion, for each reject tag befol-e an
article could be processed to the next fabrication step.
_n the last four years of the program, approxim;_tely
30,000 reject tags were generated. This averaged out to :
" one inspector writing two reject tags per day. There were
1,600 material review board actions in the last four years
which required an average of four hours to evaluate the
cause of problem and the corrective action to preclude the /
t
[ recurrence. A large amount of the time involved quality,
_ design, manufacturing and government engineers to satisfactorily
process material review board actions
: _ PROBLEM :
I. Lost production and program time due to the amount
: of in-line inspection.
_" BACKGROUNE .
A. Due to the lack of capability to adequately test
components and sub-assemblies separately, in-line inspection
became an absolute essential. No other method would assure
that the components or sub-assemblies met all acceptance
criteria for end item use until final testing and acceptance
of completed CEI.
%
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This was a costly method of assurance. De)egakion
of even a ._:mall percentage of acceptance characteristics to
{ manufacturing was considered unacceptable since qual__t-y
assurance was charged with the respon_;ibi iity of fin,
• item acceptance to assure design reliability. _
One way to reduce in-line inspection on future
contracts, without sacrifice of confidence in the end item, _,
is to design components and sub-_ssemblies for testing and
' acceptance at the component and sub-asser._J!y level. This
_" will allow a reduction of production down-time by decreasing
{' the amount of in-line inspection required. Delegation of
l various in-process inspection responsibilities could then
,; be made to manufacturin C _ersonnel. In order to delegate ,'L )
i inspection responsibility, operator cert_ficatS.on m_,_-;tbe
• implemented. It must be made a part of the hiring practice
that a person must be able to be certifiable. All tools
required to insure good quality from the operator must be
i made available to insure that any poor quality is not the fault
of management. (Example- detailed manufacturJ ng specs,
' %
' : discrepancy feed back to operator level," proper equirment,
incentive and motivation. }
Only critical inspection for component/sub-assembly
acceptance should be performed by quality personnel.
All manufacturing inspection will have to be monitored on
a scheduled basis as an audit function of Quality engineering.
This will also provide a check of operator's certification
- status.
" Any test failures, resulting from poor quality on
an operator's part, would require an immediate re-evaluation
- of operator's certification classification. _
It must be clearly understood that under an operator
%
certification program, defects may occur which will affect
component acceptance testing, the same way as defects
affected final CEI testing with 100% quality inspeciton.
Schedules would still be impacted by sub-assembly or ::
component failures, but not to the degree of a failure
encountered on completed CEI' s.
-137-
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• The system ,re,st be established to produce th< sac,r:
confidence level, under delegated inspection on the sub--
[
asse:1_uly level, that existed _.;ith 100% inspection on the
complel-c,] CEI level. This fs an absolute neces._;ity, or
, mal,uf,_ctu_ii,%'s c_Ltiflcation creditabi!iLy will be qu(n;tioned
in evaluatior:s of ma!f1_nctJon reports, single point failures,
etc. Once an (malfunction or defect) analysis se_;iously
questions this metho0, of insp_,?tion, no a_o:u_.t of explanation
will ever remove this as a possible cause of defect or
; malfunctions. A corrective action to implement 100%
inspection at a componcnt/sub-assem_!y level would occur
very quickly, eliminating any reduction in costs.
ProJuction cycle time standards allowed 12% of total
flow time for inspection during fabrication. This figure
: actually amounted to approximately 35%. This system a!Io_.s
a certain percentage of opurators to present items to
inspection when an inspector has several items to inspect
in order to create some free time before their it_m is
returned. Coupled with down-time for rejections this created
an increase in the production cycle.
II. Quantity and time required to process discrepancy
paper_ork.
A. Sampling of discrepancy reporting paperwork
over the length of the contract has revealed
several significant facts.
i. 25% to 30% of discrepancies written were of
a minor nature or cosmetic requiring no
" further action•
2. 35% to 40% of discrepancies written were of
. an obvious non-conformance nature requiring
scrap, rework or repair.
3. Remaining 30% to 40% were of a nature that
required design engineering interpretation
as to scrap, rework or material review
board action for "use-as-is" or repair
not covered by authorized repair procedures.
I
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LAs stated before, approximately 30,000 reject tags!
' _ were generated eve_ the last four years of the program.
' ' It is very significant to mention that the four years
: , previous to A7I,B/fikyl_b produced nearly _lice the amount of
t reject tags (approximately 60,000). A significant reduction
r in the total alaount of rejects can be attributed to advancement
j of the "state of-the-art" and accumulation of past history
to evaluate reject tags without as much design interpretation.
i This evolutionary process must be considerably shortenedU
. if any cost reduction efforts are to be realized.
Evaluatlon of effectiveness of reducing non-conforming
• L
paperwork, defects and positive disposition ability has shown
_ !" that quality could not be built into the product especially
after fabrication of first article qualification unit.
': i Dispositioning of non-conformance by manufacturing
and quality engineering, was very difficult without continuous
_ aide from design engineering. All manufacturing specifications
!
i were of a general nature which gave inspection very few
_ guidelines on what was rejectable and what was of a minor
' nature, not requiring generation of non-conforming paperwork.
i
Specifications lacked definitions to allow manufacturing
! engineers to make decisions effecting disposition of non-J
conforming items. Inspectors had to reject everything of
, a questionable nature, because there were insufficient
* guidelines for them to accept minor conditions. This resulted
, in a production delay while evaluation was being made.
i. Design engineering was reluctant to change acceptance
criteria after the suit was qualified. Recurring sou-
l conformances were dispositioned "use-as-is" but specification
6t
_L changes for future articles were rarely changed. Design
! engineering rationale was valid, in that multiple changes of
acceptance criteria would effect the design and reliability
I of the previously qualified suit configuration.
i
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Obviously defects occur. It is the amount of defects,
: . reporting methods and disposition of non-conformance that
. .. have significant program " ", _.imps.eL Unless effort is
, . applied in the earliest design stages to evaluate these
: problems, the most effective Quality tool _Cost Ruduction"
cannot be adequately utilized. Areas for this evaluatic_n
[ are (i) accurate tolerance study to set realistic] t - o
: .... manufacturing tolerances, instead of creating tolerances
: _ tthat exceed safety margins, (2) establish specifications that
_ ' "" _ allow manufacturing engineering to make positive dispositions
: "i
,o /of non-conformances, (3)evaluate all potential cosmetic and
' I minor defects to determine those that will not require
• .generation of discrepancy paperwork.
t
, The above tasks require sufficient manpower loadingi.
during the design concept of f]ture programs. Well defined
C _
l
i goals must be established early in the program to realize
a long-term cost reduction program.
_ RECOMMENDED FUTURE SUIT PROGIh_M METHOD:
GUIDELINES GENE}L_L: •
: Early involvement by Contractor's, Manufacturing an_
Quality departments is necessary. All previous causes of
non-conformance paperwork, detailed in-proces_ inspection,
i Manufacturing Engineering's ineffectiveness in decision making
and excessive design engineering involvement during the
production phase will not be significantly improved unless
Design, Manufacturing and Quality Engineering, together,
i- establish realistic goals to form a solid foundation
. that will assure the most efficient means of operation.
_ GUIDELINES SPECIFIC:
_" A. The Manufacturing specifications aDd.procedures
: must provide the Manufacturinq Engineer with
the capability to evaluate and disposition
non-conformance. Manufacturing and Quality
' Engineering must be exposed to pre-production
fabrication methods.
/
-140-
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A basic cause and affec£ analysis of discrcpancie_
Y
' encountered during the desion phase will serve :[
as a solid base for establishing disposition of
future production non-conformances. Manufacturing
and Quality Engineering will have an opportunity
; to observe and evaluate pre-production fabrication, •
l
' and working with the design engineer, determine
: realistic production acceptance criteria.
¢
' Manufacturing engineers, aided by Quality and
, . Desi. _, Engineers, will collect data necessary to --
b
; I generate the basic manufacturing specification that
will be used during the production phase.l
_. Specifications will be designed to allow updates -
for actual production pxoblems as they are !
_ encountered..
• This will result in the ability of the Manufacturing
Engineer to evaluate the majority of non-
conformi£ies encountered during the production
phase _ithout continued aid from Design Engineering. •
This will also reduce the "design interpretation" •
¢
i category of reject tag_, which represented 30 to
40% of total discrepancies.
L
Manufacturing specifications add procedures must
classify defects. Major and minor defect
. classification plays an important part in the
production phase of the product. Failure to
establish the defect classification during the
design phase of the product will produce wide
range interpretation of accept/reject criteria
during the production phase of the program.
Inspectors will reject any products not specifically
•" covered by specifications or procedures causing
delays for evaluations and disposition of questionable
rejects.
t
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[ T1]ero is no v:ay to idcntify and categorize all
\ possible defects du]:ing the design phase of the
r- product, fief'e, howevcr, cosmetic or minor
i conditions not requiring rejection, minor
'. [ defects dispositioning and major defects
i requiring complete engineering involvement, should
be evaluated. The eflort for improving the!
I manufacturing specifications and procedures for
use must be inJ.tiatcd during the preliminary
[" . i_
i design stage. This should result in significant
reduction of rejects involving "cosmetic" and
,f other mJnor conditions which represented 25 to
_' 30% of all rejects.
(--
! Manufacturing specifications and procedures must
r provide workmanship standards to guide manufacturing
_ and inspection functions. Many times acceptance
criteria cannot be expressed as a tolerance. Inf
I these cases, pictures or sample items of what I
constitutes an acceptable condition are preferrable
] ij to _._ritten criteria. Even when acceptance is
i, t I:
expressed by a tolerance, visual aids are helpful
; I for comparisons.
L
I This should result in better awareness by manufacturing
; operators to acceptance standards; it will also
D
,,, _ reduce the amount of non-conformities presented
_ to inspection. This will reduce the "obvious
- defects" category which comprised 35 to 40%
_ "" of total reject tags and decrease inspection
interpretation of acceptance/r_-jection criteria, i_
i
' The contractor must expand the Operator
Certification Proqram. This guideline would be [i_
_ most effective if acceptance testing is implemented
at the subassen_ly level. This concept n-u:_t be
applied in order to confidently delegate certain
?
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[, quality acceptance criteria to other departments. _
-* This Operator Certification Program must be a
_ L.( probation period to properly evaluate whether _i
an invidivual can meet the certification
requirements. To be certified, they must be
_ [_ capable of using all tools provided to insure a
Quality product. They must be capable of reading
• i" and understanding all manufacturing specifications
_ and procedures pertaining to the product such as :
E " Table of Operations and drawings. They must.,display more ha just the ability to perfoxm 5
_ fabrication operations, they must show a Quality _
! L_ awareness. Diligent pursuance of this program i
_ w_ll produce a reduction of up to 60% of in-line :
[_ inspection which will result in less down-time
waiting return from inspection, also a significant
; [" reduction of obvious defects which comprise 35 to
_ 40% of all previous defects, and a reduction in _
! Quality inspectors required to support production.
|
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r 5.3 TITLE:
L ( Pyoduct Assurance Organization and Manpower Summary. _
i OBJECTIVE:
Evaluate the management systems utilized for the
_. control of Quality, Reliability and Safety during the
i Apollo, Skylab and ASTP suit programs. Using guidelines
reconuaended in paragraphs 5.1 and 5 2 r determine projected
I manpower savings.
APPROACH : .
The Product Assurance organization and operating
procedures used in support of the Apollo, Skylab and ASTP
svit programs were used as a comparative baseline. Guide-
%
lines discussed were used to project recommended manpower
to support future suit programs• i
GROUNDRULES USED FOR STUDY:
i. The Product Assurance organization for the period
1970 through 1973 was used as the study baseline.
Primary emphasis was on manpower reduction.
(" 2. The proposed Product Assurance organization was
manloaded to support the program schedule shown
in section 3.4 (see Figure 5.3). :;
3. Compliance with NASA document NHB 5300.4 :
was assumed to be minimum assurance requirements
for future programs.
DISCUSSION:
During the period utilized for the study, 1970
through 1973, the _arious assruance functions, Quality,
i "I Reliability, Safety were continually being subjected to
organizational changes in order to most effectively optimize
manpower utilization, As a result, ILC had formulated the
Product Assurance approach of confining the overlapping
i
I or redundant functions of Quality, Reliability an_ Safety.
1 _his general philosophy is reflected %n the proposed
manpower requirements for future suit programs without
I attempting an in-depth evaluation of all Assurance disciplines.
(' _
- !
I ' ?
/
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I' 1The specific studies (Paragraphs 5.1 and 5.21 presented inr"
; .-. _is report were those areas which displayed the mo_t significant
X cost savi,,gs potential. Flow diagrams were constructed of
_i the past and the proposed procedures and the resulting
_- manpower deltas. The manloading of the .970 to 1973
!- organization was based on an average 1/5 production rate.
[_ In order to properly compare these organizatins, the production
[. rate was factored to reflect the estimated levels of manpower
i_ requized for a 1/20 production rate. Comparison of these
two programs revealed a total'manpower savings of 436 man
t months.|_,
I
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[" 6.0 TITLE:
_ " Organization and Cost Summary i
• OBJECTIVE: . _
Evaluate the entire program management, engineering
%
and quality organization which existed during the Apollo,
[. Skylab (ASTP) and ASTP suit programs. Determine the overall _
manpower savings resulting from the implementation of all :
f- : y
| the guidelines reco_nended for future suit programs.
L--
APPROACH: ..
! _- " The ILC program management, engineering and quality
_" organizations which supported the Apull0, Skylab (ASTP) and
_ _- ASTP programs were used as a comparative baseline. The
guidelines identified in Sections III, IV and V were used to
formulate the recommendcd manpo_J_r required to support a _[-
[, future suit program. The resulting summary of manpower
savings was then determined by a comparison of these program
management organizations. ?
DISCUSSION:
[-" As a result of this study, the following major
guidelines were recommended for use on future suit programs:
J
Ill i. Place emphasis on qualification of subassemblies
rather than the entire spacesuit assembly.
[! 2. FACI the first production item rather than the[ qualification item.
3. Qualify to the CEI wozst case mission requirements
_ the first time. _,_b_ ........_I_L_, ....t ,.,-/....._ %_a_'
.,.,,._.: .. ,_ •....._ .i':.."_ .'._.'/f..A"_'_.< ..,_ _,..,,.,
4. Reduce the drawing requirements by using _ :::
• _ _*.:_Z manufacturing instructions for configuration
• Qcontrol. "'7"_:_...."'_"
|_ 5. Reduce 100% in-process inspection and--replace it
[_ with component and subassembly acceptance ,
6. Allocate sufficient time early in the program to
develop efficient systems and procedures.
7. Perform astronaut fit check at the user's site,._^>
_ 8. Streamline data reporting requirements and centralize
L the data collection system.
-167- _ _
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[" 9. Consolidate program management control functions.
_ The manpower level required to support a future
F program utilizing the recommended guidelines was then compared
_ to the level of manpower required at ILC to support the
Apollo, Skylab (A7LB) and ASTP suit prog_s during the
period 1970 through 1973.
•he ma_loading of the 1970 through 1973 organization
[_ was based on an average 1/5 production rate. In order to
compare these organizations, the production rate was factored
_" tO reflect the estimated levels of ma_)ower required for a
L 1/20 production rate. Comparison of these two programs
revealed a total manpower savings of 1565 man months d_ringa four year period if the recommended guidelines are followed.
: Figure 6.1 illustrates the recommended suit program manloading.
I
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tL_
[_ A7LB-100006 Torso Limb Suit Assembly, Integrated JA7LB-100007 Torso Limb Suit AssesL_bly, EV J
i k ,k.. A7LB-109023 Knob & Shaft Assembly, Diverter Valve D !
r_ A7LB-109025 Mounting Plate, Diverter Valve D
_ [._ A7LB-109017 Mounting Plate, Gas Connector D
_. A6L-104025 Gage Pressure Dial Indicating D
9
I A6L-104035 Mount, Gage D
" A6L-104034 Ring, Back D !_ _ 7 B-109029 Wrist Disconnect, Suit Side, Left :
I A7LB-109029 Wrist Disconnect, Suit Side, Right DI" A7LB-109010 NeckRing,SuitSide D
• i [: A7LB-109013 Mounting, Ring Neck D
I A7LB-101189 Upper PLSS Attachment Assembly C
° A7LB-101190 Bracket, Attachment, PLSS C
!_ _. [" "A7LB-101191 Bar, Attachment, Connector C
° I • A7LB-104084 Arm Bear Assembly D
i I A7L-104046 Seal, Wiper C :
'_ A7L-104060 Ball, Port C
'I {_ A7LB-104092 Race, Inner E
f
, A7LB-104130 Outer, Race Assembly, Arm Bearing D
_ I [" ATL-104076 Spacer B
_|_, Four - ST Drawings B :
! One - MS Drawing A
< I A7LB-104135 Ring Retaining, Convolute Arm Bearing D
["i A7LB-104136 Tab, Locking Arm Bearing C
i [_ -A_B--10q-2.0 -3 S-t-_i_>-Asse mb_y-_ ae_ E '
: _I_-]_ 302 S_r ip_--Ba se--_i_2--(Pattern ). C i,
_ [_--_ _4YI-_ Pest_-St_?-Assemb_-y,---Tor so D
i -A2LD------_ 2 F_%s_-ener--_apeT--Pi-l._-Entrance-Z-_ppe r E ....
'_ I" Four - ST Drawings B ,_
i [ A6L-101017 Flange, Outer, Electrical C
i A6L-101016 Flange, Inner, Electrical C
-A_l_>l-i 35 Thig h-Cab ie_-Gu id st-Patch-As sembly- C
I', _%6L-4_03 Guid_r-Cord-_- B?
L_ TWO - ST Drawings B :
-A6L_IO4018 Cover-Strip Assembly ,-.Wrist-- B _.
" .A_T.-!040!8 Tape & Webbiag--Reinforcement-. B '"One - ST Drawing B _.
=A6L-10!044 ,, Washer-r-Gromm.e,_t-- B
< I'" A7LB-101155 Tube, Waist Cable Guide C ..
i L, A7LB-109018 Housing Assembly, Inner Gas Connector D
A7LB-109020 Spring Gas Connector B
",_ ATLB-109038 Ring Clamping & Multi H20 C :i
_i "_= Su-._w-r-Ned i_f.ied----- D ':¢
. -___7L_- !__!285 S_r-ilmr-Base-4-7-_.P attern.) - C ._
li TWO - ST Drawings B
[i
[.i
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"'j
, . +'" , ........ _ +
+ i2 "w •
+" A7LB-101226 Cable Guide Assent]y, Rear
I k++ A6L-101045 Plate Mounting B
A7LB-101225 Tube, Flared Cable Guide C :[i 'TWO - ST _rawings B
+ _ A7L-101035 Plug, Water Connector D[i "Y P " A7LB-109016 Housing Assembly, Outer Gas Connector,Inlet D
A7LB-109016 Housing Assembly, Outer Gas Connector, i
Outlet D !
[ A7L-101116 Base Plate, Shoulder Cable Connector C
A7L-101117 Cover Shoulder, Cable Connector D
ATLB-101229 Terminal; Swaging Cable C :
[_ .A_74_B__.i_2+35 R_ve%_7_ e __! e r-_e_t-r_in_t+ --Re_r--Neek B
A7LB-104095 Ring & Cable Guido Assembly, Shoulder E i
A7LB-104140 Ring & Cable Guide Sub-Assembly,
{ii Shoulder EA7LB-104105 Ring Form D i
A7LB-104097 Angle, Reinforcing C
{_ A7LB-104096 Tubing Guide, Shoulder Assembly C _A7LB-104106 Support, Swivel C
A7LB-104094 Washer, Thrust C _
A7LB-104102 Shaft, Pulley C
I! A7LB-104103 Shaft, Swivel C
|+ A7LB-104094 Washer, Thrust C
i+ -+-. i.7LB-104101 Bushing, Clevis C
I A7LB-104100 Clevis Pulley Assembly C
-A_LB--I-04_98 ----Pu-l-l_q_-A_emb-lY7 -e_l_-- C
A7LB-104128 Pulley Cable C
Three - ST Drawings BF
Four - ST Drawings B
Four - AN Drawings A
--ATLB-10!!55 Pu_-ey--AseemblyT--W_i__-- D '_
I_ A7LB-101197 Pulley & Bearing Assembly, Waist D +_
tJ A7LB-101164 Cover, Pulley Assembly, Waist LH C
A7LB-101160 Clip, Pulley Assembly, Waist LH D
|" A7LB-101165 Cable Guide C +_i
L• A7LB-101199 Screw, LM Restr. Attachment B
- A7LB-101157 Bracket, LN Restr. Attachment B ._
I ATLB-101167 Weldment, Pulley Assy., Waist LH D_' +_ 9 Pu ley & Bearing ,i
Two - ST Drawings B
"i " One - MS Drawing A
" ATLB-101197 Pulley & Bearing Assembly, Waist C _
• A7LB-101165 Cable Guide C _. +.
I A7LB-101160 Clip, Pulley Assy., Waist RH C i[ +:_+_
+ A7LB-10164 Cover Pulley Assy., Waist RH D +_
• ATLB-101199 Screw, LM Restr. Attachment t !
1" ATLB-101157 Bracket, LM Restr. Attachment C _4_ _
+I ,, 1 '
: L,;
........ .. ,.++_.+
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I"
....... _, :;_i:_.O]llliqlll;tltihanO]|hni_m,_._ _ L"_ | II | ,.
4
I -_ A7LB-101167 Weldment, Pulley Assembly, Waist RH D I
Two - ST Drawings B _i
._ k.. One - MS Drawing A ! }
_ [" A7LB-108038 Sleeve Plenum , Mtg. Diverter Valve C !
L. A7LB-108038 Sleeve, Plenum, Mtg. Diverter Valve C 4
-_ A7LB-101122 Bracket Assembly, Neck Turn Around RH C
- A7LB-104106 Ferrule, Guide B
_.. A7LB-101123 Bracket, Right Hand D
A7LB-101124 Tubing C _'
.... Two - ST Drawings B _
A7LB-101122 Bracket Neck Turn Around LH C
Assembly,
--_ A7LB-104106 Ferrule, Guide B
,,±
A7LB-101123 Bracket, Left Hand D "
! _ i%7LB-101124 Tubing CTwo - ST Drawings B
-_9_=B-q4)415 _ C_y_"cr _ __._i_:yT--Fn_eu-ld...... t D
[ "4_;B-_-S44_i - P at%_ rn E
L _v_£. -- _L._ ,
_/_B-LS4_ Pa_-%crn - E
[°i Two - ST Drawings D--A7LB- !0 _! 53 .......Co_r--Aseemb_5_r-Shou%de_--R_ght- D
--A6/=-14)90_I Loep--T_pe_d "_-f-ie_ B
[_ --A_LB _i_70 Pa __tern B
li Two - ST Drawings C
--A2LB_A_0OA_ ..Leb_l--As_ em _!_._a_g C
[__r.- -A_LB_I40 4 Pa t-_r-n-- C• Four ST Drawings B
A7LB-101182 Lock Assembly, Restraint Zipper E
l_ A7LB-101183 Housing, Lock, Restr. Zipper E
--Aq4_-I0119 _- Tab Ass_, L.oc__-Lock C
A7LB-101184 Tab, Lock-Lock C
A7LB-1011P5 Pin, Lock-Lock C
-! A7LB-101214 Bushing, Centering COne - ST Drawing B
A7LB-101186 Strike, Zipper Lock C
L A7LB-101187 Plate, Spring Retainer C253 in, Slider, Moun ing ._
. A7LB-101256 Housing Lock, Restraint Zipper E
: Three - ST Drawings BTwo - MS Drawings A
A7LB-108018 Inlet & Torso Plenum Assembly D
" A7LB-108020 Plenum Gas Connector Tnlet D
I_ A7LB-108021 Plenum Torso Duct C
,"#_' " , "_S 802 5 Pa_ _er-.n--- D
_' [ A7LB-108022 Spacer Assembly, Torso Vent D
I',
.l[.i
[i
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i, --It7!.!_--!C_70 29-- Fastene r-$_."-4-1>rUpp_ z_ Wr-i_ t E
"-A-7LI3-L_70@"' F_._:e:: "" " ' " "
I
k --I_77,';-15.7.05)0 /_act_Au& c_:_J!}:-,__U'.'ppc__A_m_C _n e D
--;_7i.-9c707-6 I,_,-4-c.-- .__
r , . ,
i --AqL--] F,'0.'5 .Pattcxn--- C
,- One - S'ffDrawing E
°I T I
-A-,.,B-._:_0 5[, . 2,1it er.£I__ E
,:' -A-7L B--I-Z-7056 P-,n_L._r_-,-- E
-Ag_B--I Z7056 i'e.ttez-n EI .
--_-7LB-_I_-704 _ 4'e_-te?:-n- D
f ----9_7bZ--!C=7050 -P<]t% e z_-- D
' --A7LE -!Cq-0-5/9 -Pc t% ._.r-n D
--A-7LB--I$7 065 P aEt_r _ C
-.-__7LB--I-S-706 G P_ h-t_r-_&- C
--A:_L-B-% 5-7G6:7- P -_-t_er-r C
, -4_ LB-jLS-7_6_ 4:_t-t_er_. C
--A?LB-_IC-7 0.52- 7a t_er_ D
I " -A_LD--I_P,J- _-- Pa _er4%- C
_ I=P_!_>7C_3l-- P _.d--A_e _,_ly7--Sheuld er D
=J%7L---.I_7_;12 Pa_ter n D
!- --_-L--I-S70 69 Part or n C
I One - ST Drawing B
' --A/LLB _20 29 F_s_ene_-_-S t_'/_-Low_p/--_q_i st E
--_B-_I2 9 . F_._. nc_-S/.r-i_r-TOr_,_ E
!
.-_LB---I-S7-0 6_- P_-t ern C
A.7LB--2__,_32-- Comf-or.t---P_d--Aaa_ ._l_-r--Knee D
_-A_'..:-__.-wo--3.! Pattez-n C
,_,,- ,,-d_ Pa-t_be__,_- C
One - _'9 Drawing B
--A_=B-q4_ 7433-2-- -Com_]._t--.na_--A_sem}>lq_der_r4_ D
t. --A_LB-q4_70 @0 .Rat_oz_n- D
-A_B--I_7_7_)__ P at_n D
!
I One - ST Drawing B
' | --AT 5B----..,l_7--0-3.2 Pad-As c--em_ly-w-G<)._r-_h D
--A-7-_B--q-7,-7-0-7-9 _-'a-t-t--e-r_ C
--A_LB_ISI-O 8_- Patt_n C
=. One - ST Drawing B
_--A-TLB --l-Z-7-0 _ 7 Pa4_t_-m,-- C" -A_LB_ 1Z-7078 _-Pa_e.v-n -- C
. -A_B_6-1 Pa_-_tcrn- E
, --_- 0_02_9 -- _as tenez_-S_, Neck E
1 --A-TL_-I $7049 -----Patter-_- -- J
.--- A2-LB--1-.S-7-94 9-- - _a£te_ J
-AqLB--l_qq4)gq. Pa.bter.n. C
I
I
,' 7"Y_
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[ _A_L B--I0-_0 34 Str_ p_-UC T_k-Ue sc__etaining C I
i -A-7LB- 107035 Ch in .i_adr-Linex-_A ss:_nhl), C I-4_7LB-157099 ...... P_tter-n-- Cr_ --A-7J_B-.IS2100 d)atter_. C
_. One - ST Drawing B
: -A-7LD- IC7052 P_tern .... D
•-" U--A-7-I:,B--tZ-70 -5-5 Pa t-tern E
Fourteen - ST Drawings
B
-_213 F_ stc ner--St r.i.p-A_c_-mbl_ Neck C
Five - ST Dra_.,ings B
---Aq-_B--Iq)12-1-2 Guid e--Assemb!_ ,_F-Crotch-eab{ e D
[-- --A6!_ 1S10 I-5 P0 bt-er_-- B I
-A_LLB-q-S-141-7 P._t_-e_n- C
." --k_qLD---ISI41&... Pat_tern C"_wo - ST Drawings B '
ATLB-104085 Arm Assembly, Lower Left E
i" _t-5 7 Cenvoi_--As_em_bow E :
i• A7LB-104156 Convolute, Elbow D
Six - ST Drawings B '
F One - MS Drawing A
' _ -3 F ac_t_er--S%-r_i.pT-_r/_ -Lwr-_-L D
!• -A7-LB-_I041-2_ Re&_ laddo r-_k_sem_kv-,-_5 eft E
-Aq.LB- 1041-25 I',_str_--As_ embl_ur- "_¢_i__ e ft E
t- ---A_B--I-Z-._062. Pat tern--- D|
. ---A6L--1090 01. Tape_--Looi_, Medi f_ed B
--A_L--1S4004 Patter_ B
! Seven - ST Drawings B-A_434-I-24 Bladde_--Asseml_fT--W_:-i_t--C-one, L. D
A_r/% ......
-"A-7-£,5--J:Z-4-_,__ 'p _-_)-__"n D
--4_B- l_. OGI P _.t,gor-r. _ D1 Five - ST Drawings B
--ATL-_- !Z4O 48 Pn __prn . C
Two - ST Drawings B
" A6L-101044 Washer, Eyelet B
I.. Six - ST Drawings B
Two - AN Drawings "-_
.' A7LB-104085 Arm Assembly, Lower Right E
. -4_7_B--I_ 4!57 Ca_n_¢_la4_--As se_.ly-r--Blbow E
A7LS-104156 Convolute, Elbow D
Six - ST Drawings B
) One -. MS Prawing A
ii. ---A_LB_I$_I_3 Fa s tener--S t_i_-4_r is_--r-Lwr_- R. D
_B--I-0412-7 -Restr,--&---Bladd er--As seml>ly-r-4_i_ _;
I --W_LB--1-04_2.5 P,este._b_y_ Wrist C_n_ : Right E :
[ ----A_LB--IZ,:0 62- -. Pattern-- D _"
--A6L_ 10 9001 Tape_-Loop_-Modi_-_ed B
I --A4_--1S40¢ _ P at_r_ BSeven - ST Drawings B :,.
'/ ].
_ •
} ?
I
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I• -_--ATLB=I04124 . _Bladder _tls-_.eP_bly_,_._]/isl__ioilc,_P__ D i%
_ --A-_LB=J.Z4060 Pat_re.on__ D '_
: " _ n%qLB-IZ4061- Pahtern_ D
" [. Five -.ST Drawings B
, _A_LB- 1-Z_048 P-atter.n----- C i
L- Two - ST Drawings B
: A6L-101044 Washer, Eyelet B
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, STUDYTASKS=
t"
-" PROGR_'IMANAGEMENT
•" CMO
I GOVERNMENT/CONTRACTORMANAGEMENTREPORTS
ASTRONAUTFIELDOPTIONITEMCONTROL
• IMPROVEDCONFIGURATIONr_ AGEMENIMETHODS
4
BUSINESSMANAGEMENT
I_ ANALYSISOFCOSTDATA
BUSINESSMANAGEMENTSYSTEM
.'.
i
:• PROGRAMCONTPOL
MANUFAC]URINGDOCUMENTATIONANDCONTROLSYSTEMS
PROGRAMPHASINGPHILOSOPHY
• ,¢
_" , ENGINEERING)
' ' INTERFACEONTROLDOCUMENTATION
" CONTRACTENDITEMSPECIFICATIONS
;:: _ FIELDOPERATIONALDOCUMENTATION
,w_,.
_ ENGINEERINGORGANIZATION
,' ,.L
"=,
_. ; i QUALITY
_: TRACEABILITY
i] INSPECTIONA DIN-PROCESSVERIFICATION
_L_,,
• , i |
_j .J
,,; f"3
_,, ;n i
1975005463-214
,[; • ,,_11
1975005463-215
7.
L.
E PROGRAF'IM NAGEMENT
E
_i I) MANUFACTURINGDOCUMENTATIONANDCONTROLSYSTEMS,
[ 2) IMPROVEDCONFIGURATIONMANAGEMENT/CONTROLME H DS,
3) GOVERNMENT/CONTRACTORMANAGEMENTREPORTS,
[i 4) PROGRAMPHASINGPHILOSOPHY,
['," 5) ASTRONAUTFIELDOPTIONITEMCONTROL,
Li
E_
I
I
{.
!C-_
J
[
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r_
' ENGINEERINGDRAWINGS&MANUFACTURINGDOCUMENTATION _:
[!r _
L I'
.[: PROBLEM- OVER90%OFTHEDRAWINGSCONTAINEDREDUNDANT i '
• INFORMATION,
1) MANUFACTURINGANDINSPECTIONINSTRUCTIONS(TO'S)
Ii.i WEREUTILIZEDASTHEPRIMEINSTRUCTIONSFOR
m
- OPERATIONALPERSONNELRATHERTHANTHEDRAWINGS,
A, SUBASSEMBLYDRAWINGSENERATEDWERECOMPLEX
li ANDUNWIELDY,OPERATIONALPERSONNELHAD
DIFFICULTYUSINGTHEM,
I! B, DRAWINGSWEREPRODUCEDANDPARTNUMBERS
, ASSIGNEDFROMANENGINEERINGVIEWPOINT,
L . MANUFACTURINGREQUIREMENTSWERENOTGIVEN
,-. PRIORITY,
_
i 2) TO'SCONTAINEDALLTHEINFORMATIONONTHE
DRAWINGSA WELLASSUPPLEMENTARYINSTRUCTIONS
REQUIREDTOFABRICATEA SPACESUITASSEMBLY,
- 3) BOTHTO'SANDDRAWINGSWEREMAINTAINED--DUAL
¢ ,
i," CONTROLPROCEDURESa
L!
T
'
"19750054(33-2"I7
L_J |
"C" ' •
I" DATACOLLECTIONANDDISSEMINATION
I PROBLE/.];
I_
VARIOUSDOCUMENTATIONWASGENERATEDTUMEETCONFIGURATION
p
Z. ANDMATERIALTRACEABILITYREQUIREMENTS,
i, 1) THEINITIAL_IPHASISWASPLACEDONCONTROLLING
[: CONFIGURATIONANDTRACEABILITYFORSPACESUITSBEING
FABRICATED,
[
. 2) ASTHEPROGRAMBECAMEOPERATIONAL,ADDITIONAL
i'... REQUIREI,IENTSWEREENCOUNTERED,
L,
3) NEWDOCUMENTSWERECREATEDBY INDIVIDUALDEPARTMENTS
{
i.i WITHOUTCONSIDERINGUTILIZINGORMODIFYINGEXISTING
[_ REPORTS,
O
(
i
p,
1,
i,
Li ",.
]975005463-2]8
-]
"1C " i
.. RECOrD.GUIDELINES:
[, 1) DELEGATEAUTHORITYFORDATACOLLECTIONA D
' DISSEMINATIONT ONESPECIFICGROUP
I.
w
o
" 2) DETE_IINEASEARLYASPRACTICALWHATINFORMATION
WILLBEREQUIREDWHENTHEPROGRAMBECOMES
!i OPERATIOI4AL,
o
[i
3) FUNNELALLADDITIONALREQUIREMENTSTHROUGHTHE
l)
[] DELEGATEDGROUPFORoPTIMIZATIONOFDATA
rr- DISSEMINATION,
L;
!
!-
:i
t ] • -.,......
, !
Na5 t-
1975005463-219
EO PROGRAMPHASING,PHILOSOPIIY.
E II
ANYDELAYORREDESIGNDURINGDESIGNVERIFICATIONOR 1P
•_ QUALIFICATIONTESTINGHASA DOMINOEFFECTONTHESUBSEQUENT I
"PROGRAMMILESTONES,
1) DVTWASCONCURRENTWITHTHEFABRICATIONOFTHE
n QUALIFICATIONUNITANDQUALIFICATIONWAS
U PARALLELTOTHEFABRICATIONOFPRODUCTIONSPACESUITS.
2) "FINETUNING"CHANGESWEREINCORPORATEDIN VTAND
E_I QUALIFICATIONUNITSWITHOUTCOST RADE-OFFSTUDIES,
3) THEDVTANDQUALIFICATIONPROCEDURESWEREBASEDON
MISSIONREQUIREMENTSOFANENTIRESPACESUIT
ASSEMBLY,
E
° A, PROGRAMSCHEDULESWEREBASEDONTHEENGINEERING
DEFINITIONOFTHELONGESTDURATION,
E ,i
(,?
]975005463-220
4) THEDESIGNENGINEERSCOULD_IOTADEQUATELY
EG TRAINIHEPROJECT,MANUFACIURINGANDQUALITY
ENGINEERSPRIORTOFABRICATIONOFTHEDESIGN
VERIFICATIONSPACESUIT,
t
5) THESUITCONTRACTORANDTHEGOVERNMENTARE
INVOLVEDINWHATCHANGEISORISN'TFEE
" BEARINGDURINGQUALIFICATIONTESTING.
E
E
[©
C
[
m
E
C
_o!}
[l
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P
r" RECOMMENDEDGUIDELItIES:
t-C
F 1) ESTABLISHREQUIREDCYCLELIFEOFEACHMAJOR
'- SUBASSFJ,IBLYARMS,LEGS,GLOVES,ETC.AND
[i PERFORMCYCLEQUALIFICATIONANDDESIGNVERIFIC_TION
t _ _ .",,-."
, c, ,'2.-C " = "OFTHESESUBASSEMBLIESN ERIES.i_:"" '
r _
i" " 2) ALLOWENOUGHDEVELOPMENTTIMETOPERMITHE
" • DESIGNENGINEERSTOALLOCATETIMETOPROJECT,
- [, MARUFACTURINGANDQUALI_YENGINEERING.
[ 3) COSTTRADE-OFFSTUDIESsHOULDBEACCOHPLISHED
[ BEFOREINCORPORATIO;IOF"FINE.TUNING"CHANGES
INDVIORQUALIFICATIONUNITSONCEFABRICATION
!
I !'" HAS STARTED.
r
[i 4) PERFORMINGDVI"ANDQUALIFICATIONTESTIHGONA
[ . SUBASSEMBLYBASISALLOWSADDITIONALF EXIBILITY
- WHILEPERFORMINGTESTING.THUSREDUCINGDELAYS
['" _USEDBYQUALIFICATIONFAILURESOR
L,.
; UNANTICIPATEDD LAYSINRELEASINGACCEPTABLE
!" ENGINEERINGDEFINITION.
e ['
5) FIRSTAPTICLECONFIGURATIONNSPECTIONCOULD
i-
i. BEPERFORHEDUPONCOMPLETIONFQUALIFICATION
• TESTINGOFEACHSUBASSEMBLY,
/ ;
r'%
l
L: _I_
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[i " "
!
I
! " : }
' : i., IMPROVEOCONFIGURATION'MANAGEMENT
[_ . CONTROLS:.& METHODS ." . " J'i
• PROBLEM#1 - COMPLEXDRAWINGS& CONTROL
SYSTEMSEXISTED DUE TO MULTIPLE i
; " CONFI GURAT!ON CHANGES "
1) 115 DIFFERENT CONFIGURATIONSWERE
! -CREATEDC.NTHE ATL PGA DRAWINGS
, " _ . . o
_ 2) THE MULTITUDE OF DIFFERENT CONFIGURATIONS
. [_ ".. MADETHE DRAWINGSDIFFICULT TO INTERPRET
.
_ 3) IDENTIFICATION OF CONFIGURATiONDIFFERENCES
, REQUIREDTIME-CONSUMINGPAPERSEARCHES
_ WHEN CHANGES OCCURRED AT COMPONENT OR:- : " LOWERCONFIGURATIONLEVELS "
o
_- 4-) QUALIFICATION STATUS IDENTIFICATION WAS
i ... NOT READILY APPARENT
i _ 5) APPROXIMATELY50 cMO.-RELATEDIJOCUMENTS
., [._ WERE ACTIVE DURING THE SKYLAB/ASTPPROGRAM
[" 6) MANUFACTURING& qUALITY ORIGINATED=,,
- . ADDITIOI"ALDOCUMENTATION FOR TRACE
I. AND ACCOUNTABILITY REQUIREMENTS
• - •
o •
• " •
•I/ "
l
f
t
_ w ;" '
,=
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!I
, RECOMMENDEDGUIDELINES
¢t ."
I_ 1) IMPLEMENTAN AUTHORIZEDCONFIGURATION" " AND TRACE BILITY •SYST M_,'IHICH'IiOULD
CONSOLIDATEINTER-RELATEDMANUFACTURIHG,
1_ QUALITY AND CMODATA.
1 ; A) A PROPOSEDSYSTEM,WHICH IS INCLUDED
- -. • IN THE FINAL REPORT, SHOULDBE
[ . .." CONSIDEREDFOR FUTURESPACE SUIT -
- . • . " PROGRAMS
t - _ ":o " 'o.
_,-. .
-- _" * 2) UTILIZING 2-BASIC FBRi_ISTHE SYSTEMiVOULD
-'°.o
- "" " PROVIDE ALL NECESSARYCONTROLDATA WHICH
INCLUDES: • - !
• . AD VS. AB CCNFI GURATION
L " CLASSIFICATION '
, SIZE.
t. QUALIFICATION S nATUS . a
, INTERCHANGEABI L I "iY •
! .BILLS OF MATERIALS • ;t
DRAWINGS
[.. MOBKIT STATUS -
;' TRACEABILITY
! • DELIVERY SCHEDULE
.; o
o
I_ . • °
I
p-o
_ • .. °
W
• "_° °
..
2
'"' ' :'i," '
e_ -t ° ' "° ") "o',e "
•: ; .' , .. ,:.': . •
2 -.
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[!_i " IMPROVEDCONFIGURATIONmNAGEMENTCONTROLS/METHODS
[_ PROBLEM#2: INCORPORATIONOFACCEPTABLEALTERNATE
I PARTSREQUIREDFORMALCONFIGURATIONCHANGES,
[_ 1) PERTHECEISPEC,EACHCOHPONENTCOULDONLY
" BEREPLACEDWITHOTHERCOMPONENTSHAVINGTHE
" SAMEPARTNUHBER,
L, 2) EXISTINGSPAREPARTSWEREMODIFIEDORNEW
[ PROCUREMENTWASAUTHORIZEDBECAUSEAN
t
INTERCHANGEABILITYVEHICLEDIDNOTEXIST, _.
[-
,
!J
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1975005463-226
_o
_. RECO_IENDED6UIDELINES:
o
[ " A SYSTEMSHOULDBEDEVELOPEDTOIDENTIFYANDcONTROL
USEOFACCEPTABLEALTERNATEPARTS,
L
[_
n
I
[_
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U
!
F] GOVERNMENT/CONTRACTORMANAGB_ENTREPORTS
LC_
E
[]
Li SIMILAR EPORTSWEREPREPAREDBY DIFFERENTCONTRACTOR
GROUPS. @
o
E " I) MOSTREPORTSWEREUNCONTROLLED,REQUIRINGNO
,FORMALREVIEWAND/ORCONCURRENCEPRIORTO
RELEASE.
2) NO CENTRALDATASOURCE_ISTEDANDRESULTED
_-i. INCUSTOr,IERANDCOI_RACTORCOUNTERPARTS
• FAVORINGEACHOTHER'SDATA(CMO,ENGINEERING,f-
t OA,R,
I_ 3) _ACH INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP OF THE
l; SUIT CONTRACTOR CREATED AND MAINTAINED
THEIR O_:INFILES TO PERFORM THEIR DALLY
[i TASKS.
L'-; A. AT LEAST ii REDUNDANT FILES EXISTEDAT THE CONTRACTCR'S FACILITY. IN
" SOME CASES 50 DIFFERENT CMO-RELATED.
I
[ DOCU_;IENTSIVEREINCLUDED IN FILES.
B. REORGANIZATION& RELOCATIONOF INIEC,-
f-
1 DEPARTI_ENTALGROUPSCAUSEDMUCHDUPLICATION. .....
[ ! 4.) RANDOMDISTRIBUTION TECHNIQUES. THE
" ORIGII_ATORCF THE DATA IN I_,IAtlYCASES
[_ ESTABL;SHEDHIS O_,'JNDISTRIBUTION REQUIRE-LJ
( MENTS.
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[J-:(_
RECOI.IMENDEDGUI ELINES: -
UTILIZEA DATACENTRALIZATIONSYSTFJITO:
A. MONITORANDCONTROLALLDATADISTRIBUTIONS• l
• ° ) -
B, MONITORTHEDATAREPRODUCTIONPOLICiES.
C, UTILIZEONECENTRALDATASOURCETO INPUTALLNEWDATA, .
L
o.
[
E
MU ASTRONAUTFIELDOPTIONITEMCONTROL
F ........ " "
[i FIELDOPTIONALMODIFICATIONSRE ULTEDINCONFIGURATION
L
CHANGES,MULTIPLEDRAWINGREVISIONS,ADDITIONAL
f-
i_, , TRACKINGSYSTEMSANDMASSIVEHISTORICALFILES.
w
i
F o
1) APPROXIMATELY30FIELDOPTIONALITEMS
(FOI'S)WEREAVAILABLEINANYCOMBINATIONF
b TOTHECREWMAN,
[-r. 2) CREWMANGENERALLYSELECTEDFOI'SDURINGTHESUITFITCH CK, .....
L[.-_ A. TIMEWOULDNOTALLOWINCORPORATIONF R
VERIFICATION.
[i B. ONINITIALFIELDUSEOCCASIONALLYNEWFIT
PROBLEMSOCCURRED,
I! .
F 3) STANDARDFOI'SWERESHIPPEDASPARTOFTHE
L
, SUITCONFIGURATIONWHENNOTDESIREDBYTHE
I CREWMAN(VALSALVADEVICE,COMFORTPADS,ETC,),
m
[-
_ e
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u I-I
• !(_. RECOMI.]ENDEDGUIDELINES: . -
i) INSTALLALLFIELDOPTIONALITEI]SIN THEFIELD, _?
2) IDENTIFYANDCONTROLFOI'SATA TYPEIILEVEL,
PREPARETHELISTING'OFFOI'SASA TYPEI, ";
I! DOCUMENT _
A, DONOTMAKEFOI'SPARTOFTHECONTROLLED _
: DRAWINGSYSTEM, ;
3) PROVIDEFOI'SONLYWHENSPECIFICALLYREQUESTED .
[i BYTHECREWMAN, .
......-..........--T,--TT_
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' !
[._. CEISPECIFICATIOrIS 1"t,I: PROBt  :#
1. NUMEROUSCHANGESTOCEISPECIFICATIONS
, CEIWEIGIffCHANGES
.L SEPARABLECOMPONENTSREQUIREDCLOSETRACKING
F. - " EXCESSIVECHANGEACTIVITYOCCURREDDURING
PROGRAM
L , CREWOPTIONITEMS
• _DED THROUGHOUTPROGRAM _
[ EFFECTEDWEIGHTANDCREWOPTIONITEMLIST _.
L ICDT_UI.ATION _
CHAIIGESOCCURREDATHIGHRATETHROUGHOUT
I
L PROGRAM ,
- NINklNS.. ,
[ ALLOWSUFFICIENTSAFETYFACTOROHSPECWEIGHT i
F i!
DELETEREQUIREMENTTOREFLECTICDLISTINCEISPECS
i CUSTOMERSIGNATUREONICDSHOULDSUFFICE
T'
I
DELETECREWOPTIOI,_LISTFROMCEISPECANDCOIITROL
_.. BYOTHERLOWERLEVELDOCUMENT,
(
\
f,._
d
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-I
' ![ PRo L .I.• ,. ;_ !
F "
- _ EXPENSIVETOPREPAREArIDMAINTAIN "
[_ CONTAINEDHIGHLEVELOFTECHNICALDETAIL
- ILLUSTRATIONSEXPENSIVE
i :
!.II_ . ALLCLASSI ANDITCONFIGURATIONSMAINTAINED3 MODELSATONCE
I_ OTHEROPERATIONALDIRECTIONS(FOB'S,SSN,SRP) :_._
[ REFERENCESRESTRICTED -
[ -i
L SEPARATEANDDIFFERENTINSTRUCTIONSATDEPOTAND
f FIELD
I
' TO'SFORNEWFAB.
I. MMFORTEARDOWNANDREBUILD
r MMRESTRICTEDTONON-STRUCTURALEPAIRS •
t,
L.;
r CHANGEACTIVITYEXCESSIVE "
_" 1970- 1971,- 80CHANGESEFFECTING2378
f
PAGES,173ILLUST. i| i:
LEVEL-OF-EFFORTMETHODOFMAINTENANCE _
C i CHANGESDIRECTEDW/OREGARDTOCOST .i
I INITIALSTANDARD/,IAINTAINED ,_
,: '
• I
t
I
!
1975005463-240

I i1
i
E •
i
[_ _ =
[i _- _ ""
z
{ _ '-' ,,, ,_
l 1
l
t
l
1975005463-242
"i _'"
i
I_'s
k



E1975005463-'247
_ °
E
Ii _,.,
• e_'
_o
" LIE ,'i!
(
[.i
197_00_463-248
!If
I" INSPECTION& IN-PROCESSVERIFICATION
_" PROBLEM_ -
k AMOUNTOF IN-PROCESSDISCREPANCYPAPER,PRODUCTION :
"DOWNTIME"ANDMANPOWERREQUI:._DTOCLEARPAPERWORK,[,
F " 1) THETOLERANCESONVARIOUSDIMENSIONSWERE
"TIGHT"TOINSUREQUALITYWORkmANSHIP,
t-
2) 100% I NSFECT]ON WAS PERFORMED ON ALL ITEMS IN _
-PRODUCTION, , i
?
" 3) MANUFACTUR!NGE INEERINGWASNOTDELEGATEDANY
!
L RESPONSIBILITYFORDISPOSITIONINGA REJECT,
I' A, EACHREJECTAGREQUIREDANAVERAGEOFONEHOUR[. TOPROCESS,
[! B, MAJORANDMINORDEFECTSWERENOTCLASSIFIEDAND
INDICATEDONTHEINSPECTIONI STRUCTIONS
E :
w
i
L
f .
'_._i _;'__''_
1975005468-249
.--+i
__ _-_ .. •
b - +
( i PROGRAMGUIDELIIIES:
_ i,[", I) INSUREALLTOLERANCESAREPRACTICALPRIORTO
•! , i
"-"4 RELEASEOFDVTPRODUCTIONDOCUMENTATIOII.THE
+" ; E+ , RENLTSSHOULDI_EREVIEWEDAFTERDVT,AND
_,- ;_ TOLERA!ICESR VISEDASNECESSARYFORTHE ,
," J QUALIF-ICATION , J" : : UNITS
£:
" IL -- : :, :- :.
2):CLASSIFICATIONOFDEFECTS
+) [] 3) A MININI+IOFIN-PROCESSINSPECTIONSHOULDBE +>
:_;: PERFORMEDBYQUALI-TY.THEEMPHASISSHOULDBE
PLACEDONSUBASSEMBLYINSPECTIONA DTESTING. -
_+ It !
/
+ +.
: r . + 1
L I- ; +_+--" 4) BANUFACTURIIIGSHOULDBEDELEGATEDGREATER :-
_'" . 2
- .2
,< _ _. RESPONSIBILITYFORIN-PROCESSINSPECTION. ::
i
++,:-, .= 5) MANUFACTURINGE INEERINGSHOULDBE _++.
'+ RESPONSIBLEFORDISPOSlTIONINGMINOR++_
_'_"-I_ REJECTS.THISWOULDELIMINATEAPPROXIIIATELY
.> I 70%OFTHEREJECTAGS.
t ;+"
t
" L
J _[i -..
t2-
(, I_
• 1 ,_._'_,
-I
J
1975005463-250
!- . . . *
°,
r_
i.-. TRACEABILITY
F
r
L HIGHLEVELOFMANPOI'IERREQUIREDTOt'_INTAII'I
TRACEABILITYSYSTEII,
STANDARDTRACESYSTEI.}DEVELOPEDINTOTOTALo
-[" HISTORICAL/VERIFICATIONCAPABILITY,
F CONTAINEDALLFIELDAIIDEPOTTRACEDATA,
U
MANUALSYSTEI.ICAUSEDHEAVYMANLOADING,
_. CRmCALPARTSA_Dr_TERIALSNOTIDE,TIFIED."
L ALLI_TERIALSTREATEDEQUALLY
[ REVIEWIHDICATES25%IIEEDNOTBETRACED
L.
[_ VARIATIONINTYPESOFTRACESYSTEI'ISUTILIZED
(SHOPORDERS,PIRS,FIRS)F:
L! COMPLICATEDDATARECORDII'IGANDRETRIEVAL
I_ INCREASEDCHANCEOFERRORS
VARIEDANDREDUNDANTREQUESTSFORDATA
" RETRIEVALTIMECONSUI'IItlG
I TRACEABILITYI'.IATRIXNOTFEASIBLE .i
: I CAUSEDHIGHLEVELOFOVERTII'.IE
SOt,IEREQUESTSOFNON-CRITICALNATURE _,
C
I" NOREQUESTSYSTEI4ORREQUEST"CHAIN-OF-
t
• .( COFIIIA{ID"EXISTED "
1975005463-251
'I
I
L;
[ _ i
BETHODI. STREAMLINEANDMAINTAINA MANUAl,.SYSTEM _
RECORDALLTRACEDATABYONESYSTEM i
[_ IDENTIFYNON-CRITICALfIATERIALANDDONOT •
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